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THE GLOBAL SETTING AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY:
PRELIMINARY CONJECTURES

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ABSTRACT

The Global Setting and Transition to Democracy:
Preliminary Conjectures

Exploring the global dimensions of democratizing potential at the state level is, at once, an elusive and complex topic. It is difficult to establish convincing causal linkages. At the same time, the interaction between the global setting and national political development involves a plethora of elements difficult to assess in terms of their relative importance. At the same time, the clustering of regional and subregional tendencies toward and away from democratization lends substance to the contention that the global setting is an important element in any adequate account of the course of political development for any particular country.

Thus, our concern with global setting is partly a matter of achieving a better understanding of prospects for, and obstacles to, the realization of full democratizing potential at the state level. It also feeds into the policy-forming process of a country such as the United States which contends that it favors democratizing tendencies in foreign societies.

The following paper mainly considers, and elaborates upon, nine guidelines for policymakers dedicated to the promotion of democratic potential:

1. State actors, except in extreme instances, promote democratization best by agreeing to respect the dynamics of self-determination by refraining from intervention in the internal affairs of foreign societies.

2. Demilitarization initiatives on all levels seem conducive to the promotion of democratic potential.

3. Publicity, censure, and withdrawal of the symbols of legitimacy by impartial international actors in response to authoritarian abuses generally contribute to the mitigation of authoritarian practices and to progress toward democratization.

4. Delegitimizing interventionary options within the domestic arena of hegemonic actors is of great importance.

5. Promoting normative activism in global and transnational arenas with respect to the protection of human rights generally encourages democratization.

6. Selective easing of short-term economic burdens by way of debt relief, extension of credit, and foreign aid encourages democratization.

7. Critical scholarly and journalistic appraisals of the failures of antidemocratic regimes and the successes of democratic governance in relation to proclaimed goals may encourage democratization.

8. The emergence of a new international economic order that equalizes North-South relations and that strengthens the capabilities of all states to achieve self-determination would increase democratic prospects.

9. Transforming structures of world order in the direction of establishing the will and capability to protect global, as well as national, interests would generally work in favor of democratic prospects.

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PRELIMINARY CONJECTURES

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Introduction

In a fundamental sense, democracy is a matter of degree, necessarily an evolving process, beset by setbacks and apparently constrained by the complex forms of labor specialization at all levels of social organization. Simone Weil's arresting observation establishes a baseline of sorts for an inquiry into democratizing prospects: "What is surprising is not that oppression should make its appearance only after higher forms of economy have been reached, but that it should always accompany them."[1] Obviously, this is not the place to consider the aptness of this sweeping generalization, except to assert its underlying relevance to this more modest inquiry into democratizing tendencies in their contemporary global context.

Even such a constrained undertaking is, perhaps, too broad to be very helpful. In any event, the objective here is to underscore the importance of this direction of assessment, and, as well, to erect a few signposts. It hardly needs stressing, I suppose, that little prior work of a general character has been done on the relevance of global developments to democratizing prospects. The emphasis of such earlier work that exists has been on "domestic factors," "case studies" of particular countries that may incorporate foreign influences, and on "world system" constructs that proceed from a characterization of the whole ("world") to an inference about the political makeup of the part ("state"). Most efforts to specify "linkage" have been outer-directed, as in Rosenau's work, getting at "the domestic sources" of foreign policy. My emphasis is on inner-directed linkage—that is, on "the global sources" of democratizing potential at the state level.

At the outset, also, is the troublesome question of the viability of the enterprise itself. The causal connections seem argumentative rather than demonstrable, much less demonstrated. To some extent the answer (or evasion?) is to await "further research," especially in the form of empirical studies organized around a framework that allows comparability and validation. In the meantime, such an inquiry as this proceeds by way of intuition, anecdote presented as example, and the construction of certain plausible-sounding conjectures that appear to explain, or give insight into, patterns of political drift. In effect, then, the objective of analysis is to formulate some hypotheses and to make a tentative case for taking seriously the relevance of global setting to democratizing potential at a given time.

