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A Romanian INTERKIT? Soviet Active Measures and the Warsaw Pact “Maverick” 1965-1989

By Larry L. Watts, December 2012



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**A Romanian INTERKIT?
Soviet Active Measures and the Warsaw Pact “Maverick,” 1965-1989**

Larry L. Watts

In 1965, Moscow instructed the informal system of China-watchers placed in its embassies and those of its “closely cooperating partners,” a group that included all of the Warsaw Pact members except for Romania plus Mongolia, to move from their posture of passive observation and analysis to a more operational footing.¹ Four years later, Soviet authorities launched a coordinated “active measures” campaign known as the “China International” or INTERKIT, a joint ideological, propagandistic, and disinformation assault against the Chinese that ran from the late 1960s until 1986.² It has been described as the last of the “Internationals,” having been preceded by the granddaddy of them all, the COMINTERN (1919-1943), and its short-lived successor, the COMINFORM (1948-1955).³

However, during the same period in which the INTERKIT skeleton was being fleshed out, Moscow was developing a similar structure for addressing the Romanian heresy, while also targeting Romania within INTERKIT itself.⁴ During its first iteration in 1965-1968 this structure was internal to the USSR, involving primarily central Soviet and Moldavian SSR party and state organs, although with occasional participation of Ukrainian SSR organs as well [**Documents 1, 2**]. By August 1971, Brezhnev proposed to the other Warsaw Pact members that they create a structure dedicated to Romanian operations based on their Central Committee Departments for Ideology and International Relations (International Departments), just as they already did,

¹ Polish former Ambassador to Beijing Rowiaski in Xiaoyuan Liu and Vojtech Mastny, eds., *China and Eastern Europe, 1960-1980s*, Proceedings of the International Symposium: Reviewing the History of Chinese-East European Relations from the 1960s to the 1980s, Beijing, 24-26 March 2004, pp. 108-109, *Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact*, <http://php.isn.ethz.ch>, by permission of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on behalf of the PHP network (hereafter: PHP).

² Document 8 in James Hershberg, Sergey Radchenko, Peter Vamos, and David Wolff, *The Interkit Story: A Window into the Final Decades of the Sino-Soviet Relationship*, Cold War International History Project (hereafter: CWIHP) Working Paper #63, February 2011, pp. 61-65, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-interkit-story>. See also, pp. 8, 11-12.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

⁴ See, e.g., the study, *Analysis of the Romanian Attitude Toward Maoism*, posted as *Maoism and Romania*, May 1974, PHP.

Brezhnev underscored, “with regard to China and Romania,” i.e., in INTERKIT.⁵ Brezhnev made this proposal shortly after identifying the Romania leader as “leading the fight against us” and constituting “the principal obstruction to our line,” and after the other Pact members agreed that Romania had repeatedly betrayed the alliance by pursuing policies that were “all directed against the Soviet Union, against the Warsaw Pact, and against the CMEA [the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance].”⁶

Strategies of Entanglement and Isolation

Anti-Romanian operations were designed with essentially the same ends as INTERKIT: to isolate the target country from the rest of the socialist community where the negative influence of its heresy threatened Soviet control, and to isolate it internationally—especially from the United States and other Western partners—and thus deny it outside support for further heresy still. Also as in the case of China, achieving these ends would increase the vulnerability of Romania to Soviet pressure and influence.

Aside from their dramatic differences in scale—and the lack of any military threat from Romania—there were two major differences between Soviet operations against the Chinese and Romanian targets. In the first place, China was already in a hostile isolation vis-à-vis the West when INTERKIT was launched—an isolation made all the more complete by China’s withdrawal from world politics during the 1966-1969 Cultural Revolution. Soviet disinformation could therefore take advantage of pre-existing antagonism and the cognitive biases formed in the US during the Korean War of the sudden and, to the Americans, inexplicable Chinese attack; each new advertisement of the imminent “yellow peril” apparently confirmed US fears of Beijing’s aggressive irrationality.

Romania, on the other hand, was already deeply involved with the West. This was most visible in its economic shift westward, already evident by the late 1950s. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s startling denunciation of Soviet missiles in Cuba to President John Kennedy in 1963, followed by the provision of Romanian good offices with Vietnam from 1965 under President

⁵ *Record of the Meeting Between Leonid Brezhnev and East European Party Leaders in the Crimea*, 2 August 1971, pp. 40-43, PHP.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-29, 31-32, 36-37, 40-43. These statements by Leonid Brezhnev and János Kádár were accompanied by similar condemnations of traitorous Romanian behavior by Edward Gierek, Gustáv Husák, and Todor Zhivkov.

Lyndon Johnson, set in relief the surprising degree of political involvement with the Kremlin's "main adversary" as well.⁷ Isolating Romania from its newfound partners thus required a somewhat different approach.

Secondly, as publicly declared adversaries, neither Moscow nor Beijing were under any compulsion to feign friendship and cooperation and both were free to give vent to their true attitudes, which they generally did. Romania, in contrast, formally remained a member in good standing of the Soviet alliance system—both in its economic variant, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (often referred to in US documents as COMECON), and in its politico-military variant, the Warsaw Pact. Overtly attacking Romania would inevitably heighten international awareness of the actual degree of Soviet-Romanian differences, probably driving Romania further towards the West and possibly drawing friendly Western attention and even assistance to it.

The same sequence of events had already occurred with Yugoslavia during 1948-1957, gaining Belgrade \$750 million in US military assistance alone, as well as assistance agreements with NATO members Greece and Turkey in 1952-1958.⁸ Although the context was very different, Moscow also feared possible Chinese rapprochement with the West and spent considerable resources to ensure that it did not occur, even establishing the aim of preventing it as a top priority for the other Pact members.⁹

To prevent their realignment with the West, the Kremlin applied a dual-track strategy towards all three countries. The first track sought to maintain the target's isolation from outside sources of support by projecting them as basically loyal, if temporarily misguided, Soviet allies (or members-in-good-standing of the socialist community) and entangling them in a skein of multilateral arrangements that apparently confirmed their loyal participation. Towards China, where entanglement was not a viable option, the Kremlin adopted public postures of reconciliation.

⁷ See, e.g., Raymond L. Garthoff, "When and Why Romania Distanced itself from the Warsaw Pact," *CWIHP Bulletin*, no. 5 (Spring 1995), p. 35, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/bulletin-no-5-spring-1995>; and *The New York Times*, 22 and 23 November 1965.

⁸ *The Yugoslav Military Elite (U)*, R-2131, February 1977, RAND publication prepared for Office of Regional and Political Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, 1 February 1977, pp. 8, 28, at www.foia.cia.gov (hereafter: CIA)

⁹ The testimony of several former Warsaw Pact officers with security and intelligence responsibilities agree on this point. See, e.g., Jan Sejna, *We Will Bury You* (London: Sedgwick and Jackson, 1982), pp. 120, 151-3; Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972), p. 158.

Meanwhile, the second track sought to isolate and overthrow recalcitrant regime leaders by combining propaganda, ideology, disinformation, and covert operations elements in full-blown "active measures" campaigns. One such campaign was mounted against Belgrade with the COMINFORM in 1948-1955, and in less intense form for some years after, until it was gradually replaced with an ever-increasing series of economic and military entanglements.¹⁰ As the CIA noted at the time, the Kremlin was seeking both to isolate Tito and "to avoid strengthening Yugoslav ties with the West and alienating neutralist opinion" that would result from an open break.¹¹

INTERKIT was another campaign of this type. As in Soviet-Yugoslav relations during the 1950s, Soviet calls for reconciliation with Beijing masked incessant efforts "to isolate China ideologically," to "foster its continued exclusion from the international community," and to increase "Chinese vulnerability to Soviet political and military pressure."¹²

In both the Yugoslav and Chinese cases, the split with Moscow was both evident and formal, and even then some influential schools within the US intelligence community remained unconvinced long after the fact. In Romania's case, continued formal alliance with the Soviet Union and conciliatory noises from both Bucharest and Moscow naturally made US observers more circumspect. Thus, US intelligence concluded that Kremlin leaders were "looking more or less constantly for some device to compel Romanian conformity and to diminish Romanian independence," and could be expected to use either "political or military pressures, or both," but preferred entanglement and isolation to "a collision course" in hopes that "time and geopolitics will one day solve the problem."¹³

During 1972-1983, East German intelligence and the Romanian Sector chief of the CPSU CC's Department for Liaison with Ruling Socialist Parties repeatedly referenced the Warsaw Pact's "agreed foreign policy vis-à-vis Romania." The aim of this coordinated policy was to "create further elements tying Romania to the socialist community," to stop "the slide of the Romanians down the slope of anti-Russianism and anti-Sovietism," and "to draw in Romania

¹⁰ Larry L. Watts, *With Friends Like These: The Soviet Bloc's Clandestine War Against Romania* (Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 2010), pp. 314-315, 355-363, and 594-596.

¹¹ *Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure (NIE 12-57)*, 19 February 1957, p. 8, CIA.

¹² *Sino-Soviet Relations After a Year of Talking*, CIA Directorate of Intelligence Special Report (SR), Weekly Review, 23 October 1970, p. 9, CIA.

¹³ See, e.g., *Soviet Foreign Policies and the Outlook for Soviet-American Relations (NIE 11-72)*, 20 April 1972, pp. 20-21; and *The USSR and the Changing Scene in Europe (NIE 12-72)*, 26 October 1972, pp. 17-18, CIA.

and to neutralize the consequences of its separate foreign policy course, [which is] damaging for the entire socialist community.”¹⁴ As Moscow noted at the end of the 1970s, “the policy elaborated earlier by the CPSU CC of stopping the slide must be continued, but more insistently, with more calculation, more efficiently, through all means of communication.”¹⁵ And the same policy continued into the mid-1980s with, for example, the East German *Stasi* exploiting “all the possibilities of the socialist states to act on [Romania] in political-operational work with the aim of maintaining and intensifying its ties with the Warsaw Pact and CMEA.”¹⁶

Romanian-Chinese Relations as a Topic of Special Soviet Concern Prior to 1967

Romania began running seriously afoul of the Kremlin shortly after Stalin’s death, first by pressing for the closure of the exploitive Soviet-Romanian joint ventures and then compounding their transgression by requesting the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the country in 1955.¹⁷ In parallel, and already by 1954 when Romanian head of state Petru Groza visited Beijing as Mao Zedong’s honored guest, a rather extraordinary relationship formed between Bucharest and Beijing.¹⁸ Emil Bodnăraș, Groza’s defense minister and vice-prime minister, maintained a relationship of even older vintage with Mao’s chief of security, Kang

¹⁴ *Analysis of Romanian-Chinese Relations by the East German Embassy in Bucharest*, 18 December 1972, pp. 7, 9, PHP; Documents 1 and 2 in Larry Watts, *The Soviet-Romanian Clash over History, Identity and Dominion*, February 2012, CWIHP, e-Dossier No. 29, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/e-dossier-no-28-the-soviet-romanian-clash-over-history-identity-and-dominion>.

¹⁵ Document 1 in Watts (2012).

¹⁶ *Informational Note Drawn Up by the Chief of Service [HVA VII] on the Current Situation and Policy of Romania*, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 6267, S. 9-11, 15 December 1983; Georg Herbstritt and Stejaru Olaru, *Stasi și securitate [Stasi and Securitate]* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2005), p. 367.

¹⁷ As Khrushchev later noted, “for Romanians, ‘SOVROM’ [Soviet-Romanian joint venture] was a curse word.” Sergei Khrushchev, editor, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Statesman, 1953-1964*, Volume 3 (Philadelphia: Penn State Press, 2007), p. 389. The Soviet leader likewise alluded to his furious response to the troop withdrawal request in his memoirs. Strobe Talbot, editor, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1970), p. 514. Romania participants reported a dangerous three-month freeze in Soviet-Romanian relations as a result of Khrushchev’s violent reaction. See, e.g., Mihai Retegan, *In the Shadow of the Prague Spring: Romanian Foreign Policy and the Crisis in Czechoslovakia, 1968* (Iași: Center for Romanian Studies, 2000), pp. 18-20.

¹⁸ See, e.g., Romulus Ioan Burdura, *Politica Independență a României și relațiile Româno-Chineze 1954-1975: Documente [Romania’s Policy of Independence and Romanian-Chinese Relations 1954-1975: Documents]* (Bucharest: Arhivele Naționale ale României [Romanian National Archives], 2008), volume I, pp. 8-27, 85-92. On Groza’s return from Beijing in 1954 the Romanians published a markedly pro-Chinese book under his signature, *In the Land of the Six Million*.

