Judicial Reform in Mexico: a Comparative Between the Old and the New Process for Electing Judges

On September 15, 2024, after a controversial and rushed legislative debate, the most significant reform in Mexico's judicial history was published in the Official Journal of the Federation (DOF).¹ The primary aim of this reform was to replace all Mexican judges across the board—state judges, federal judges, and Supreme Court justices—and introduce a new "semi-democratic" system for electing judges directly by the citizenry. No previous reform has so radically transformed the administration of justice. However, numerous voices from academia, international organizations (including the IACHR and the UN), and the private sector have raised concerns about the potential dangers of this overhaul. 

The reform is so extensive that it’s challenging to focus on just one issue to highlight the problematic elements it introduces. It’s worth noting that the Mexican government admitted to having no prior diagnostic study for this reform. Without secondary legislation and regulations, most of what we know about it comes from the constitutional text and the calls to organize the first judicial election process. 

For this essay, I will concentrate on the election of judges, magistrates, and justices in the federal judiciary: first, how the system worked previously, then how it functions now, and finally, a conclusion about the implications on the US-Mexico relationship.² 

How Were Judges Elected Before the Reform? 

Before the constitutional reform, the selection of judges in the Judiciary followed a process outlined in the secondary legislation.³ This process involved three stages: a general examination of legal knowledge, drafting a proposed judgment, and an oral examination before a panel of senior judges, who would pose hypothetical cases to test candidates' decision-making abilities. 

The structure of the Judiciary promoted step-by-step career progression through civil service positions. Candidates would begin as junior clerks, advance to notifiers⁴, and become senior law clerks before qualifying for the judge position. Each position required a certain period of experience and completing exams or training courses. For instance, junior clerks, responsible for drafting routine procedural resolutions, worked under the supervision of senior law clerks, who prepared detailed draft judgments for judges to review. To become a senior clerk, one had to complete a year-long training program or pass rigorous exams to advance. Only after gaining significant experience and meeting strict requirements could candidates apply for a Judge position through a competitive selection process organized by the Federal Judicature Council (CJF), the judiciary's governing body. 

In 2019, several reforms were introduced to address gender disparities and adapt the selection process to emerging needs. Competitive examinations exclusively for women were launched to promote gender parity within the judiciary, representing a groundbreaking effort to increase women’s representation in high-ranking positions.⁵ Similarly, following the labor justice reform, specialized exams were designed to prioritize labor law expertise, allowing for the integration of labor courts—previously under the executive branch—into the judiciary as independent entities for the first time.⁶ 

To illustrate the pre-reform selection process, consider a 2022 call to fill vacancies for criminal judges in the adversarial criminal justice system.⁷ The selection involved several stages: 

1. Admission Exam: A 100-question multiple-choice test determined the top 60 candidates (42 women and 18 men) to advance to the next stage. 
2. Training Course: Candidates underwent a two-month intensive course at the Judicial School, with strict requirements. 
3. Final Evaluation: This involved solving a practical case based on a recorded hearing, where candidates demonstrated analytical skills, legal reasoning, and their ability to craft well-reasoned resolutions. 

The final score was calculated as a weighted average: 20% from the admission exam, 30% from the training course, and 50% from the final evaluation.  

However, while these formal requirements reflected a structured and competitive process, they were only part of the equation. Becoming a judge demanded intense dedication and a near-military level of discipline, particularly for those aspiring to positions like senior clerks. Handling caseloads efficiently and meeting statistical benchmarks required extensive preparation and experience, ultimately enhancing the expertise of those who entered the judiciary. 

That said, the system was far from perfect. Despite efforts to improve the selection process —shifting from rote memorization to more complex reasoning exercises that required deep knowledge of Supreme Court precedents— the judiciary faced persistent challenges. Corruption scandals, such as the sale of exam answers⁸, and widespread nepotism, were serious issues that remained largely unaddressed until recent years. Academia and civil society frequently criticized these shortcomings⁹, but meaningful reforms only began to take shape after 2019.¹⁰ 

How Is the New Process for Electing Judges? 

Under the new rules, selecting judges has undergone a radical transformation. There is no requirement for a public service career to become a Judge. They will be elected based on a "semi-democratic" election, which I will explain in detail below. 

The process began with the publication of a public call for applicants and the registration period.¹¹ Candidates must submit documentation demonstrating their eligibility, including a birth certificate, law degree, professional experience (if any), a supporting essay, and letters of recommendation. Evaluation Committees from each branch review the applications to ensure they meet the constitutional requirements, publishing an initial list of approved candidates. 