This notion of "democratizing potential" also deserves a comment. It is selective in relation to the overall drift of national political development. Indeed, with greater plausibility, given the militarizing of politics at all levels of social organization, an assessment of global forces contributing to antidemocratic or authoritarian state tendencies can be undertaken.[2] One of the reasons for considering democratizing potential as a focus of inquiry arises from normative or policy preference, raising the possibility of enhancing democratizing potential by policy recommendation or even by direct action. The most immediate meaning for democratizing potential has to do with increasing the accountability of governmental leadership to the people by way of "free elections." Such a core sense of democratizing potential is connected closely, however, with a wider set of standards, values, and rights. It is helpful to conceive of democratizing potential in plural forms, especially corresponding to capitalist and state socialist patterns of governance, but as associated with two clusters of normative criteria:

(1)   the extent of protection of human rights, including rights of the person, satisfaction of basic human needs, and participatory rights;

(2)   the extent of realization of collective rights, including national self-determination with respect to political independence, territorial integrity, and social, economic, and political autonomy; arguably, but less firmly established in positive international law are rights associated with freedom from the threat of "illegal warfare" and from environmental decay.[3]

It may be worth exploring a "values" approach to democratic potential as an alternative to this emphasis on "rights." The advantage of rights is that established governments and political leadership have generally acknowledged the validity of the normative claims, thereby providing a juridical foundation for insisting upon the realization of democratic potential. Such a foundation has, for instance, been used by Soviet dissidents to ground their political demands on a legal base previously endorsed by the Soviet government. The advantage of values is to provide a coherent normative framework that encompasses global as well as statist considerations, a coherence responsive to the increasingly integrated reality of political behavior. The work of the World Order Models Project is illustrative.[4] Both of these conceptions of democratizing potential are more comprehensive than usual. The mainstream emphasis is upon minimum rights to be free from state abuse and to engage in political activity by way of discourse, parties, and elections; generally, as well, democratizing potential is connected with civilian rule, secure evidence of recurring consent by the governed, a tolerably free labor movement, and reasonably reliable protection for minorities who suffer from traditions and structures of discrimination. In popular usage, the image of democratic potential is more of a two-way switch or threshold between authoritarian and democratic forms of political order; in other words, one or the other condition pertains to any particular polity. For the purposes of this paper, however, the idea of degree of democratization is essential, especially to capture the drift that is occurring (and might be encouraged) within an essentially authoritarian antidemocratic political framework.[5]

The relevance of the global setting, as a hypothetical matter, should not be difficult to establish even if it is hard to measure. Surely patterns of governance seem to cluster in time and space in response to a play of social forces larger than the particularistic mix of factors in a given country. That is, there are transnational waves of "liberation" or "repression" that engulf or virtually engulf entire regions within a few years of each other. The spread of liberal democratic ideas in Europe after the French Revolution is illustrative, as were the various revolutionary uprisings of 1848. The patterns of developments in the Southern Cone from 1964 to 1975 are surely suggestive of an antidemocratic regional wave, as has been the outburst of revolutionary nationalist movements (1978-present) in Central America. It hardly seems persuasive to contend that coincidence of time and space reveals nothing more substantial than a similarity of circumstances in a series of separate countries. Indeed, such an explanation proves too much, as it undermines the stronger claim of national distinctiveness, namely, that specific national endowments and configurations largely shape the democratic prospect on a country-by-country basis.

At the other extreme, there is little to comfort international determinists who assert that a given condition of national politics inevitably follows from a given global or regional or subregional set of circumstances. The variations in democratizing experience from country to country suggest that distinctive domestic factors are indeed influential.

Systemic Orientation

Very summarily, there are two main approaches to the study of global linkage. First of all, there is an attempt to specify the relevance of the world system, or its regional or subregional counterpart. That is, global structures of inequality and hegemony seem correlated to democratic potential in important respects. For instance, the current obstacles confronted by Solidarity in Poland or the Front in El Salvador seem, in significant part, to involve the hegemonial roles of the superpowers. These obstacles are more numerous and formidable than the ultimate threat of military intervention and occupations along the lines of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or the U.S. intervention in Guatemala in 1954. Such hegemonic patterns yield reasonably strong probabilistic propositions relating to outside interference. Movements toward democratization in certain regions will be opposed to varying degrees by fairly predictable patterns of intervention, often facilitated to the extent possible by support and encouragement for antidemocratic rulers or factions internal to the particular society. But the degree and form of external opposition may be decisive. For instance, if the hegemonic actor is otherwise preoccupied (Soviet Union in Afghanistan), recently defeated in a comparable endeavor (United States shortly after Vietnam), lacking in effective capabilities to project specific military forces (United States in Iran, 1978), or widely opposed by internal and external political forces (current opposition to outside hegemonic uses of force in Poland and Central America), then the prospects for democratization seem enhanced as there is greater inhibition upon more blatant types of intervention. That is, hegemonic patterns structure predispositions, but do not by any means assure a given outcome, although even if not finally controlling, hegemonic elements, as in Vietnam, made the eventual outcome much more "costly" for all actors involved.