Sheng.¹⁹ During the People’s Republic of China 9th Party Congress in 1956, Mao seated Romanian party leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej on his left (the Soviet representative was on his right). The Romanian leader was engaged in resolving financial issues from World War II with the US at that time and offered to assist an interested Mao Zedong in doing the same.²⁰

During the May 1958 back-to-back CMEA and Warsaw Pact meetings where Soviet authorities laconically announced the withdrawal of their troops from Romania, Gheorghiu-Dej underscored his party’s rejection of the principle of “leading centers” and supranational control—a challenge to Soviet integrationist efforts in both the economic and politico-military spheres quite similar to the stance adopted by Beijing at the time.²¹ Romania insisted on the national control of its military from that moment on, summarily ending the training of its military personnel in the USSR after Moscow used Soviet-trained officers to place Romanian troops on alert in 1958 and 1961 without consulting the RCP leadership in violation of Article 3 of the 1955 Warsaw Treaty.²² As Khrushchev complained in an unguarded declaration to Soviet shipmates during his 1960 voyage to the US with the Balkan leaders, “in Romania, and even in the ranks of its Communist Party, pernicious nationalist and anti-Soviet attitudes were developing which must be cut off at the root.”²³

Romania quickly became a strategic nightmare for the USSR. It refused to consider NATO members or China as “enemies.” It steadily reoriented its economy towards the West. It pursued a foreign policy increasingly aligned with that of Moscow’s adversaries. And it adopted and advertised a security policy that threatened Soviet military control over the other alliance members.

¹⁹ Reportedly, Bodnăraș and Sheng met in the 1930s, while attending a Soviet school for sabotage and partisan warfare. See, e.g., Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, *The Chinese Secret Service: Kang Sheng and the Shadow Government in Red China* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1989), pp. 94-96, 102, 114-115.

²⁰ Burdura (2008), Document no. 2, pp. 95-96.

²¹ Vojtech Mastny, “Second Meeting of the PCC: 24 May 1958, Moscow: Editorial Note,” Records of the Warsaw Pact Committee: Records of the Political Consultative Council, August 2001, p. 2, PHP.

²² Watts (2010), pp. 162-165, 215-216, 260-261. Prime Minister Maurer publicly denounced the practice after Moscow employed it one last time during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Dennis Deletant And Mihail Ionescu, “Romania And The Warsaw Pact: 1955-1989,” CWIHP, Working Paper #43, April 2004, p. 74, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/deletant-ionescu-romania-and-the-warsaw-pact>.

²³ Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 97-98. Khrushchev, who wrote his memoirs eight years before Shevchenko’s defection to the US, apparently found the incident so embarrassing that he claimed the Romanian delegation had never shown up for the voyage and had “traveled to America on its own.” Sergei Khrushchev, editor, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Statesman, 1953-1964*, Volume 3 (Philadelphia: Penn State Press, 2007), p. 259.

Bucharest gave the most apparent demonstration of Romanian sympathies in 1963. On one hand, it ended all radio-jamming operations against Western broadcasts and dropped the systematic ideological “enemy-imaging” of the US and NATO.²⁴ Concurrently, it engaged in a *de-Russification* that ended obligatory Russian language training and shut down cultural influences (e.g., Romanian-Soviet friendship societies) and even called for an end to the Soviet espionage networks that underlay them. As Gheorghiu-Dej reported to the RCP Politburo in August 1963, not only did he inform Khrushchev that there was no comprehensible reason for the USSR to “organize intelligence agent networks in a socialist state, where there is a party militating for the same cause,” he recommended the Soviet leadership consider “not maintaining agent networks in any socialist country” as a sign of mutual respect.²⁵

If that request prompted Khrushchev to call the Romanians “bastards,” as Gheorghiu-Dej reported, no less worrisome to the Soviet leader was the evident sympathy Bucharest continued to exhibit towards the People’s Republic of China.²⁶ This growing intimacy prompted the Kremlin to impose restrictions on Warsaw Pact intelligence collaboration with Romania already in 1962, even before Romania’s own withdrawal from such arrangements.²⁷ Beijing’s suspicions of Romanian motivations in mediating the Sino-Soviet conflict were effectively laid to rest when Bucharest blocked Moscow’s attempt to admit Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact in 1963.²⁸

²⁴ Contrary to popular belief, Hungary did not do the same several months later. Although Budapest ended jamming of Western programming destined for the Hungarian population, it continued to participate in the Soviet jamming network to block broadcasts from reaching other members of the Warsaw Pact as well as the Soviet Union itself. Istvan Rev, “Just Noise? Impact of Radio Free Europe in Hungary,” in A. Ross Johnson and R. Eugene Parta, editors, *Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A Collection of Studies and Documents* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), pp. 239-257. See also Documents 34 and 35, pp. 487-493 and 494-500. The uniquely pro-American cant of Romanian propaganda was especially visible during the US bicentennial. See, e.g., RAD Staff, “East European Reactions to the US Bicentenary,” RAD Background Report/156, 7 July 1976b, OSA, Box 99, Folder 6, Report 62, pp. 1-4.

²⁵ Watts (2010), pp. 196-201. See also *Transcript of Meeting of RWP CC Political Bureau of 2 April 1963* in Mircea Munteanu, Compiler, *Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1989: CWIHP Document Reader*, for the International Conference “Romania and the Warsaw Pact,” 3-6 October 2002, Bucharest, Romania, pp. 157-176, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/munteanu-romania-and-warsaw-pact>.

²⁶ The transcript of the Romanian Political Bureau Meeting of 30 August 1963 recounting Khrushchev’s reaction is reproduced in Petru Otu, “In Biroul Politic, despre agentura sovietica: Vin vremuri grele” [In the Politburo, Regarding Soviet Agents: Hard Times Are Coming], *Magazin Istoric*, no. 7, July 1999.

²⁷ Sejna (1982), p. 66-67; Bittman (1972), pp. 146-147. See also Watts (2010), pp. 183-201.

²⁸ As Hungarian leader János Kádár noted: “The only negative reaction to it was by the Romanians.” *Excerpts of Report to the Hungarian Politburo on the PCC Meeting by the First Secretary of the MSzMP (János Kádár)*, 31 July 1963, PHP. Another firsthand observer, former East German Military Attaché Col. Joachim Schröter, likewise stresses Romania’s singular opposition to the admission of Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact in Liu and Mastny (2004), p. 140.

Although all other Pact members, including Poland, initially agreed with the Soviet proposal, Romania’s refusal to budge on the issue provoked a stampede for the exits—a feat that Romania would repeat in 1969 when it blocked Mongolia’s admission again and, in a different context regarding Vietnam, in 1978 as well.²⁹

In the spring of 1964, Romania launched its statement on the Sino-Soviet rift, colloquially known as its “declaration of independence,” criticizing both sides for the damage their public polemics was doing to international communist solidarity.³⁰ More importantly, Romania’s “declaration” (1) explicitly condemned the COMINTERN and the notion of any sort of “supranational” or “leading center”; (2) adopted with little modification China’s five-principle “Panch Shila”—which itself could have been lifted from Hugo Grotius’ treatise on international law—as the basis of its international policy; (3) established the mediation of international tensions and conflict as “sacred obligation” for all states, especially those small and medium-sized; and (4) justified Bucharest’s future contacts along these lines even with capitalist states as “not betraying socialism but serving the cause of peaceful coexistence.”³¹

Romania now presented a threefold challenge to the Kremlin—one towards the East, one towards the West, and one within the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA—all of which were based on the ideological heresies set down in its April 1964 statement. Within the Warsaw Pact, Romania’s heresies combined with its now persistent efforts to transform the alliance in a manner that would diminish Soviet political and military control—for example, by calling for collective decision-making and the full rotation of all command posts to all participants.³²

²⁹ Warsaw is frequently misattributed credit for blocking Mongolia’s admission to the Warsaw Pact. Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki noted at the end of his argumentation for Warsaw’s revised position that “a negative stance on the part of Romania regarding Mongolia’s accession should also be seriously counted on,” rather clearly indicating the *a priori* nature of Romanian opposition. *Memorandum by the Polish Foreign Minister (Adam Rapacki)*, 20 July 1963, PHP. Romanian argumentation is in *Transcript Meeting of the RWP CC Political Bureau of 18 July 1963*, ANIC, fond CC al PCR-Cancelerie, dosar nr 39/1963, f. 122-128, in Munteanu (2002), pp. 177-183.

³⁰ *Scântea*, 23 April 1964. For an English translation see William E. Griffith, *Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 269-296.

³¹ “Panch Shila” called for “mutual respect for territorial independence and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual advantage, and peaceful coexistence.” Hershberg et al. (2011), p. 16. Romania’s inter-state principles included: respect for national independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, equal rights, non-interference in domestic affairs, and mutual advantage. Romanian authorities discussed its declaration beforehand with Chinese authorities, during the Beijing visit of Emil Bodnăraș, Nicolae Ceaușescu, and Ion Gheorghe Maurer in March 1964. See, e.g., J. F. Brown, “The Rumanian Visit to Peking,” 5 March 1964, RFER Background Report, OSA, Box 50, Folder 2, File 128, pp. 1-5.

³² Romania “leaked” its call for “new ways” of decision-making within the Warsaw Pact to international media. See, e.g., *The New York Times*, 14 December 1964. For a much more detailed variant of these proposals see *The New*

Romania's self-proclaimed independence coupled with its economic reorientation towards the West threatened to pull it out of the Warsaw Pact altogether. Soviet authorities from Khrushchev to Chernenko concluded that Romania's departure would be catastrophic, resulting in the loss of the Romanian land bridge to *über* ally Bulgaria, and as probably pulling others alliance members along with it.³³

These "subversive" effects were not limited to the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members. One of the most problematic aspects of the Romanian independent policy for Moscow was its impact on the Soviet Union itself—particularly on the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Pre-Soviet Russian historians uniformly recognized the majority population in the area as ethnically Romanian, and this "error" repeatedly surfaced in Soviet works ranging from the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* to a variety of Soviet historical and ethnographic works into the mid-1970s [Document 4]. Politically and culturally disenfranchised in a republic that was, to all appearances, purposefully maintained at the tail end of economic development, the more than 60 percent ethnic Romanian-Moldavian majority in the MSSR remained susceptible to the attractions of a neighboring state of their fully enfranchised (within the Communist context) ethnic kin.³⁴

Towards the East, Bucharest-Beijing relations were developing at an astonishing pace, raising the specter of a competing socialist center. The Chinese actively supported Romania's new historiography, particularly in its open discussion of Russian and Soviet territorial

York Times, 11-14, 16, and 22 May 1966. The other Pact members confirmed the accuracy of *The New York Times* reports in their internal discussions. See, e.g., *Report to the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party Political Committee on the Meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers [and on the Meeting of the Deputy Ministers of Defense in Moscow]*, 11 February 1966, PHP.

³³ For Khrushchev see Sejna (1982), p. 76. For Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Grechko's opinion see Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chapel Hill: University of Northern California, 2003), p. 17. Similar concerns provoked by Romania's Balkan Pact initiatives were repeatedly expressed by Brezhnev, Andropov, and even Chernenko during his short tenure. As late as February 1989, Moscow believed a Romanian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact likely, and likely to result in substantial Western assistance, although the Kremlin was apparently no longer concerned that the other Pact members would follow. "Changes in Eastern Europe and Their Impact on the USSR," *Memorandum to Alexander Yakovlev from the Bogomolov Commission (Mariana Sylvanskaya)*, February 1989, Document No. 1 in Jacques Levesque, "Soviet Approaches to Eastern Europe at the Beginning of 1989," *CWIHP Bulletin*, no. 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001), pp. 57-59, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/bulletin-no-1213-fallwinter-2001>.