The Committees then evaluate the most qualified candidates and conduct a public lottery to narrow the pool to match the available positions, adhering to gender parity criteria. The results of this lottery are published, and the final lists are forwarded to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches for approval (with veto power to reject the list). 

Each branch reviews and validates the candidacies within its jurisdiction before submitting the final lists to the National Electoral Institute (INE). INE manages all election-related activities, from preparing ballots and materials to promoting voter participation and regulating campaigns. Election Day is scheduled for June 1, 2025. INE handles counting votes, computation, assigning positions based on the results, and issuing majority certificates to the elected candidates.  

Although this process is framed as a democratic advancement, it is better described as a “semi-democratic” vote that falls short of being genuinely representative. While citizens cast their votes to elect judges and magistrates, the pool of candidates appearing on the ballot is not freely or broadly determined. Instead, these candidates are preselected through a filtering process by the branches' committees and elected not in a transparent process, limiting the public’s role in shaping the judiciary. 

This problem is particularly acute within the Executive and Legislative, where the dominance of a single political party allows it to wield decisive influence over the selection of candidates. This creates an imbalance, enabling the ruling party to impose its agenda on the judiciary and undermining judicial independence.  

Conclusions: What are the main risks of this reform for the US-Mexico bilateral relationship? 

Mexico's judicial reform, which establishes the popular election of judges, poses significant risks to the bilateral relationship with the United States, encompassing trade, security, and human rights. First, the politicization of the judicial selection process weakens the independence of the judiciary, generating distrust in its ability to enforce international agreements such as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and increasing the risk of trade disputes. Security collaboration, critical to combating drug trafficking and other transnational crimes, could also be affected if the Mexican judicial system is perceived as less trustworthy or influenced by partisan interests, hindering the exchange of information and resources. 

Given the constant flow of people along the border between the two countries, the human rights of migrants are a particularly sensitive area. Judges play a critical role in resolving cases related to detention controls, expulsions from the country, and amparos for detentions that exceed legal limits. With a judiciary weakened by the massive replacement of its members, the capacity of the courts to address these systematic human rights violations could be severely compromised. 

Internationally, this reform could also be seen as a democratic setback, damaging Mexico's image as a reliable partner and affecting broader strategic agreements. These risks weaken the bilateral relationship and aggravate both countries' social and humanitarian issues, especially in migration. 

[1] See: https://www.infobae.com/mexico/2024/09/03/senado-avala-aprobar-fast-track-la-reforma-al-poder-judicial-de-amlo/

[2] I’d first like to clarify a distinction that has been largely overlooked in public discourse: Mexico's judiciary operates on two distinct levels: the state judiciary and the federal judiciary. The state judiciary handles first-instance cases, such as divorces, inheritance disputes, and criminal cases, while the federal judiciary primarily oversees amparo lawsuits, acting as a constitutional reviewer for alleged human rights violations. Unfortunately, these critical distinctions and disparities were not adequately addressed in the recent judicial reform, and these differences should be explained in depth in another post.

State judiciaries faced significant challenges, including insufficient infrastructure, underqualified judges, and politically influenced appointments. In contrast, the federal judiciary enjoyed stronger guarantees of independence, a merit-based selection process, and better training. However, the amparo trial, originally intended as an exceptional mechanism, had become a de facto third instance for constitutional review, accessible mainly to those with sufficient resources.

Despite their differences, many states had modeled their judge selection processes after the federal system, implementing competitive exams to improve meritocracy. The federal judiciary's stronger development resulted from reforms like the 1994 constitutional changes under President Zedillo, which established a judicial career service and greater budget autonomy to meet international trade commitments, such as NAFTA.

Unfortunately, these critical distinctions and disparities were not adequately addressed in the recent judicial reform. A comprehensive approach that considered the specific needs and challenges of both the state and federal judiciaries could have resulted in a more balanced and effective improvement of Mexico’s justice system.

[3] See: https://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/lopjf.htm 

[4] This position is responsible for notifications and actions of the court and used to be the first position in the career civil service.

[5] See: Here is a summary of this policy which is an example for all judiciaries worldwide https://www.scjn.gob.mx/premiogeneropjf/acerca-de.html   

[6] See: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5655889&fecha=22/06/2022#gsc.tab=0 

[7] See: https://escuelajudicial.cjf.gob.mx/v2/Publicaciones/ConcursosOposicion/2022/JuecesPenal/Convocatoria.pdf

[8] See: https://www.reforma.com/vendia-examen-evaluador-de-jueces/ar2390233   

[9] See: https://contralacorrupcion.mx/web/magistrados/   

[10] See: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/los-claroscuros-de-la-presidencia-de-arturo-zaldivar 

[11] See: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5741185&fecha=15/10/2024#gsc.tab=0