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Also, even from a normative viewpoint, democratizing tendencies that erode hegemonial patterns may not necessarily be desirable on balance.[6] For instance, if the efforts to inhibit hegemonial intervention raise superpower tensions and increase risks of general war, then possibly hegemonial patterns, even if these result in stabilizing more authoritarian rule, should not be opposed beyond a certain point. Furthermore, the pursuit of democratization by radical means does not in each instance assure democratization--already, for instance, comparisons are being drawn between the Shah's tyranny and Khomeini's tyranny. Of course, it goes without saying that in certain circumstances the prospects of democratic potential depend on radical means (e.g., South Africa).

Actor Orientation

A second focus for inquiry examines the impact of outside actors in democratic potential. Of prime interest, of course, is the orientation of strategic actors toward democratization. For instance, Jimmy Carter's early embrace of a human rights diplomacy seems to have encouraged certain democratizing tendencies, both by liberalization of regime policies and by emboldening resistance movements in foreign societies. In this respect, there is a definite difference between the leadership and policies of the early Carter and early Reagan administrations relative to democratization abroad. Leadership shifts in key actors are a definite factor to the extent that international actors concern themselves with "stability" and "democratizing" policies.

An entirely different type of global actor arises from the transnational roles of religious bodies, labor unions, and political parties. For instance, the United States government's antidemocratizing policies in Central America have been restrained to some extent, it would appear, by the efforts of the Catholic Church and Western European social-democratic political parties to promote democratization, peaceful resolution, and nonintervention.

A critical, controversial kind of actor is associated with international financial institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund. These actors have particular leverage over the governing process of countries that are heavily indebted or seek credit lines from the IMF. Antidemocratizing effects have been attributed to the IMF's insistence on tight-money and fiscal austerity, thereby interfering with social programs for the poor, including even food subsidies. Not only do such pressures operate antidemocratically to the extent that they deprive people of satisfaction for their basic needs, but they indirectly encourage reliance on paramilitary approaches to internal security because austerity of this type stimulates militant discontent. Again, the wider policy context is not without ambiguities. Supporters of the IMF approach point to sound development policies as being eventually beneficial to all, or argue that without austerity outside capital sources would dry up, thereby causing even more severe austerity, more "illegal" manifestations of opposition, and more antidemocratic forms of rule.

Then there are transnational actors, so-called nongovernmental organizations with an explicit democratizing mission. Amnesty International is illustrative. Here, by means of persuasion and adverse publicity, specific

political abuses are challenged in particular societies--for instance, torture as a practice, or the incarceration of specific political prisoners. The campaigns of Amnesty International have undoubtedly saved many lives and mitigated the sufferings of others, but it is generally difficult to assess their overall causal impact, partly because target governments rarely acknowledge bowing to pressures of this sort.

Finally, mention should be made of international political institutions at the regional and global level. Certainly, it is widely believed that the United Nations, assisted by the Soviet-bloc countries, accelerated the process of decolonialization in the non-Western world. The United Nations may also have helped to create a climate which promotes democratization in southern Africa. In select instances, regional organizations also seem effective either where sanctions of some sort are available or symbols of legitimacy on the international level are important confirmations of domestic political status. Some experts have contended that the EEC promoted the redemocratization of Greece by its censure moves in the late 1960s and early 1970s, others that the human rights reports by the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights have exerted a moderating influence on authoritarian regimes, and have discredited such regimes.