³⁴ For example, although the "Moldavians" made up 65 percent of the population in the Moldavian SSR, they made up "only 28 percent" of its Central Committee, the other 72 percent being composed of ethnic Slavs. Robert R. King, "The Escalation of Rumanian-Soviet Historical Polemics over Bessarabia," RAD Background Report/38, RFER, 12 February 1976, OSA, Box 115, Folder 5, Report 164, p. 11. See also Zev Karz et al., editors, *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), pp. 441, 449-451.

predations and other “blank spots” of Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations.³⁵ By August 1964, Albanian leader Enver Hoxha—thought in the West to be China’s closest protégé since Tirana’s break with the USSR in 1961—was complaining bitterly of being supplanted as favored political partner in Beijing by the “centrist” Romanians.³⁶

The Sino-Romanian relationship had grown so intimate by mid-1965 that Romanian leaders felt comfortable discussing their efforts to roll back Soviet control over the other Warsaw Pact national armies with Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping and Kang Sheng.³⁷ Meanwhile, as one Chinese diplomat later observed, Romania was “enthusiastic” in its efforts to get China and the US to “normalize their relations as early as possible.”³⁸ The Romanian prime minister demonstrated this enthusiasm several months later, insisting to the departing US ambassador in October 1965 that Washington “should not forget China” in US foreign policy.³⁹

Kremlin concerns over the Bucharest-Beijing relationship were signaled in its initial December 1965 instructions to Soviet authorities in the Moldavian SSR within what would become known as INTERKIT. Amidst a host of other questions regarding Chinese policies, Moscow sought information on Beijing’s interest in the “Bessarabian question,” the degree and “kind of influence” the Chinese Communist Party leadership exercised over the RCP, and the reasons why Romanian radio “frequently spoke in the first place about progress in China and

³⁵ For an outside perspective on this clash see, e.g., Charles King, *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia and the Politics of Culture* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), especially chapter 5, “A Stipulated Nation.”

³⁶ Hoxha also considered the Romanians an “American imperialist mouthpiece” responsible for leading China into the arms of the US. Enver Hoxha, *Reflections on China 1962-1972: Extracts From The Political Diary*, Vol. 1 (Tirana: The “8 Nentori” Publishing House, 1979), pp. 71-79, 96-97, 104-105, 108, 113, 425, 496-503, 510-513, 531-538, 550-551, 573, 586, 590-591, 653-655, 661, 667

³⁷ *Transcript of Discussions Held with Chinese Communist Party Delegation to the 9th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party*, 26 July 1965, ANIC, CC al PCR/Cancelarie, dos. Nr. 105/1965, ff. 2-15; *Stenographic Transcript of Ceaușescu-Deng Conversation*, PHP.

³⁸ Ambassador Chen Denlai in Liu and Mastny (2004), pp. 132-3. At the time, Enver Hoxha denounced Ceausescu and Bodnaras as the “‘god-fathers’ of the Sino-American friendship.” See especially chapter 12, “Rumania and China Have The One Line” in volume two of Enver Hoxha’s political diary *Reflections on China* (1979), p. 151 at http://www.enverhoxha.ru/Archive_of_books/English/enver_hoxha_reflections_on_china_volume_II_eng.pdf

³⁹ Mircea Răceanu, *Cronologie comentata a relatiilor romano-american* [An Annotated Chronology of Romanian-American Relations] (Bucharest: Silex), p. 196. At about the same time the US requested Romanian assistance regarding Vietnam. *Memorandum of Conversation*, Washington, October 14, 1965, 8 p.m., Document 168, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968*, Volume III, Vietnam, June-December 1965. Five months later, in March 1966, Vice President Hubert Humphrey launched a new policy towards Beijing of “containment without isolation.”

Albania and only afterwards” about progress in the USSR.⁴⁰ Apparently, the view that Beijing and Bucharest were plotting against it was already well-established, leading Moscow to ask:

What positions does the Romanian Communist Party take in appraising policies of the CCP leadership? Is there a perspective of creating a new Communist international, which would coordinate the policy and practice of the international communist movement?⁴¹

US Perspectives on the Romanian-Chinese Connection

Paradoxically, judging from declassified intelligence reports, neither the CIA’s sinologists nor its East European specialists paid very much attention to the Sino-Romanian relationship, consistently assessing it as insignificant years after it had assumed central importance in China’s relations with the Soviet bloc. Part of the reason for the lack of US intelligence focus on the Beijing-Bucharest connection was the extraordinary degree of secrecy established by successive US administrations regarding US-Romanian relations, a secrecy at the time insisted upon by the Romanians themselves.⁴² Consequently, intelligence on the Sino-Romanian relationship, and the Soviet response to it, was simply not a collection priority.

“Hindsight bias,” inherent to any institutionalized analytical process, whereby previous analyses inform and influence current ones, virtually assured that it would not become a collection priority barring some explicitly jarring development, such as the spectacular welcome

⁴⁰ Moldavian Communist Party CC [illegible], *Information on the results of familiarization of communists of the Moldavian republic with the letter of the CPSU CC of 30 December 1965*, 12 February 1966, in AOSPRM [Archive of Social-Political Organizations of the Republic of Moldova], fond 51, inventory 27, box 11, file 43-47.

⁴¹ Ibid. At the end of that year, the focus of Moscow’s interest was directed towards: “Which Communist and Workers’ Parties support the schismatic policy of the CCP leadership? [What is] the attitude of the Romanian Communist Party towards the occurrences in China?” and “What economic ties does the Romanian Socialist Republic have with China?” Moldavian Communist Party CC Secretary A. Cornovan, *Questions: Communist tasks regarding familiarization with the information materials of the CPSU CC*, 16 November 1966, in AOSPRM, fond 51, inventory 27, box 11, file 110-113.

⁴² The practice began with the Kennedy administration, which so closely held Romania’s break with the USSR over the Cuban Missile Crisis that it did not leak for 30 years. See, e.g., Garthoff (1995), p. 35. The practice continued under the Johnson administration regarding both US-Romanian relations and Romanian good offices with Vietnam. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Volume XVII, *Eastern Europe*, Washington D.C., 1996, folder no. 140, cited in Retegan (2000), p. 47. See also Interview with Gaston Marin by Lavinia Betea, “De la Kremlin spre Vest și Casa Albă” [From the Kremlin to the West and the White House], *Jurnalul National*, 6 March, 2007. The Nixon and Ford administrations also continued the practice, especially regarding China but also vis-à-vis issues of military cooperation. Although probably necessary at the beginning of US-Romanian relations, that same secrecy ultimately proved self-defeating by the mid-1970s, after the informal “contract” by which Congress extended its bipartisan support to presidential administration foreign policy had broken down in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate.

organized by Beijing for the visit of the Romanian leader in 1971.⁴³ Consequently, US intelligence arrived at a set of erroneous conclusions with long-term impact over US understanding of the Sino-Romanian relationship. For example, US intelligence concluded that “as a result of the cultural revolution, China’s only allies were the Albanians,” and that Chinese-Romanian party relations during 1966-1967 “were only moderately better than with other East European Communists.”⁴⁴

Beijing’s public promise of assistance to Romania in case of Soviet aggression during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia is not dealt with in this report (or, indeed, in any of the reports on China and Romania declassified as of 2011). Instead, CIA sinologists evaluated the Sino-Romanian warmth of 1969-1971 as of “relatively recent” genesis, even while noting that “the Chinese have seemed particularly concerned with maintaining good relations with Rumania”—a special concern that was not adjudged as indicating a special relationship.⁴⁵ Likewise, no special significance was attributed to the attendance of Kang Sheng at every visit of Ceaușescu, Deputy Prime Minister Bodnăraș, or Prime Minister Maurer until Sheng’s death in 1971.

In contrast, US administrations since President Lyndon B. Johnson were much more aware of the Bucharest-Beijing relationship, and especially of Romanian efforts to facilitate Sino-American understanding. In June 1967, during a wide-ranging meeting that also covered common perspectives on the Middle East and Bucharest’s efforts to mediate an end to the conflict in Vietnam (codenamed Packers), President Johnson requested Romanian mediation with the People’s Republic of China:

Johnson told Maurer the United States did not want war with China, did not seek to change China's system of government, had no designs on Chinese territory, and wanted only to trade with China and get along to the extent that China would permit. He stated that he would like to talk to the Chinese about a non-proliferation treaty and to “work out ground rules so that we can avoid nuclear war.” He stated also that it would be "the height of folly" for the United States to want to go to war with China; nothing could be further from his mind. Noting that Maurer was about to visit other countries, Johnson

⁴³ “Hindsight Biases in Evaluation of Intelligence Reporting” in Richards J. Heuer, Jr., *Psychology in Intelligence Analysis*, Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999, pp. 161-172.

⁴⁴ *Intelligence Report: The International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party*, December 1971, POLO XLIV, pp. v, 14-17, 20, CIA.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

stated that he was at liberty to describe their conversation and to quote anything Johnson had said, if it would be useful.⁴⁶

Exactly one month earlier, newly-appointed KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov had designated intelligence regarding any “‘secret negotiations’ between the US and China” as a “first priority” collection requirement for the KGB and its East European analogues.⁴⁷ Warsaw Pact intelligence services monitoring the “numerous high level visits” Bucharest officials made to Beijing reported the Romanian prime minister’s 1967 trip to inform “the Chinese about his previous discussions with Johnson.”⁴⁸ The KGB immediately launched an active measures operation to undermine the Sino-Romanian relationship, part of which consisted of forged Chinese notes of a meeting between Zhou Enlai and Romanian leaders, in which the Chinese prime minister was represented as having “contemptuously dismissed” Ceaușescu as a poseur and “an uncultured upstart,” lacking real influence in the Politburo.⁴⁹

Chinese authorities later acknowledged that during this same period the Romanians helped mediate Beijing’s relations with Italy, Austria, and “several northern European countries,” apparently under the Soviet radar.⁵⁰ Bucharest was going head-to-head with Moscow in this effort. At the end of the 1960s the Kremlin mounted a campaign that “at first indirectly and later directly” warned the governments of Austria, Italy, and West Germany through multiple channels “against moving to establish diplomatic relations” with Beijing.⁵¹

Romanian activities as a proxy foreign ministry during the period of Beijing’s self-induced isolation included considerable lobbying for the entry of the People’s Republic of China

⁴⁶ Editorial Note, Document 271, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXX, China. The text of the memorandum is in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. XVII, pp. 430-435.

⁴⁷ KGB “Orientation-Requirements” instruction *Concerning Some Aspects of USA. Policy in Regard to the PCR*, 26 May 1967, as quoted in *Intelligence Report: Soviet Thinking About the Danger of a Sino-US Rapprochement*, Reference Title: ESAU LI, February 1971, author Arthur A. Cohen, pp. 7-9. The same report notes that Soviet diplomatic and KGB personnel openly pressed a variety of Americans, official and unofficial, regarding the rumor of secret talks “already taking place between American and Chinese Communist diplomats” during 1967-1971, pp. 24.

⁴⁸ BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5481, pp. 1-38; Herbstritt and Olaru (2005), pp. 259-287.

⁴⁹ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p. 290.

⁵⁰ Liu and Mastny (2004), pp. 98, 112, 132-133.

⁵¹ *Intelligence Report: Soviet Thinking About the Danger of a Sino-US Rapprochement* (1971), pp. 14, 27, CIA. East German intelligence became aware of Romania’s role in mediating Beijing-Bonn relations by mid-1971. *Evaluation by the East German Embassy in Bucharest of Ceaușescu’s Visit to China*, 11 June 1971, PHP.

into the UN, and especially into the UN Security Council.⁵² According to a report of East German intelligence, there was very little ambiguity within the Warsaw Pact as to Bucharest's aims in this effort:

Romania sees in China's UN presence a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the United Nations and the possibility for its own nationalistic interpretations and activities, which deviate from those of the other socialist states... The Romanian-China relationship harms the agreed approach of the socialist countries on the main international issues and harms the development of unity and cohesion of the socialist world system.⁵³

Against this background, Beijing's apparently sudden defense of Romania during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia seems less surprising. The People's Republic of China publicly declared its intention to support Romania and privately promised to supply weapons; promises that it followed up with the transfer of arms, defense technologies and entire plants from Beijing to Bucharest (and possibly vice versa).⁵⁴ For its part, throughout the 1960s, the 1970s, and up until the Sino-Soviet rapprochement of the mid-1980s, Romania continued to defend the Chinese against formal expulsion from the socialist community within the Warsaw Pact.⁵⁵

In March 1967, three months before President Johnson's request for Romanian mediation with Beijing, Richard M. Nixon underscored the need to improve US-Chinese relations during his visit to Bucharest. The future president described with equal astonishment the wildly enthusiastic crowds that lined up to see his motorcade and the openness that Ceaușescu showed to his ideas for Sino-American rapprochement.⁵⁶ Thus, President Nixon had firm reasons for

⁵² Beijing issued a public communiqué specifically thanking Romania for its efforts vis-à-vis the UN. On Romanian efforts regarding the PRC and the UN see China's former Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Hungary, Zhu Ankang, in Liu and Mastny (2004), pp. 98, 112, and 132, PHP.