Some General Guidelines

The purpose of this survey of "systemic" and "actor" influences on democratization raises more questions than it resolves. At least, it seeks to suggest strong grounds for supposing that, in interaction with domestic social and political forces, the global setting is definitely relevant. Yet it seems equally evident that these crude indicators of linkage cannot help us much with respect to scholarly concerns about the extent of relevance under varying circumstances of time and place, nor about prescriptive concerns relating to policy recommendations designed to realize democratization potential more fully. Too many factors are involved, secrecy and deception give us little access to the actuality of leadership perceptions, and different aspects of democratizing potential react in contradictory directions to varying forms of outside pressure.

Does this suggest abandoning the quest for prescriptive understanding of democratizing potential? Must we throw up our hands and get on with more modest, but "do-able" analytic and normative tasks? I think not. Even grasping the general contours seems like a step forward. To turn away from these concerns would, among other effects, reinforce prevalent cynical, militarist political orientations. It seems possible to set forward some general assertions that might help guide thought and action on the part of those who seek to promote democratic potential.

1. State actors, except in extreme instances, promote democratization best by agreeing to respect the dynamics of self-determination by refraining from intervention in the internal affairs of foreign societies. The ideology of nonintervention is, in general, the best available protection in the present world-order system for democratization.[7] Forcible "humanitarian intervention" or interventions on behalf of democratization, despite their pretensions, rarely seem capable of contributing, on balance, to these goals. Self-serving rationalizations by great powers often emphasize their commitment to democratizing potential as their chief motive for

intervening. Such rationalizations have lost their credibility as the effects of the interventions are generally adverse to democratization. In the contemporary context, consider the official stress on preserving the appearances of democratic governance in Vietnam by the United States during the 1960s, or Washington's justification of its anti-Allende stance, or the Soviets' insistence that their interventions in Eastern Europe over the years have been designed to preserve socialist democracy in target countries. Note, also, that these claims of benign intervention also purport, usually unconvincingly, to be reacting to prior interventions by a rival state actor, who allegedly has antidemocratic designs. The U.S. government's 1981 "white paper" on El Salvador uses the extent of the Soviet/Cuban connection with antigovernment forces as a basis for support of the government. Similarly, the Soviet Union has tried to justify its invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 as essential to neutralize prior external subversive efforts to build an anti-Marxist movement of rebellion. Creating codes of conduct to restrain the superpower practice of hegemonial diplomacy might reinforce nonintervention and self-determination norms at the point where the structure of power in international life and patterns of geopolitical conflict make them weakest. Severe instances of domestic abuse involving the threat or practice of genocide present such extreme normative challenges that the argument for intervention may, on balance, be persuasive--for instance, to remove leaderships such as Amin in Uganda or Pol Pot in Cambodia.

The nonintervention rationale loses some of its force with respect to regional and global actors entrusted with the promotion of normative goals. However, if regional actors are little more than fig leafs for superpower hegemony, then their activity is subject to most of the same qualifications as unilateral state action. Similarly, to the extent that the political organs of the United Nations abandon constitutional procedures under the pressure of quixotic majorities, their normative role is compromised in relation to democratization.

In general, norms of nonintervention are linked to the achievement of democracy and independence, as the nonaligned movement has been clear about since its inception in 1955 at Bandung.

2. <u>Demilitarization initiatives on all levels seem conducive to the promotion of democratic potential</u>. Other factors being equal, the militarization of international life works against democratization. In this regard, the scale of North-South arms sales and the type of military training offered is especially important. To the extent that transnational links strengthen the military sector relative to others, they may tip the balance of domestic forces away from democratic governance. Such an imbalance is likely to be of even greater significance if officer training programs emphasize internal political missions along counterinsurgency lines, and seem to encourage repression as a necessary element of the military's mission to provide for national security. Latin American elites were directed along these lines during the 1960s by their North American neighbor.[8]

Part of the dynamic of militarization is, of course, the style of oppositional politics. To the extent that oppositional forces deploy illegal violence, especially in the form of terror directed at civilians,

antidemocratic responses and justifications emerge, often winning wide-spread popular backing. If these violent disruptions of domestic order are further perceived to emanate, even in part, from external adversary sources, then the pretext for repression is further strengthened. The tactics of the ultra-left in Latin America and the foreign policy of Cuba in the early Castro years are illustrative. Nonviolent mass demonstrations and movements, even if illegal in strict terms, usually give less reinforcement to antidemocratic tendencies. In fact, repressive leaderships often seek to provoke or stimulate revolutionary violence in order to lend an aura of legitimacy to counterrevolutionary terror. It is widely believed, for instance, that elements of the Shah's government started a fire that killed hundreds of civilians in an Abadan movie theater in the midst of the Iranian revolution both to frighten the Iranian people about religious fanaticism and to vindicate militarist tactics; the Reichstag fire is an even more prominent example.

Even strategic interaction bears on democratic potential at a given time. Arms-race patterns usually produce raised international tensions, contributing to a greater stress on "national security" considerations in domestic political life, including secrecy, surveillance, and the encouragement of militarist tendencies in foreign allied states.

3. Publicity, censure, and withdrawal of the symbols of legitimacy by impartial international actors in response to authoritarian abuses generally contribute to the mitigation of authoritarian practices and to progress toward democratization. All governments, even repressive ones, accept the normative framework of democratization and human rights. Indeed, the legitimacy of political rule is to some degree based on this framework. Hence, persuasive withdrawals of legitimacy are setbacks for almost any antidemocratic government and for its leaders. Short of this, even the prospect of losing legitimacy may inhibit governments or lead them to correct some abuses.

The swing of the Catholic Church in the last decade or so in relation to the political future of Central America has been of great significance.[9] For one thing, militants for democratizing causes enlist the support of Church officials, priests, and nuns. For another, such individuals become targets of official violence, creating ugly incidents. Such a dynamic generates transnational shock waves, as occurred after Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero's 1980 assassination in San Salvador, significantly eroding, in this instance, popular support for interventionary approaches on behalf of the existing regime that were being generated in the United States. The Catholic Church has considerable weight in relation to the symbols of political legitimacy in the United States, especially in relation to developments in predominantly Catholic countries. In this regard, U.S. public opinion is without any fissures when it comes to lending support to Polish democratizing prospects despite increased international tensions resulting from confronting the Soviet Union within its primary sphere of influence.

Even the Reagan administration has tried to couple its accelerated military assistance programs to informal commitments by recipient governments to the rhetoric of human rights and democratization. The Soviet Union habitually claims that its interventions are motivated by the need

to rescue democratic socialism from antidemocratic threats, abetted from abroad, reasoning not dissimilar to that used by Henry Kissinger in The White House Years to justify U.S. efforts to destabilize Allende's Chile. Notorious dictators like Pinochet or Marcos periodically promise elections, liberalization, and the like.

Of course, the nexus between legitimacy and democracy debases political discourse, generates meaningless propaganda on these issues, and emphasizes the importance of relying as much as possible upon actors with reputations for prudence and impartiality. In the last decade the United Nations has lost much of its moral authority on these matters because its votes of "censure" seem arbitrary and selective, motivated to a considerable degree by partisan political coalitions. Some regional actors have fared better, and essentially private public-interest organizations have done the best job of all, but their vulnerabilities are often a consequence of the limited size of their budgets and the "partiality" and "sensitivities" of their funding sources.

4. <u>Delegitimizing interventionary options within the domestic arena of hegemonic actors is of great importance</u>. Despite the formal mantle of approval routinely conferred on democratic governance, the real attitude of political leadership toward democratization in key state actors, especially the two superpowers, is of great importance. The issues here are partly pragmatic, partly normative, and partly a spillover from other domestic political outlooks.

The general proposition can be simply illustrated by the chilling impact of Vietnam on interventionary diplomacy during the 1970s. The pragmatic case involves the acknowledgment that military approaches do not work in the face of determined nationalist opposition, that United States prospects for influence may be enhanced, not diminished, by accommodating various movements of national revolution in the Third World. Such a pragmatic approach also often puts forward the view that foreign leaders are more likely to govern effectively if they enjoy popular support made manifest through free elections than if dependent on military rule. Thus, for instance, the promotion of human rights for a country like South Korea, it was argued, helps assure the stability of overall U.S.-Korean relations better than does a repressive style of rule.