⁵³ *Analysis of Romanian-Chinese Relations by the East German Embassy in Bucharest*, 18 December 1972, pp. 7, 9, PHP.

⁵⁴ See, e.g., the three telegrams in Document 7 in Hershberg et al. (2011). In May 1979, the chief of the Romanian section for the CPSU CC Liaison Department reported that Romania "furnished and continues to furnish China with arms and munitions, including those which it had earlier received from the USSR," and that "Romania is now building, together with China, a large factory for the fabrication of tanks on the Soviet model." Document 4 in Watts (2012). Along with Chinese gunboats, which the Romanians manufactured under license, the PRC also built a smokeless powder factory in the mountain region where Romanian forces planned to withdraw in case of a Soviet-led invasion. For Romanian defensive plans, developed largely as a response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, see Watts (2010), pp. 329-413. See also Retegan (2000). Hoxha attacked Chinese military assistance to Romania in Hoxha (1979), volume I, pp. 500, 571, 589.

⁵⁵ See, e.g., Henry Kissinger's report to President Nixon in "Establishment of the Kissinger-Dobrynin Channel: Dialogue on the Middle East; and the Sino-Soviet Dispute, April 23-December 10, 1969," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1971*, Volume XIII, pp. 218-221.

⁵⁶ Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 281-282.

choosing to renew the US request for Romanian mediation of a Sino-American rapprochement during the first year of his administration.⁵⁷ According to the State Department summary of their 2 August 1969 meeting:

The President emphasized that the United States did not intend to become involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict and would not “join in a bloc to fence off China.” Finally Nixon told President Ceaușescu that “if it serves your interest and the interest of your government, we would welcome your playing a mediating role between us and China.”⁵⁸

Nixon indicated something of the flavor of Romania’s position vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing during a National Security Council meeting two weeks later. The US, Nixon explained, had “always assumed that the Chinese are hard liners and the Soviets are more reasonable,” but “Ceaușescu says that the Soviets are tougher and more aggressive than the Chinese.”⁵⁹ CIA Director Richard Helms and President Nixon agreed with this assessment.

Soviet authorities did their utmost to discourage US cooperation with Romania regarding China while concurrently attempting to discredit Romania as a viable intermediary with Vietnam.⁶⁰ Moscow went so far as to conclude understandings with the staunchly anti-communist Nationalist Republic of China in order to block a US-PRC rapprochement, and Nationalist Chinese authorities attempted to dissuade Washington from even considering the use of a Romanian channel, forcing US officials to deny the use of or intention to use Romania as a go-between for talks with Beijing.⁶¹ Reflecting both paranoia and superior knowledge of

⁵⁷ Johnson told President-elect Nixon “that he was prepared to go ahead with these measures on his own responsibility” or “simply turn them over to the incoming administration to use as is saw fit.” William Bundy, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), p. 103.

⁵⁸ *Editorial Note: 24 July – 3 August 1969 Nixon trip. Memorandum of conversation between President Nixon and President Ceaușescu*, August 2, 1969, Document 20, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Volume XVII, pp. 51-53.

⁵⁹ *Minutes of Meeting of the NSC, San Clemente*, 14 August 1969, Document 74, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Volume XXX, China, p. 221.

⁶⁰ *Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson*, Washington, January 24, 1968, 0530Z, Document 24, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968. See also Documents 206 and 211-216. On Romanian mediation see, e.g., Transcript, Dean Rusk Oral History Interview II, 9/26/69, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Internet Copy, LBJ Library, Tape 1, p. 14, and Tape 2, p. 4, available at <http://www.lbjlibrary.org>.

⁶¹ *Intelligence Report: Soviet Thinking About the Danger of a Sino-US Rapprochement* (1971), pp. 11-13, 62; *Memorandum of Conversation (Kissinger, John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, and GRC Ambassador Chow Shu-kai)*, 6 August 1969, Document 21, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Volume XVII, p. 53; *Memorandum from the President’s Asst for NSA (Kissinger) to President Nixon*, Washington, 10 July 1969, Document 65, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Volume XII, pp. 197-198, 200-202. Moscow

Beijing-Bucharest relations, Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov later complained to the other Pact members that “the Chinese rely on Romania and the Romanians support Chinese policies” such that “in the West, Mao and Ceaușescu are viewed as twins.”⁶²

A Romanian Precursor to INTERKIT?

While Soviet and Pact operations against Romania’s “separate course” as it related to China were spread over INTERKIT, over the apparently undesignated Romanian operation that was inspired by it in 1971, and over the Moscow-Chișinău operations against Romanian “propaganda and subversion,” the latter operation was the most narrowly focused on Romania and its relations with the US, West Germany, and Israel. This more narrow focus was driven partly by the post-Stalinist reform of Romanian historiography during the early 1960s that brought it back into line with what Soviet authorities in the Kremlin and Chișinău would repeatedly label the “falsifications” of “Western bourgeois” historiography. In consequence, the ethnic Romanian-Moldavian majority in the Moldavian SSR (and the hundreds of thousands of co-ethnics in the Ukrainian SSR) had increasing access to historical accounts affirming their common identity with the Romanians, and these accounts were confirmed by Western historiography and, for those able to access it, pre-Soviet Russian historiography as well.

In reaction to Bucharest’s unilateral broaching of Stalin-mandated “blank spots” in 1964, for example, Moldavian Communist Party First Secretary Ivan Ivanovich Bodiul, Brezhnev’s protégé from when the Soviet leader was MSSR First Secretary in 1950-1952, accused Romanian authorities of spreading “‘lies’ and ‘distortions’ about Moldavia,” even labeling the Romanian publication of Karl Marx’s notes on Russia’s seizure of Bessarabia as “nationalist propaganda.”⁶³ Initial Soviet and Moldavian reactions were aimed at limiting all contact and communication between Romania and the Moldavian SSR. However, more proactive tactics were soon incorporated into this approach.

leaked reports in Prague alleging Romania’s mediation of Sino-American relations on 10 and 15 July 1969, less than two weeks after Nixon announced his intention to visit to Bucharest.

⁶² *Record of the Meeting Between Leonid Brezhnev and East European Party Leaders in the Crimea*, 2 August 1971, pp. 21, 23-24, PHP.

⁶³ Mark Kramer, “Moldova, Romania, and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” *CWIHP Bulletin*, no. 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001), p. 326, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/bulletin-no-1213-fallwinter-2001>.

By 1966 Bodiul was calling upon central authorities in Moscow to compel a Romanian retraction and its silence on historical issues; advocating the generation of publications to “objectively expose” Romanian and bourgeois interpretations “from a class position and in the interests of the socialist community of nations;” and requesting the

assistance from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the CPSU CC, and of a series of institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences and of the apparatus of the CPSU CC. In our opinion, it would be opportune to prepare and to publish in the Moldavian language, Russian and in a series of foreign languages a series of historical studies (monographs, brochures, atlases, etc.) and articles in central periodicals, on the radio and television broadcasts that bring to the attention of wider public opinion—Soviet and foreign—the truth about the Moldavian people, about its authentic history and about the true reality of its contemporary life [**Document 1**].⁶⁴

More than a year later, in December 1967, the first meeting of INTERKIT convened in Moscow. This week-long meeting was preoccupied primarily with conceptual themes rather than the more practical organizational issues of the undertaking. While organizational details were worked out over the next year, the approach of the six pact members (the USSR, GDR, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria) plus Mongolia had already undergone a shift from reaching a common understanding of Chinese policy to developing “the tactics on how to combat Mao Zedong’s factional course.”⁶⁵ The December 1967 meeting concluded with an agreement by all participants on the need to consult and coordinate efforts regarding “the Mao Zedong group and the fight against its ideology and splittist activity.”⁶⁶

In February 1967, almost a year before the first session of INTERKIT was called to order, the Soviet leadership of the Moldavian SSR publicly called for a counterpropaganda campaign mobilizing “qualified scholars and cultural workers, as well as leading officials of the Party, Soviet, and economic organs,” and coordinated with “newspapers, and journals, radio and television broadcasts, books, brochures, and other publications,” in order to combat Romanian

⁶⁴ At the end of 1966, the outgoing chairman of the Moldavian SSR KGB noted that his “main task had been combating the influx of printed and verbal propaganda from abroad, mainly that which comes directly across the frontier,” i.e., from Romania. *Sovetskaia Moldavia*, 20 December 1966.

⁶⁵ This shift can be seen in the July 1967 Hungarian report prior to the first meeting and the Polish report following it. Documents 4 and 5 in Hershberg et al. (2011).

⁶⁶ This is from the East German report. Document 6 in Hershberg et al. (2011).

subversion.⁶⁷ The problem was not just that Romanian subversion was penetrating into the MSSR, but that it was already having an impact. According to the head of the Moldavian Communist Party:

Individual persons easily fall under the influence of disorienting propaganda, often themselves become its bearers, and at the same time fail to be reprimanded. It is necessary to say that our silence and passivity is employed by bourgeois falsifiers of history who, in their publications, consciously... suppress facts and events which characterized the age-old aspirations of the Moldavian people for union with Russia and for reunion with the Russian state.⁶⁸

Soon thereafter, during the same period that INTERKIT was assuming its structural contours and defining its operational missions, secret documents generated by the MCP CC began detailing how exactly a similar operation would be carried out against Romania.

It is worth noting that the use of "nationalist" and "chauvinist" by Soviet authorities did not reflect ethnic intolerance as understood in Western cultures, but rather the failure to accept "proletarian internationalism"—i.e., subordination to the Soviet leading center—as having priority over national interests. For example, concurrently, Soviet authorities were attacking classic works by American scholars on Romania on the same basis:

In the ideological struggle against communism, against the unity of the socialist countries, the apologists of imperialism constantly exploit the poisonous weapon of nationalism. This is clearly manifested in their interpretation of the foreign history of bourgeois-landlord Rumania. In the West in recent years there have appeared not a few books the authors of which slander Soviet foreign policy in relation to Rumania.⁶⁹

The first explicit rendering of the overall INTERKIT apparatus was given at its second meeting in East Berlin in December 1969. However, more than a year and a half earlier, in May 1968, the CPSU CC had adopted an innocuously named decision (no. 51 §49 gs) "Regarding

⁶⁷ *Sovetskaia Moldavia*, 16 February 1967; P. T. O., "Moscow Claims Bessarabia Was 'Illegally Attached to Romania,'" RFER, 28 July 1967, OSA, Box 50, Folder 6, Report 138, p. 1; Fritz Ermarth, "Soviet Historian on Rumania's Prewar Foreign Policy," RFER, 17 July 1967, OSA, Box 50, Folder 6, Report 146, p. 3. Fritz Ermarth, soon to be recruited into the US National Security Council where he would eventually manage the production of the US intelligence community's *National Intelligence Estimates*, detailed how Moscow and its allies persistently grouped Romania together with China in their media attacks in spite of the rather contradictory nature of the charges levied against the two states.

⁶⁸ *Sovetskaia Moldavia*, 16 February 1967.

⁶⁹ Nikolai Ivanovich Lebedev, "Some Questions of the Foreign-Political History of Rumania in the Light of Bourgeois Historiography," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, no. 3 (1967), pp. 146 ff; Ermarth (1967), p. 3.

Assistance Measures to the Moldavian SSR for the Improvement of Ideological Work,” establishing measures that closely foreshadowed the structure, tasks, and aims of INTERKIT.

The MCP’s June 1968 instruction regarding the Soviet decision described a coordinated effort involving the USSR Committee for Radio Broadcasting and Television, State Planning Committee, Ministry of Telecommunications, Academy of Sciences, Foreign Ministry, State Committee for Science and Technology, Committee for Press, Ministry of Culture, Union of Sport Societies and Organizations (DOSAAF), Union of Friendship Societies and Cultural liaison with Foreign Countries, the *Shtiintsa* and *Nauka* publishing houses, the press agencies *Novosti* APN and TASS, the newspapers *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, *Selksaia zhizn*, *Ekonomicheskaiia gazeta*, the journals *Kommunist*, *Partiinaia zhizn*, *Voprosi istorii KPSS*, *Voprosi istorii*, etc., [Document 2]. Working together with an equally long list of their counterpart entities in the Moldavian SSR, these organizations were instructed to strictly regulate and reduce the entry of Romanian publications, broadcasts, information, and tourism into the republic; to create a propaganda base within the republic that would include increased numbers of publications and broadcasts, and new radio and television broadcast facilities; and to launch a new ideological offensive to combat Romanian influence.

For the Moldavian party, this required the joint effort of their newly created House of Political Education in Chişinău, the MCP’s Central Committee Propaganda and Agitation Section, the Ministry for Safeguarding Public Order, Directorate for Foreign Tourism, and the State Control Committee, as well as the Presidium of Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, which would organize “conferences, scientific sessions, symposiums, colloquiums, and all-union and international scientific schools in social and natural sciences” on the pertinent themes. It was likewise stipulated that this work would be carried out together with the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences (especially regarding the designation of personnel and of the works to be produced) as well as Moldavia’s State Planning Committee, Ministry for Radio Broadcasting and Television, a proposed Special Editorial Office for Information Abroad, the State Committee for Press, and the Union of Communist Youth. A corresponding ideological offensive was to be mounted by “municipal and county party committees, ministries and republic departments, party organizations, trade unions, and komsomol organizations” [Document 2].

Seven months later, the January 1969 INTERKIT meeting laid out a similar organizational structure pursuing similar goals against China:

In the area of radio and TV:

- Exchange radio and TV materials... for domestic and foreign programs;
- Organize joint broadcasts, especially operational broadcasts, for the purposes of counterpropaganda on the most important and current problems;
- Produce in the near future a TV documentary on the events in China;
- Coordinate our countries' efforts in the International Organization for Radio and TV (OIRT) and at Intervision;⁷⁰
- Send specialists to exchange opinions in the area of propaganda on the China question;
- Mutually inform ourselves regarding the basic direction of radio propaganda on the China question.

Written propaganda directed at third countries:

- Coordinate in third countries the activities of press and information agencies and other organs of foreign propaganda of the fraternal countries in the dissemination of materials on the China question;
- Prepare a collection of materials on "the events in China." This collection is to be translated (into English, French, Spanish and Arabic) and distributed in third countries;
- Coordinate the future planning on anti-Maoist propaganda;
- Exchange current materials and information on the China question on a regular basis;
- Organize cooperation of foreign correspondents of our countries with respect to the collection and exchange of information on China.

In the area of research

- Organize a symposium... on the subject "Basic problems of social-economic developments in today's China" and publicize the materials from this symposium;
- Exchange scientists, scientific associates, aspirants, and students that are involved in China issues;
- Organize a consultation of the heads of research institutions in the summer of 1969 to exchange information and agree on a plan for publications and scientific works.⁷¹

Both efforts resulted in the creation of new institutions dedicated to the mission.⁷² The anti-Romanian effort included the generation of new institutional forms and entirely new

⁷⁰ The International Organization for Radio-Broadcasting and Television (OIRT) was originally created by Moscow to institutionalize Soviet access to Western media. Finland was its only Western member.

⁷¹ *Second INTERKIT Meeting*, East Berlin, 28 January 1969, PHP, pp. 6-7; Document No. 8 in Hershberg et al. (2011).

institutions to carry out the campaign early on.⁷³ Beginning in 1968 with the establishment of a new House of Political Education, anti-Romanian operations provided the motivation for the transformation of the MCP Central Committee sector for foreign relations into a fully-independent Section in 1970, the creation of a Special Editorial Office for Information [Sent] Abroad in 1976, a new Sector on the History of the International Communist Movement within the Institute of Party History at the Moldavian Communist Party CC formed in the same year, and a new Council for Foreign Policy Propaganda in 1982, among others [**Documents 2, 7, 9, 10**]. All of these were specifically created for combating Romanian subversion.

In 1972, citing the “intensification of subversive activities directed against the republic by the special services and ideological centers of the Western countries,” of Israel, and of Romania, Soviet Moldavian authorities requested that “the KGB of the Moldavian SSR” be “supplemented with 59 state posts, and 38 officers” in order to staff “new KGB apparatuses and consolidate existing KGB subunits that fight against the ideological subversions of the adversary” [**Document 3**]. Travelers coming from Romania were deemed particularly dangerous because of their efforts “to inculcate our citizens with a nationalist spirit.” A “considerable part of them” smuggled in “materials and literature that are dangerous from the political perspective” while others “propagated the separate course of the Romanian leadership, the idea of breaking off the former Bessarabia from the USSR and uniting it with Romania” [**Document 3**].

During 1968-1972, illegal border crossings from the USSR into Romania had increased significantly. There were more than 80 incidents in which 62 persons were arrested while trying to cross the Soviet-Romanian frontier (several of whom were convicted of “treason to the fatherland”). Organized national movements also appeared within the republic—for example, “The National Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Bessarabia, Bucovina, and the Counties of

⁷² See, e.g., Hershberg et al. (2011), p. 11.

⁷³ See, e.g., Gheorghe Negru, “Campanii împotriva României și naționalismului românesc din RSSM în anii 60-80 ai sec.XX (Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova) [The Campaign Against Romania and Romanian Nationalism in the MSSR in the 60s-80s of the 20th Century (Documents Collected within the Research Program for the Commission for the Study and Evaluation of the Communist Totalitarian Regime in the Republic of Moldova)], *Destin românesc*, vol. 16, no. 1 (2010), pp. 135-157; and Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, “PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova” [The MCP and Nationalism: Documents Collected within the Research Program for the Commission for the Study and Evaluation of the Communist Totalitarian Regime in the Republic of Moldova], special edition, *Destin românesc*, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 1-333.

Tiraspol, Dubăsari and Râbnîța from Under the Russo-Soviet Yoke” (or NPF) and “The National Renaissance of Moldavia”—whose members had been arrested and were now pending trial. With the arrest of the NPF members, Soviet authorities had also confiscated Romanian-language copies of the proceedings and decisions of their first congress, “as well as draft letters to the SRR [Socialist Republic of Romania] government, the list of inhabitants of Moldavia who were persecuted by the Soviet organs and over 5 thousand pages with all sorts of notes under the form of treatises, studies, [and] letters with a pronounced hostile tendency judging from their contents” [Document 3].

Soviet Ambivalence, Moldavian Identity, and Romanian Subversion

During the interwar period, Moscow had developed several contradictory strategies regarding the incorporation of the once-Romanian territories into the USSR, some of which fed intra-Union conflicts over territory, population, history, and identity. One conflict arose over whether to eradicate Romanian identity altogether and replace it entirely with a Slavic one—primarily through forcible assimilation and mass deportations of the ethnic Romanian majority—or to strengthen a redefined ethnic identity using the pre-existing (and predominate) Latin base—the creation of a “Moldavian” ethnicity. Actual Soviet policy oscillated between the two.⁷⁴

Alongside this conflict, there were also very real differences between the Moldavian and Ukrainian Communist Parties. Bolshevik and Soviet Ukrainian leaders had controlled the territory of Bessarabia/Moldavia briefly at the end of WWI, again during 1940-1941, and again at the end of WWII (remaining in possession of northern Bucovina, where ethnic Romanians constituted only a relative majority, and coming into possession of the southern portion—the Bujak/Bugeac—by Stalin’s fiat in 1952). During the latter interludes, then Generals Khrushchev and Brezhnev (along with then Ukrainian NKVD chief Ivan Serov and Khrushchev’s lieutenant, A. A. Epishev, a native of Odessa) actively encouraged separatist movements in the region and advocated its annexation to the Ukrainian SSR.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ For Soviet documents reflecting this debate see Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, *Cominternul și originile “Moldovenismului”* [The COMINTERN and the Origins of “Moldovenism”] (Chișinău: Editura Civitas, 2009).

⁷⁵ See, e.g., Sergei Khrushchev, editor, *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Commissar 1918-1945*, Volume 1 (Philadelphia: Penn State Press, 2005), pp. 610-611; NARA, RG 59, Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, Report #3013.5, *Secessionist Movement in Maramureș (Transylvania)*, 24 May 1945.

The leadership of the “Moldavian Clan”—Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Chernenko—that ran the USSR for some 28 years of the Cold War was often divided amongst itself as to policies towards the republic and the identity of its people. Consequently, Soviet Russian, Soviet Ukrainian, and Soviet Moldavian publications continued to make mutually exclusive claims as to the identity of the majority population on the territory, and the historic character and legitimate ownership of that territory into the mid-1970s [Document 4]. Most distressing for Soviet Moldavian authorities attempting to create a new non-Romanian identity was the common practice in Soviet ethnologies and histories of ignoring their manufactured “Moldavian” ethnicity altogether, referring to it instead simply as Romanian [Document 4].

To rectify this, MCP leaders argued the need for a “comprehensive” and “coordinated single plan” involving not only “the republican party organization, the scientific community, and the entire Moldavian people,” but also the expansion of “the scientific institutions of social science and the information organs of the republic,” and the creation of a new “organization, especially good in informational and publicity practices” [Document 4]. “In the first place”—the Soviet Moldavian leadership stressed in its 1975 memorandum to the CPSU CC on Romanian historical “falsifications” and the “Measures for Preventing their Negative Consequences in Moldavia”—it was necessary to “eliminate immediately” the “confusion existing in the domain of publishing houses” according to “a unique and clear position referring to the historical past.”

As usual, the neutralization of “the negative influence of Romania” required yet further restriction of incoming Romanian periodicals, literature, and tourists into the republic. Those Romanian tourists who still came were to be targeted by more extensive operations that required the unified preparation of tourist guides, translators, and Romanian specialists. A much greater investment was required in order to create a radio and TV broadcasting capability for carrying the ideological and propaganda war to the enemy [Documents 4 and earlier].

As the MCP First Secretary described it, this “intensified” subversive effort from Romania was carried out

by ideological organizations within Romania—the Central State Library of Bucharest, [and] some institutions which send to the addresses of librarians, newspaper and journal editors, to the churches, to the priests in Moldavia, books, newspapers, journals and other materials that contain nationalist, anti-Russian conceptions. Among others, the works of N. Ceaușescu in eight volumes were sent into Moldavia, which include his speeches in Beijing, the well-known protest against the assistance accorded to the Czechoslovakia

people during the counter-revolutionary events in that country, and other discourses in which the Romanian political leader disagrees with the Marxist-Leninist positions of the socialist countries of Europe, of the workers and progressive communist movements in the world, and approaches a hostile bourgeois and Marxist [sic] ideology [Document 4].

During 1970-1975, more than 80 works were issued by Moldavian publishing houses combating "Romanian authors and their contemporaries that falsify the past and present of the Moldavian people," not including hundreds of newspaper articles and book reviews [Document 4].

Anti-Romanian operations underwent a major expansion in the mid-1970s, precipitated by the central CPSU CC decision (No. St-188/2s, 15 October 1975) *With Regard to the Supplementary Measures in the Domain of Ideological Work in Connection with the Intensification of Romanian Nationalist Propaganda which Harms the Interests of the USSR* [Documents 5, 6, 7, 8]. The plan for 1976-1980 included the production of 42 titles on history, ethnology, and linguistics under the rubric "List of Works on the Problems Connected with the History of the Formation and Development of the Moldavian Nation and Statehood, and of Russo-Romanian, Soviet-Romanian and Moldo-Romanian Relations" [Document 8]. Seventeen separate topics—some with multiple sub-topics—were included in the instruction regarding "Approximate Themes for Republic Press, Radio & Television Interventions Oriented Towards the Neutralization of Romanian National Propaganda that Harms the Interests of the USSR," along with the additional instruction that

the State Committee of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers for Radio Broadcasting and Television, [and] the editors of the republican newspapers must systematically transmit on the radio and television, as well as publishing in the press, articles and materials that unmask the efforts of the Western and Romanian information organs to misrepresent the past and present of the Moldavian people, the essence of Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations, the most important events of contemporary international life, and the issues of CPSU domestic and foreign policy [Document 5].

TASS General Director Leonid Zamiatin finally approved the creation of a new "Special Editor of Information for Abroad" for counteracting the "more active attempts by Western means of information to misrepresent the past and present of the Moldavian people, of combating certain tendencies of Romanian propaganda" [Document 9].