The normative case involves stigmatizing certain practices (export of repressive technology, covert operations) as "wrongful" in official arenas—what the U.S. Congress attempted by way of Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act and by various moves to contain CIA discretion. The normative case came under heavy attack in the late 1970s as being "unrealistic" and as wasting "assets" needed for an effective foreign policy. It was claimed by conservative critics that the U.S. government needed greater flexibility to help its "friends" and hurt its "enemies"—that is, it needed antidemocratizing interventionary options.

The domestic spillover involves unintended foreign-policy shifts being mandated by elections decided largely on other groupds. Ronald Reagan's ascent to the presidency is illustrative. In no serious sense can it be said that Reagan was elected to revive interventionary approaches to the Third World, notwithstanding Norman Podhoretz's protestations to the

contrary. And yet neo-conservative support for an enlarged CIA mandate
and for less restrictive inhibitions on trade in the technology of repres-
sion work against promotion of democracy.[10]

In the background is the calculus of costs and benefits perceived to
result from democratization in a given country or region. The Soviet
Union is favorable to democratization for South Africa or Argentina, but
not for Eastern Europe. The perception of democratization is also relevant.
The Nicaraguan revolution took many steps to reassure Washington that its
victory in 1978 did not have to result in "confrontation"; the Polish
Solidarity movement has tried to convey a similar message to Moscow.
Beyond the reassurance is the question of feasibility. If antidemocratiza-
tion interventions fail or are very costly in terms of blood, treasure, and
prestige, then the inhibitions are likely to be much stronger than if a
small stash of money and a handful of agents seem able to turn a government
around, or over, without any very substantial foreign publicity.[11]

An underlying issue for both the United States and the Soviet Union
is the legitimacy of antidemocratizing foreign-policy moves. The issue of
legitimacy relates to overall political mood. It is quite unstable, wax-
ing and waning quite dramatically. There is no doubt, I think, about the
general conclusion that diminishing the legitimacy of interventionary at-
titudes and practices in hegemonic actors is of considerable relevance to
democratizing processes and prospects of Third World countries.

5. Promoting normative activism in global and transnational arenas
with respect to the protection of human rights generally encourages democ-
ratization. At present, there exists a formal commitment to the desirabil-
ity of democratic governance, including the protection of human rights.
All governments, regardless of other divergencies, have joined at a formal
level in building this consensus. As a result, it is possible to maintain
that modern international law reinforces the moral and political case for
democratization.

Such a consensus puts antidemocratic political leadership on the de-
fensive. Authoritarian practices and policies are justified, to the ex-
tent acknowledged, as a temporary expedient to deal with exceptional circum-
stances. Internal opposition groups and external actors can both invoke
this consensus to encourage democratization. The consensus leads external
actors, even those without much of a normative commitment, to indicate
that their level of support for a foreign government depends on some degree
of democratization. Even if this expression of concern is pro forma, it is
capable of creating a certain momentum for democratization, at least up to
a point.

Therefore, the further buildup of this normative consensus by way of
additional international agreements seems useful, as does improved fact-
finding mechanisms, reporting procedures, and the like that call attention
to progress and regress relative to democratization. Such normative pres-
sure seems consistent with nonintervention norms and respect for the sover-
eign rights of foreign states.

6. <u>Selective easing of short-term economic burdens by way of debt</u> <u>relief, extension of credit, and foreign aid encourages democratization.</u> Progress toward democratization seems connected with some degree of economic flexibility by national political leaders. The Western willingness in early 1981 to reschedule Poland's debt payments seems partly intended to moderate the pressure on the Polish leadership to crush the Solidarity movement. To the extent that the IMF and private banks encourage debtor states to invest to increase foreign-exchange earnings at the expense of a greater effort to meet minimum human needs, there is a political tendency to impose "discipline" on the popular sector, especially on the organized labor movement. A massive foreign-aid program of the sort envisioned by the Leontieff model, the RIO report, or in some of the writings of the Overseas Development Council seems capable of creating a moderate political atmosphere via the rapid elimination of mass poverty. Democratization is more likely to flourish in an atmosphere of moderation than in the context of crisis.

7. <u>Critical scholarly and journalistic appraisals of the failures</u> <u>of antidemocratic regimes and the successes of democratic governance in</u> <u>relation to proclaimed goals may encourage democratization.</u> Part of the antidemocratic pretext is a mixture of honest conviction and hypocritical pretension that repression is needed to save the country from its enemies, from socioeconomic chaos, or merely from the fractiousness of politicians. The military leaderships in Brazil or South Korea advanced claims that a certain amount of repression in the short-term was the necessary price of rapid economic growth, and pointed for a while to impressive economic achievements as confirmatory. The Shah of Iran reportedly told critics that when the Iranians behave like Swedes then Iran would be governed as is Sweden. In essence, such views maintain that Third World countries do not have the cultural disposition for democratization, at least not yet. It is important to examine these various contentions carefully. For instance, José Serra, in an important essay, effectively refutes the myths of economic efficiency claimed on behalf of the Brazilian alliance of technocrats and generals, and shows that much of the positive economic behavior of the country after 1964 was attributable to favorable factors in the world economy and that the imposed discipline had failed to fulfill one of its main promises, namely, the control of inflation.[12] An aspect of the partial redemocratization of Brazil in the late 1970s seems to have been a widespread acknowledgment that the economic benefits of antidemocratic rule had been wildly oversold. In contrast, it seems evident to some observers that the majority of the South Korean population seems acquiescent to dictatorship in the post-Park years partly because it evidently continues to accept the view that their nation's earlier economic spurt was a byproduct of repressive rule. In essence, then, critical social thought which both undermines the various rationales for antidemocratic practice and strengthens the impression that democratization is fully consistent with the pursuit of economic and social goals is helpful. In this latter regard, publicizing instances of governance that exhibit a reconciliation of stability, economic progress, and democratization would be useful. (There are some difficulties here, especially involving the degree to which democratization can in general be shown to be also superior, or at least equal, to authoritarian governance vis-a-vis stability and economic achievement; at best, the record of achievement is mixed for both market and state-socialist polities.)

It is also essential to examine critically "showcase" democratization, where electoral process is activated to suggest either that a repressive government, despite all, enjoys the support of its people or that its government is moving toward democratization. Lyndon Johnson's pressures on the Thieu government to organize free elections for South Vietnam illustrate a wider phenomenon. The elections were designed above all to legitimize the U.S. role on behalf of the Saigon government in the Vietnam war. It is helpful for critical forces to question such "legitimizing" activities and to expose them as shams and frauds to the extent warranted.

In addition, positive models of "development" that relate resources to needs provide the basis for a transnational democratizing learning experience. The work of the Bariloche Foundation on the regional sufficiency of capital resources for needs-oriented development in Latin America is illustrative.[13] In contrast, academic works that emphasize prospects for scarcity in the face of overwhelming population pressures lay the psychological and ideological foundation for antidemocratic governance, virtually as a matter of political necessity. Writings in the North that favor "triage," insist upon "lifeboat ethics," and discuss the political consequences of persistent scarcity exert an antidemocratic influence, even if this is not their intention.[14]

8. <u>The emergence of a new international economic order that equalizes North-South relations and that strengthens the capabilities of all states to achieve self-determination would increase democratic prospects.</u> The international economic foundations for democracy at the state level are complex and controversial. Structurally, it would seem that breaking down core/periphery relationships with respect to productive role would be helpful. At the same time, so-called newly industrialized countries (NICs), such as South Korea and Taiwan, have not shown any correlated disposition to embrace democratic patterns of governance.

The persistence of demographic pressures that make it so much more difficult for most Third World governments to satisfy the basic needs of their peoples seems related, in large part, to expectations of persistent poverty. Altering these expectations is mainly a matter of domestic social, economic, and cultural reform, but it would seem facilitated by a more equitable international economic order, one that allowed each government greater autonomy. Indebtedness, unregulated multinational corporations, and adverse terms of trade all seem to work against the maintenance of moderate structures of government, the latter being a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for democratizing progress.