The collection of institutions marshaled for this offensive was impressive. The cooperating institutions on the side of the Moldavian SSR included the State Committee for

Radio Broadcasting and Television; the editors of the republican newspapers; the Moldavian SSR Ministries of Public Education, Culture, and Foreign Affairs; the Moldavian Academy of Sciences; the Institute of Party History at the Moldavian Communist Party CC; the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Houses, and Commerce with Books; the institutions of higher education and those of specialty secondary education; the creative unions; the State Cinematography; the Film-Makers Union; the Directorate for Foreign Tourism; the Council of Trade Unions; the Union of Communist Youth, the Society for Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries; the Moldavian Communist Party CC Sections for Propaganda, Information, and Liaison with Foreign Countries; the Information Agency (ATEM); the Moldavian branch of the *Novosti* Press Agency; and the new branch of the CPSU CC Institute of Marxism and Leninism opened at the Institute of Party History of the Moldavian Communist Party CC. On the central Soviet side, the cooperating institutions included the USSR Academy of Sciences; the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs; the sections of the CPSU CC corresponding to those involved on the Moldavian side; the USSR State Planning Committee; Ministry of Telecommunications; and the State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting of the USSR Council of Ministers. This coordinated effort was responsible for preparing, publishing, transmitting, and monitoring the broad and relentless counteroffensive against Romania, covering several dozen topics of Romanian history, archeology, ethnology, linguistics, and current foreign and security policies [**Documents 5, 6, 7**].

In May 1976, after underscoring the common approach of Western bourgeois imperialist, Maoist, and Romanian historiography, the MCP CC complained that Romania had become the launching point from which, “through different channels, reactionary literature published in the US, FRG, Israel, China, and other countries in which the most extravagant anti-Sovietism prospers penetrates into the Soviet Union” [**Document 11**]. This grouping reflected already mainstream Soviet views that Romania was at least in league with, if not a component part of, the “main adversary.”⁷⁶ In perhaps the most succinct description of the Soviet-Romanian clash over Moldavia, the MCP CC noted that the “principle sense” of the Romanian position “comes

⁷⁶ *Stasi* archives suggest this view predominated already by 1968. See, e.g., Georg Herbstritt, “Eine feindliches Bruderland: Rumänien im Blick der DDR-Staatssicherheit” [An Enemy Fraternal Country: Romania As Perceived By GDR-State Security], *Halbjahresschrift für südosteuropäische Geschichte, Literatur und Politik* (Berlin), no. 1 (May 2004).

down to the argument of the ethnic unity of peoples who live between the Danube and the Nistru Rivers, the community of traditions, of cultures, of languages, etc.” In contrast, the Soviet position held that any reference to or assertion of this common ethnicity and its historical circumstances “negated the legitimacy of the independent existence of the Moldavian nation and statehood outside of Romania,” and was therefore not only “nationalist” and “chauvinist,” but represented an aggressive claim on Soviet territory [**Document 11**].

Romanian leaders since Gheorghiu-Dej had repeatedly argued with Moscow that history and current political realities were two separate issues. In June 1976, for example, the Romanian foreign minister informed President Gerald Ford:

You know we are in favor of maintaining the territorial integrity of states in Europe, for respecting the 1947 treaty and the Helsinki undertakings which we signed. We consider the Moldavian Socialist Republic as a part of the USSR... Our President has declared publicly that we recognize the Moldavian Socialist Republic as an integral part of the USSR, but we cannot accept the idea that Moldavians are not Romanians, when the greater part of Moldavia is part of Romania.⁷⁷

The Romanian leader insisted on the very same to Brezhnev, underscoring that while his country had no territorial claims on the Moldavian SSR, it could “in no case accept the thesis which flagrantly contravenes historical truth, that the Romanians and the Moldavians are two different nations [peoples], that the Romanian and Moldavian languages are two different languages.”⁷⁸

The problem for both official Chişinău and Moscow was the favorable echo this approach found within the republic. According to the MCP CC, some “insufficiently prepared” intellectuals and young people fell “under the influence of Western and Romanian propaganda,” and made “demagogic pro-Romanian affirmations” in “their circles of relatives and intimates, and sometimes in public places.” Even members of “Jewish and German nationalities who wait to depart the USSR but who, for various reasons, were not allowed to leave” were employing “Romanian and bourgeois insinuations regarding the Moldavian SSR” and “sending through delegates of various institutions many calumnious letters to the UN and to the ambassadors of capitalist countries accredited to Moscow.” In a backhanded admission of the discrimination applied against the majority population of the republic, the MCP CC acknowledged that

⁷⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, Tuesday, June 22, 1976, 3:35-4:05 pm, The White House, Volume E-15, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973-1976, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*.

⁷⁸ See, e.g., Documents 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 in Watts (2012).

the negative influence of bourgeois propaganda over persons of Moldavian nationality increases. The essence of the unhealthy manifestations on the part of nationally marginalized Moldavians is expressed in the spirit of Romanian publications and Western bourgeois anti-Soviet propaganda [**Document 11**].

The Moldovan documents make clear that this campaign concerned not only central CPSU authorities, but both the Moldavian SSR and Ukrainian SSR leaderships as well, the latter particularly over the several hundred thousand-strong ethnic Romanian population in “the Cernăuți [Chernovitz] region.” Consequently, Moscow ordered larger print-runs of material, and new, more numerous, and more powerful radio and television broadcasts to “unmask the attempts of Western and Romanian intelligence organs” and combat “Romanian nationalist propaganda” from a Marxist-Leninist “scientific position.” The report noted that, since 1968, “up to this moment, over 150 monographs, collections of articles, documents and other publications” had been issued in this effort, not including newspaper articles and reviews. Russian and Soviet officials had been rewriting the history of the region since the late 19th century, largely limiting their creative efforts to the 18th-20th centuries. Moscow now deemed it necessary to get rid of the “exaggerated attention” to the feudal period in school manuals, a period in which the common identity of Romanian princes was evident. This was accompanied by a renewed campaign of anti-Romanian indoctrination within the republic:

The Moldavian Communist Party CC is fully conscious of the exclusive importance of the measures undertaken in connection with the Romanian nationalist and chauvinist propaganda which harms the interests of the USSR, and it translates into life, with all responsibility, the CPSU CC directives connected with the internationalist and patriotic education of the working people, of the formation within it of strong moral qualities and patriotic fidelity to their great Soviet fatherland [**Document 11**].

During the second half of the 1970s, a concerted effort was made to reduce communications and contacts between the Moldavian SSR and Romania [**Documents 11, 12, 16**]. Thus, increasingly draconic restrictions were introduced on the flow of books and periodicals into the republic from Romania, while people-to-people contacts were made extremely difficult, for example, by steadily shutting down private and tourist visits in both

directions, and removing possibilities for Romanian tourist groups to visit only the MSSR without spending the bulk of their visit in other republics [**Documents 12, 16**].⁷⁹

The varied nature of the Romanian subversive threat was examined in minute detail during the 1970s. The message of its broadcasts, for example, was deemed to be “penetrated with the spirit of nationalism, anti-Russianism and anti-Sovietism,” of containing “hostile calumnies of the Maoists,” of proselytizing “the ideas of Eurocommunism,” and of transmitting “diverse Western information” and “bourgeois” ideas [**Document 13**]. Soviet authorities were especially concerned by Bucharest’s role in attempting to consolidate an anti-Soviet Eurocommunism, and the apparent encouragement provided to its efforts by Western media outlets such as the West German *Deutsche Welle*, the Italian *Il Popolo*, the Austrian *Die Presse* and the American *Radio Free Europe*. For example, the Viennese journal enthused about Romanian ability to promote “an amazing foreign policy even at the party level,” while *RFE* and *Deutsche Welle* spoke approvingly of Romanian efforts to mediate between French Communist Party leader G. Marchais and Spanish Communist leader S. Carillo to achieve a “Eurocommunist solidarity” that would counterbalance Soviet influence [**Document 13**].⁸⁰

As always, however, the intra-Soviet anti-Romanian campaign was most concerned about the impact of Bucharest’s “separate course” on the MSSR, noting:

The ideological organs of the SRR continue to send to the address of higher education institutions, libraries, as well as private persons in the republic a large amount of historical, philosophical, artistic literature, etc. (in general, around 100 thousand pages monthly), which contain ideas and conceptions that are dangerous for the Moldavian people [**Document 13**].

Targeting Romania within INTERKIT in the 1970s

While the focus of INTERKIT operations differed considerably from the anti-Romanian operations conducted by the Soviet republics, they often overlapped. Ceaușescu’s explanation to Mao in June 1971 that the danger motivating the 1968 Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia

⁷⁹ Moscow encouraged not only Hungary and Bulgaria but even Mongolia to establish far closer ties to the Moldavian SSR than were permitted to Romania. Fritz Ermarth, “Bodyul Again Attacks Anti-Russian Feeling in Moldavia,” 17 March 1967, Radio Free Europe Research (RFER), OSA, Box 110, Folder 2, File 163, p. 5.

⁸⁰ During the same period, Romania was engaged in a mediation Moscow would have found far more ideologically and strategically offensive had it known. Future Spanish King Juan Carlos asked Ceaușescu, through his emissary Manolo Prado y Colón de Carvajal, to mediate with Spanish Communist Party chief Santiago Carillo, for which Juan Carlos later thanked the Romanian leader. Charles Powell, *Juan Carlos of Spain: Self-Made Monarch* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1995).

had been Kremlin fears of the “serious criticisms against the policy of domination” arising within the Socialist community, underscored how much Bucharest reciprocated the antagonism of Moscow.⁸¹ According to East German intelligence, Ceaușescu’s visit to Beijing was of a fundamentally “anti-Soviet character.”

[T]he visit does not represent, as the RCP maintains, a contribution to general understanding and to the friendship and unity of all socialist states, but is instead directed against the unity and solidarity of the Warsaw Treaty states and the cohesion of the International Communist and Workers’ Movement. The “mediating role,” which the RCP has assumed, only serves the nationalist policies of the SRR and is supposed to demonstrate the growing role of small and medium states in relation to the great powers. It is not to be excluded that the SRR assumed a “mediating” role in the relations between China and the US, as well as the Federal Republic of Germany during this visit.⁸²

The Soviets, Poles, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Czechoslovaks shared the conclusions of their East German colleagues, describing the speeches made during the visit as “anti-Soviet” and “directed against the greater cohesion of the socialist community of states and the International Communist and Workers’ Movement,” while Soviet officials underscored “that the contradictions between China-SRR and the Soviet Union are becoming deeper.”⁸³

At the Crimea meeting in August 1971, Brezhnev declared that “during his trip to China, Ceaușescu did not represent the interests of our community, he acted against the interest of our community.”⁸⁴ Ceaușescu, the Soviet leader announced

leads the fight against us, he is the fundamental obstruction to our line. He has shown this in connection with the opening of diplomatic relations between Romania and the FRG, and now he has shown it with his visit to Beijing. We have had patience regarding Romanian behavior. We must try to exert influence on developments inside the country.⁸⁵

Hungarian leader János Kádár described the variety of Romania’s “treachery”:

⁸¹ *Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and Mao Zedong in Beijing*, 3 June 1971, Document no. 10 in Mircea Munteanu, “Romania and the Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969-1971: New Evidence from the Bucharest Archives,” *CWIHP Bulletin*, no. 16 (2008), pp. 444-445; ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, secție relațiile externe, dos. 39/1971; Budura (2005), pp. 1064-71, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/bulletin-no-16-spring-2008>.

⁸² *Evaluation by the East German Embassy in Bucharest on Ceausescu’s Visit to China*, 11 June 1971, pp. 1-3, PHP. This assessment repeats almost verbatim that made by the *Stasi* in 1969. BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5481, S. 1-38; Herbstritt and Olaru (2005), p. 268.

⁸³ *Evaluation by the East German Embassy in Bucharest on Ceausescu’s Visit to China*, 11 June 1971, pp. 4-7, PHP.

⁸⁴ *Record of the Meeting Between Leonid Brezhnev and East European Party Leaders in the Crimea (Including Discussion on China)*, 2 August 1971, p. 14, PHP.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-43.

Ceaușescu has always abandoned us in critical situations. He abandoned us in the execution of our coordinated policy towards West Germany and against what was agreed in establishing diplomatic relations with the German Federal Republic. He abandoned us in the fight against counter-revolution in the CzSR. Now he has betrayed us by his visit to Beijing. He has betrayed our common position that we took at our 1969 international consultation... Now there is a Beijing-Bucharest-Tirana-Belgrade line. It is all directed against the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and against the CMEA.⁸⁶

Polish leader Eduard Gierek volunteered suggestions as to what might bring the unruly Romanians to heel, the key to the problem being a proactive “offensive”:

I cannot believe that we can exercise no influence over the *Aktiv* of the Romanian Party. One must speak candidly with the people, those whom we know there. When we exercise our influence, Ceaușescu will not be able to avoid this question. We must even now identify those people in Romania on whom we can rely in the future.⁸⁷

Czechoslovak leader Gustáv Husák underscored the futility of dealing with Ceaușescu, seconding Gierek’s recommendation to seek alternative partners among the “people who in the future will support us.”⁸⁸ Ceaușescu, Husák argued, departed so “completely from our agreed line” that he denied “the escalation of the ideological struggle” and the fact that the “imperialists” were “waging a campaign of ideological subversion.”⁸⁹

Regarding Romania’s independent Balkan initiatives, Kádár blamed Bucharest for the formation of an anti-Soviet and anti-Warsaw Pact Beijing-Balkan axis.⁹⁰ Husák likewise condemned the “Beijing-Bucharest-Tirana-Belgrade Bloc.”⁹¹ Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov described how China had taken up “the idea of the Balkan Pact” at Romanian instigation, and that the idea was supported by both “the US and the Chinese.” There was no doubt, Zhivkov claimed, that Romania’s Balkan Pact was designed to be “against the Warsaw Pact with an anti-Soviet impulse.”⁹²

⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 27-29.

⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 31-32.

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 35-36.

⁸⁹ Ibid. This “approved” phrasing apparently originated with KGB chief Andropov, first appearing in his 1967 KGB annual report, delivered in May 1968, and reiterated before KGB cadre in a published speech in October 1968. See, e.g., “New Evidence on Soviet Intelligence: The KGB’s 1967 Annual Report, with Commentaries by Raymond Garthoff and Amy Knight,” *CWIHP Bulletin*, no. 10 (March 1998), pp. 215, 218, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/bulletin-no-10-march-1998>.

⁹⁰ *Record of the Meeting Between Leonid Brezhnev and East European Party Leaders in the Crimea (Including Discussion on China)*, 2 August 1971, pp. 27-29, PHP.

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 35-36.

⁹² Ibid., pp. 21, 23-24.

Summarizing the unanimous opinion regarding the need to influence Romanian policies internally, Brezhnev asserted that “there are also good comrades in Romania,” and that the fraternal “closely cooperating” partners must reach out to through their “embassies there and other contacts.” He then spoke approvingly of a new joint effort of Central Committee International Department and Ideological Department secretaries to “coordinate our common work, [as we have done] for example in connection with China and Romania.”⁹³

The list of intelligence collection priorities for Romania sent to KGB illegals by Moscow Center in 1971 naturally placed its relations with the US and China in first place, given the looming Sino-American rapprochement and Soviet knowledge of it.⁹⁴ Bucharest’s policy regarding the territory and populations of the Moldavian and Ukrainian SSRs was listed immediately after, and underscored Soviet fears of Western and Chinese involvement:

The Romanian Communist Party leadership does not openly reveal its territorial claims; but it does everything to demonstrate that historically, ethnically and in other ways Moldavia and the Chernovitsy [Cernăuți] Oblast belong to Romania. The [1964] statement made by Mao in conversation with Japanese socialists about the USSR’s illegal acquisition of Bessarabia has been developed in Romania. The French newspaper *Le Monde* has twice published articles casting doubt on the legality of Bessarabia’s inclusion in the Union.⁹⁵

KGB collection priorities continued with the “political and economic basis of opposition to the Soviet Union,” the position of German and Hungarian minorities; Ceaușescu’s cult of personality; and the internal politics and disputes of the RCP.⁹⁶ 1971 marked the formal end of a Soviet-Romanian intelligence cooperation that had been superficial since 1963. As a former head of KGB foreign counterintelligence later noted, while “Romanian State Security terminated its ties with the KGB,” the “other Eastern European secret services became even more subservient to the Soviets.”⁹⁷

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 40-43.

⁹⁴ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 270.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid. The 1971 KGB instruction was very similar to that given *Stasi* officers at the beginning of 1969. *Situation of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Imperialist Influence on This Country*, 2 February 1969, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5481, S. 1-38. The *Stasi* variant included minority dissatisfaction also among the Serbs concentrated in the Romanian Banat, between the Yugoslav border and the city of Timișoara.

⁹⁷ Oleg Kalugin, “A Window of Opportunity: Russia’s Role in the Coalition Against Terror,” *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 24, no. 3 (Fall 2002), <http://hir.harvard.edu/intelligence/window-of-opportunity>.

After describing the “agreed foreign policy” of entangling Romania within the Warsaw Pact alliance, a 1972 East German report noted that Romania appeared “objectively” to third parties—China specifically—to be “under the strong and continuing influence of the Soviet Union and other states of the Warsaw Treaty,” and thus an uncertain partner.⁹⁸ From this perspective alone, the entangling policy already “objectively narrowed the maneuvering room” available to Bucharest.⁹⁹ In reality, however, the impact of the entangling policy on actual Romanian behavior was negligible. As the same report explained, the entangling policy of the other Pact members had actually provoked Romania to “strengthen their activities through more numerous bilateral contacts” with China as “counterweight.”¹⁰⁰ Bucharest’s overall “negative attitude” towards Soviet and Warsaw Pact foreign and security policy, its provision of “political assistance to the Chinese,” and its “development of an unprincipled and harmful cooperation with Chinese anti-Sovietism” remained unaffected.¹⁰¹

In a rather evident effort to claim victory while admitting defeat, the report came to the following mutually exclusive conclusions:

The coordinated policies of the states of the Warsaw Pact and CMEA and the stronger involvement of Romania in the common links is a strong counterweight reducing the nuisance of Chinese influence on Romania and strengthening the socialist world system... Despite the existing connections of Romania and the, for Romania, objectively existing necessity of close cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the nationalist orientation of the RCP does not exclude the unconstrained development of opportunistic relations with China and the support of China’s point of view.¹⁰²

The failure of efforts to alienate China from Romania was reflected in the conclusion that the “Romanian-China relationship harms the agreed approach of the socialist countries on the main international issues” and damages the “unity and cohesion of the socialist world system.”¹⁰³

Erich Honecker complained in April 1974 that it was “completely incomprehensible how the Romanian comrades can appreciate the development of their relationships to the Peking

⁹⁸ *Analysis of Romanian-Chinese Relations by the East German Embassy in Bucharest*, 18 December 1972, p. 2, PHP.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 9.

¹⁰⁰ Romania again clashed with the other Pact members on “fundamental issues” of the International Communist Movement and “the Socialist International,” and over “conceptions of domestic and foreign policy.” *Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 9.

leadership ‘as a meaningful contribution to the strengthening of the forces of socialism and the unity of all anti-imperialist forces.’”¹⁰⁴

We ask ourselves how our Romanian comrades reconcile the principles and obligations of our alliance and their pursuit of close ties and military comradeship with the leaders of the Chinese Army, who make no bones about the fact that they are arming up for a military confrontation with the Soviet Army, which is the backbone of our defensive coalition.¹⁰⁵

The May 1974 INTERKIT report—*Analysis of the Romanian Attitude Toward Maoism*—likewise attacked the “demonstrative development” of its relations with China in the political, military, economic, cultural, and ideological domains as “an open affront against the states of the Warsaw Treaty.”¹⁰⁶ Bucharest, the report complained, was motivated by its “deviationist” and “national-opportunistic special position” to align its policy with “Beijing’s goals” and “in opposition to the common line of the states of the socialist community.” It not only praised rapprochement “between China and the imperialist states” as “a success of socialism,” it actively propagated and defended “the current foreign policy course of Beijing:”

The Romanian leadership has repeatedly, openly and indirectly, opposed the collective critical standpoint of the brother parties against the Maoist course. It avoids not only making its own critical comments on the policies of the Chinese leadership but actively opposes the condemnation of Maoism by other parties.¹⁰⁷

Fidel Castro noted during a 1976 meeting with Todor Zhivkov that Cuba had adopted “a similar stance towards China and Romania” as did Bulgaria. According to Castro, Romania was sabotaging the “unity” of Latin American communist parties in condemning China:

The Mexicans are to a certain extent in friendly relations with the Romanians. Whenever someone expresses disagreement with our China policy, the Romanians start brainwashing them trying to instigate conflicts; they take up rousing distrust toward the Soviet Union and breaking up the movement.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ *On the Position of the Socialist Republic of Romania: Additions to the Speech by the East German Head of State (Erich Honecker)*, 4 April 1974, pp. 1-9, PHP.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ *Analysis of the Romanian Attitude Toward Maoism*, May 1974, PHP, pp. 1-6.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ *Minutes of the meeting between Todor Zhivkov and Fidel Castro in Sofia*, 11 March 1976, CSA, Sofia, Fond 1-B, Record 60, File 194, in “Bulgaria and the Cold War,” CWIHP Digital Archive, <http://wilsoncenter.org/digital-archive>.

The positions Romania adopted against Soviet and Warsaw Pact policy within the alliance, in Europe, in the Middle East, in Asia, and in Africa were explained to the Moldavian SSR leadership in July 1978 by the head of the CPSU CC's sector for Romania within the Department for Liaison with Ruling Socialist Parties, V. I. Potapov. All of the "negative tendencies" of Romanian policy, Potapov affirmed, not only "encouraged" and "supported in every way" the policies of Washington and Beijing, they were "exploited" by the US and China:

It is no simple coincidence that during the visit of N. Ceaușescu to these countries they made him a warm, cordial and lavish welcome, and gave speeches praising him. For his part, N. Ceaușescu made—but not from a class position—a series of evaluations of the actions of [President] Carter and [Prime Minister] Hua Guofeng.¹⁰⁹

Brezhnev delivered the same message even more explicitly to Erich Honecker two days earlier. Explaining how Washington and Beijing were using "the differentiated approach to the Socialist countries" in order "to bring them into confrontation with the Soviet Union," the Soviet leader pointed out that

for this purpose they are actively taking advantage of the nationalistic deviations of such politicians as Ceaușescu and make various promises. It is difficult to say something about his behavior. Basically he is a traitor. The devil knows what else he might possibly do.¹¹⁰

The discussion at the December 1978 INTERKIT meeting in Havana of China's "differentiated approach" and its goal of creating "a separate political grouping within the Socialist system" closely echoed one of the basic concerns first expressed by Moscow in 1965, when, after requesting information on Romanian-Chinese party relations, the Kremlin had inquired as to whether there were plans for creating a new center for coordinating "the policy and practice of the international communist movement."¹¹¹ The INTERKIT participants decided "to expose the influence Beijing exerts over the policy of Romania" (and over those of Yugoslavia and North Korea) and "to actively exploit the existing contradictions between the Chinese

¹⁰⁹ Document No. 2 in Watts (2012).

¹¹⁰ *Transcript, Meeting of East German leader Erich Honecker and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, 25 July 1978*, Document 8, "US-Soviet Relations and the Turn Toward Confrontation, 1977-1980—New Russian & East German Documents," *CWIHP Bulletin*, no. 8/9 (Winter 1996), p. 123, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/bulletin-no-89-winter-1996>.

¹¹¹ *Tenth INTERKIT Meeting, Report on 10th Internal China Deliberations of the International Department Delegations*, 11 December 1978, pp. 4, 6, PHP; *Information on the results of familiarization of communists of the Moldavian republic with the letter of the CPSU CC of 30 December 1965*, 12 February 1966, in AOSPRM, fond 51, inventory 27, box 11, file 43-47.

leadership and the leaderships of these countries.”¹¹² A Soviet document prepared for the meeting underscored Romania’s “special place” in Chinese differentiation policy, its aim of increasing party and state political, economic, and military relations with the PRC, and its efforts to form a separate political group in the Balkans.¹¹³ Thus, the Soviet study concluded, “concrete resistance [and] counteraction on the part of the fraternal states, of their collective organs, the exchange of information and the coordination of operations” should be brought to bear on the Romanian target.

Active Measures in the First Half of the 1980s

Soviet Moldavian authorities reported annual “abrupt” increases in Western and Romanian hostile operations against the republic—especially of the “ideological subversion” variety. At the end of the 1970s, for example, they justified their request to KGB Chairman Andropov for a significant increase in KGB personnel (40 officers) by the need of “means specific to State Security” for “curbing subversive activity.”

Recently, the special services and ideological centers of the imperialist states, intensifying their intelligence and undermining activity against the Soviet Union, have considerably increased their hostile efforts towards the Moldavian SSR [**Document 14**].

“These provocative actions,” the request noted, were “fundamentally shared” by the Romanian leadership. This “ideological subversion” was further propagated by the Romanian print and broadcast media, through direct mailings (mail correspondence having “surpassed 500 thousand letters per year”) and through Romanian citizens visiting the republic who sought to indoctrinate the Soviet people “in an anti-Soviet, anti-Russian spirit.” Romania also continued to be viewed as a hotbed of Zionist and clerical agitation, from where such organizations using the “same channels” carried out “an intense subversive activity among persons of Jewish nationality,” complicating “the operational situation in the Moldavian SSR” [**Document 14**].