9. <u>Transforming structures of world order in the direction of establishing the will and capability to protect global, as well as national, interests would generally work in favor of democratic prospects.</u> The state system, as it functions, reinforces coercive patterns of governance, including militarizing tendencies. Demilitarizing processes, especially those bearing on relations between strong and weak states and those lending external support to repressive regimes (by means of assistance, including transfers and sales of repressive technology), would enhance democratizing prospects. In general, no particular alternative structure of world order is indicated as beneficial. There exists an array of possible global organizational frameworks within which democratic values could more easily

flourish than is currently possible.[15] An appropriate leadership in domi-
nant actors would be helpful--that is, a leadership that was sensitive to
the overall risks of continuing down the militarization path in the nuclear
age and was receptive to positive alternative approaches to the attainment
of security.[16]

A Note in Conclusion

Exploring the global dimensions of "democratizing potential" is, as
we suggest, elusive and complex. Given developments can often be construed
in a variety of ways. We don't know what will work, or to what extent.
There are two broad types of policy activities: reinforcing support for
democratizing potential, and organizing opposition to antidemocratic polit-
ical structures. There are also heavily ideological debates present--is
Cuba more or less democratic under Castro than Batista? Is Iran more or
less democratic under Khomeini than the Shah? A central source of confu-
sion is that virtually all points on the political spectrum, even the most
militarist, affirm their allegiance to democratizing potential. Hence, it
becomes necessary to cut through the various polemical barriers and set
forth some fairly stable criteria centering around the realization of polit-
ical self-determination. Another source of confusion arises because govern-
ments profess one set of goals, yet often pursue policies and practices that
seem motivated by contradictory goals. The hegemonic actor in international
affairs loudly proclaims endorsement of noninterventionary standards, while
quietly or covertly engaging in intervention.

The nine general assertions set forth above are framed in light of
these confusing actualities. Their purpose is to focus thought-for-action,
as well as to delimit some of the ways in which the global dimension im-
pacts upon democratizing prospects and struggles.

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[1] Simone Weil, "Analysis of Oppression," in George A. Panichas (ed.), The Simone Weil Reader (New York: David McKay, 1977), p. 131.

[2] This possibility of interpretation underlies my article "A World Order Perspective on Authoritarian Tendencies," Working Paper No. 10, World Order Models Project, 1980.

[3] For my overall orientation on these matters, see Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981).

[4] See Saul H. Mendlovitz (ed.), On the Creation of a Just World Order (New York: Free Press, 1975); for a more general indication of a world order orientation, see Louis René Beres, Peoples, States, and World Order (Itusca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock, 1981).

[5] The deep structures of antidemocratic statism are a main theme of Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974), esp. ch. 1; that is, democratization as we explain it is decisively restricted by the modern state and the states system, yet there is a wide range of normatively significant variations in the way in which state and society are linked.

[6] For interesting speculations along these counterintuitive lines, see Michael W. Doyle, "Imperial Decline and World Order: The World Politics of a Mixed Blessing," International Interactions 8 (1981), 123-150.

[7] A strong argument along these lines is advanced by R. J. Vincent, "Western Conceptions of a Universal Moral Order," in Ralph Pettman (ed.), Moral Claims in World Affairs (New York: St. Martins, 1979), pp. 52-78.

[8] Perhaps Alfred Stepan's work on Brazil has provided the most influential documentation. See Stepan, The Military in Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[9] For a good overall account of the shifting alignment of the Church in Central America, see Alan Reding, "The Sword and Cross," New York Review, May 28, 1981, pp. 3-8; this story is also the central theme in Penny Lernoux, Cry of the People (New York: Doubleday, 1980).

[10] Michael Klare, The Export of Repression.

[11] The claim made in relation to the 1953 intervention in Iran. See Kermit Roosevelt, The Struggle for Iran.

[12] José Serra, "Three Mistaken Theses Regarding the Connection between Industrialization and Authoritarian Regimes," in David Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 99-164.

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[13] Amílcar O. Herrera, et al., <u>Catastrophe or New Society? A Latin American World Model</u> (Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, 1976).

[14] Such conceptualizations are to be found in Robert Heilbroner, <u>An Inquiry into the Human Prospect</u> (New York: Norton, 1974); and in Garrett Hardin, <u>Exploring New Ethics for Survival</u> (New York: Viking, 1972).

[15] For such a depiction of world-order alternatives, see Falk, <u>A Study of Future Worlds</u> (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 150-276.

[16] The emphasis on appropriate leadership is influenced by Robert C. Tucker's forthcoming book, <u>On Political Leadership</u> (University of Missouri Press, 1981), especially chapter 4, entitled "Leadership and Man's Survival."