At the end of 1979, the list of collection requirements from Romania for the MCP CC’s Radio-Interception Group closely resembled those of the KGB and *Stasi* over the past decade:

- Soviet-Romanian relations;

¹¹² *Tenth INTERKIT Meeting, Report on 10th Internal China Deliberations*, 11 December 1978, PHP. See also *Tenth INTERKIT Meeting, Record of Meeting with Fidel Castro*, 14 December 1978, p. 3, PHP

¹¹³ See also *The Politics of the Chinese Leadership after the 11th Congress of the Chinese CP [Politika kitaiskovo Rukovodstva posli XI Syezd a KPK]*, Havana, December 1978, pp. 15-16, PHP.

- Romanian-Chinese relations;
- American-Romanian relations;
- The ties of the SRR with the Western European countries, especially Western tendencies to create cleavages between the USSR and SRR;
- The relations of SRR with Israel and with Egypt in the problems that pertain to the initiative of the Romanian leadership in resolving the crisis in the Middle East;
- The internal situation of the SRR, Romanian reality;
- About the Romanian leadership.

The main differences were three additional categories: (1) "Questions related to the falsification of the history of Moldavia, and to the economy and culture of the republic, [and] other moments which relate to Soviet realities;" (2) the speeches of "former USSR citizens who have emigrated from Moldavia;" and (3) planned actions "to be undertaken in the West by Zionist and other centers" [**Document 15**].

At the end of 1981 yet another impetus was given: "The Continual Intensification of the Struggle Against Bourgeois and Revisionist Propaganda Targeting the Moldavian SSR" mobilized the entire education system and print and broadcast network to bolster and reinforce "a scientific conception of the world," "ideological convictions," "firm political vigilance" and "a class-oriented intransigence towards bourgeois and revisionist propaganda." Although China was mentioned as one of the responsible parties for this propaganda, the central culprits behind the "abruptly intensified hostile actions" seeking "to oppose the Moldavian people to the Russians and other peoples of the USSR" resided in the West and over the Moldavian-Romanian frontier.

Nationalism has become one of the principal means of the imperialist secret services in their subversive actions against real socialism. Implementing an ideological subversion based on bourgeois nationalism, foreign anti-Soviet centers propagate the ideas of "national exclusivity" and "national spirit." ...The coincidence of perspectives shared by reactionary historians in the West and by some researchers in the Socialist Republic of Romania regarding the so-called Bessarabian question and in a series of problems which harm the interests of our country has been noted [**Document 17**].¹¹⁴

The following year, the "Council for the Coordination of Foreign Policy Propaganda" was formed in Chişinău to carry out the "extraordinarily important" task of foreign policy propaganda "under conditions of the increasingly acute ideological struggle in the international arena." The more specific justification for the new council was the "task of permanently

¹¹⁴ The references to "our country" that appear in these documents invariably refer to the USSR rather than any one of its constituent republics.

counteracting the subversive activity of all sorts of falsifiers of the history of the Moldavian people, statehood, language and culture,” with Romanian policies singled out as continually “exercising a negative influence over Moldavian society” [**Document 18**].

During 1983-1984, two major campaigns were launched by Moscow to combat the “New Historical Concept” in Romania and to counteract the “Falsifications of Romanian Sociologists.” The first decision, taken in March 1983 by the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, announced a broad offensive to combat Romanian perspectives on “the history, language, literature, ethnography and culture of the Moldavian people,” as well as on “Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations.” This was to be accomplished through a drastic improvement of “the quality of analysis” emanating from the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, and through a massive increase in “the publication of materials referring to the history of Russo-Romanian, Soviet-Romanian relations and to key problems from the history of Romania and Moldavia, as well as of reviews written by Soviet historians of the works of Romanian authors that contain erroneous historical appreciations.” The list of works to be published from mid-1983 to 1986 included 45 titles, many involving multiple volumes, as well as “series of articles and book reviews referring to key sections from the works of Romanian authors, for the central scientific and republic-wide press” [**Documents 19, 20, 21**].

The second campaign, launched by the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences in November 1984, was prompted by a “recent” increase in Romanian publications tolerating the “transgression of fundamental principles of scientific communism” and “interpretations of a nationalist spirit.” The ideological challenge Bucharest mounted over the concepts of “real socialism,” the “socialist community,” the “passage from capitalism to socialism,” and the “new correlation of forces in the world” apparently concerned central Soviet authorities so much that they decided to mobilize the bulk of educational and research institutions in Moscow, in the Moldavian SSR, and in the Ukrainian SSR to combat it jointly:

The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences [AS] has tasked the History Institute of the USSR, the Institute of Military History, the Institute of Slavistic and Balkanistic Studies, the Institute of Universal Literature, the Institute of General History, the Linguistic Institute, the Institute of Philosophy, the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in close contact with the corresponding scientific institutions of the Ukrainian AS and the Moldavian AS, with undertaking measures for the intensification of the counteracting of the falsifications

in the works of Romanian sociologists ([through] the publication of books, brochures, [and] articles of a counter-propagandistic nature) [**Document 22**].

Again, the Section of Social Sciences of the Academy was urged to "increase the quality" of its work, to adopt a unified view concerning all Romanian historical and contemporary political issues, and to "raise the level of re-censorship" regarding them. In addition, the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences instructed the USSR Council for International Collaboration in the Domain of the Social Sciences, and the Academy's own Directorate for Scientific Collaboration with Socialist Countries, to work directly on their "Romanian colleagues" by involving the latter in more exchanges and activities [**Document 22**].

Seven measures were identified under this campaign for implementation during 1985-1987, including the production and publication of more than a dozen books and articles from the Academy of Sciences designed to be the scientifically authoritative "last word" from the Soviet academy. In an effort to make this process more efficient, an *Outline of the Political History of Romania (1859-1944)* was to be published in five separate Soviet journals (*Problems of History, USSR History, New and Contemporary History, Communist Moldavia, and The Annals of the MSSR AS*), and separate cycles of articles would be published for each of six topics of Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations and Romanian history, as well as for Moldavian history, culture, ethnography, and linguistics, with specifically-designated articles on philosophy, the Church (and defeating it), the economy in Moldavia, and "Valah" (i.e., Wallach or Romanian) ethnography. Collections of articles on the foreign and domestic policies of modern and contemporary Romania, on Slav and Valah ethnography, and radio and TV broadcasts on Moldavian linguistics were planned, while "a group for counterpropaganda and for propagandizing the realizations of Moldavian philological science" was to be created at the Institute of Linguistics and Literature of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences [**Document 23**].

Soviet authorities used to great effect in the 1980s the labels "nationalist," "chauvinist," and "falsifying" to refer to Romanian historiography. However, the fundamental problem that Romanian historiography presented to the USSR ever since the early 1960s was that it agreed in its essentials with "Western bourgeois" historiography (likewise supported by the Chinese on these topics), and that all were found more persuasive by the Moldavians than the Lysenko-style

historiography first imposed by the USSR's Marxist-Leninist ideologues under Stalin. For example, in a report on "new" Romanian "falsifications" in mid-1976, the MCP CC informed the CPSU CC of an observable "numerical increase in the published materials" and "intensification of their anti-Russian, anti-Moldavian and anti-Soviet orientation" in which "many historians of the SRR shared the bourgeois national-chauvinist conceptions of both the current imperialist and Maoist adepts of anti-Sovietism" [Document 11]. MCP chief Ivan Bodiul complained of the unity of perspectives existing between the "Western bourgeois imperialists" and Romania to KGB Chairman Andropov in December 1978:

Recently, the special services and ideological centers of the imperialist states, intensifying intelligence and subversive activity against the Soviet Union, have considerably increased their hostile activities towards the Moldavian SSR. The adversary accords a special attention to undertaking ideological subversion including along the lines of the so-called "Bessarabian question." These provocative actions are, basically, shared by the position of the SRR leadership... [Document 14].

In 1980, the Soviet Embassy in Romania reported to Moscow that the "similarity or identity of modern Romanian opinions with the appreciations of Western bourgeois historiography vis-à-vis many events regarding Russo-Romanian and Soviet Romanian relations" increased the difficulty in countering it and required special handling, something which he recommended be "coordinated" with Hungary and Bulgaria.¹¹⁵ The following year the Moldavian CP CC underscored the "harm" done to the interests of the USSR by this "coincidence of points of view shared by the reactionary historians of the West and of some researchers of the [SRR]" [Document 17]. In 1982, the head of the MCP CC Bureau explained that while the insistence of "bourgeois ideology" in misrepresenting or negating "in every way possible the successes of the Moldavian people," the "centuries-old fraternal ties with the Russian people," and the "progressive importance of the joining of Bessarabia to Russia" caused problems in and of themselves, the situation was considerably "aggravated by the fact that the Socialist Republic of Romania adopts an approach in common with bourgeois historiography in the treatment of the above-mentioned problems."¹¹⁶

Nor had this situation altered in 1986, when the MCP Central Committee complained yet again to the CPSU CC that "bourgeois and revisionist propaganda abruptly intensified their

¹¹⁵ Document no. 32 in Negru and Negru (2010), pp. 120-125; AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 54, dosar 7, filele 13-19.

¹¹⁶ Document 36 in Negru and Negru (2010), pp. 137-138; AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 59, dosar 3, filele 75-76.

activities against our republic.” As the MCP CC underscored, the “historians, publicists and means of mass information from the Socialist Republic of Romania” had “have aligned themselves with the falsifying calumnies of the bourgeois ideologists,” making common cause with it [**Document 24**].

Ending INTERKIT, Redoubling Operations Targeting “Objective 24”

INTERKIT, which began tottering in 1983, finally shut down after the dismissal of the hardline CPSU CC International Department chief, Oleg Rakhmanin, in 1986.¹¹⁷ In striking contrast, during the same period intra-Soviet anti-Romanian operations received new impetus. Although based on the same fundamental concerns that had driven it from the beginning (clashes over Moldavian identity and over the legitimacy of Soviet claims to Moldavian territory), this redoubled effort was now motivated by fears of Moscow’s looming inability to preserve the Moldavian SSR within the Union given the reappearance, formalization, and rapidly-growing strength of indigenous national movements.

Although no less trenchant than former incarnations, after 1985 these operations acquired an even more schizophrenic aspect. For example, in 1986 an indirect acknowledgement that ethnic Romanian Moldavians were disenfranchised appeared with the relative liberalism that began to characterize Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies, albeit in an entirely exculpatory manner that directed the blame onto local Moldavian leaders [**Document 24**]. On the other hand, the campaign plan for 1986-1990 established as a “permanent” task “an increase by all means in the role of the Russian language as the language of interethnic communication, as an important means of consolidating the international unity of the Soviet people,” with “special attention” to be accorded to “inculcating military [conscripts] and pre-military youth with the Russian language” [**Document 25**].

As usual, the cause of the new directive was given as a “recent” and “abrupt intensification of bourgeois and revisionist propaganda operations,” fully supported by a “series of historians, publicists and means of mass information from the Socialist Republic of Romania,” and by Romanian tourists who, “educated in the spirit of nationalist and chauvinist calumnies of Romanian bourgeois and revisionist historiography,” try to spread their ideas among the

¹¹⁷ Hershberg et al. (2011), pp. 28-31.

population of the republic [Document 24]. Again, the problem was not only that Romanians were doing it, but that Moldavians were receptive to it. The report criticized the Moldavian Academy of Sciences, its research institutions, and the central university in Chişinău for tolerating “nationalist and localist opinions in discussions, reviews and scientific treatises,” for departing from “party-mindedness, [and] from clear class positions” in evaluating past events and personalities, and for failing to conform to CPSU and Moldavian CP requirements for “patriotic and international education, the offensive character of counter-propaganda, and the timely unmasking of the falsifiers and distorters of the historic past, of socialist and communist construction” [Document 24]. Among the mandated publications (including a new six-volume *History of the Moldavian SSR*), lectures, and broadcasts for 1986-1990 that indicated the main preoccupations of Soviet authorities were *The Historical Importance of the Joining of Bessarabia and Left Bank of Transnistria to Russia*; “Defense of the Fatherland—The Constitutional Obligation of the Soviet Family”; and “The Way of Life—The Soviet Way” [Document 25].

Interestingly, in a republic infamous within the USSR for remaining at the tail end of infrastructural investment and economic development, central authorities deemed it necessary to criticize the MSSR for being insufficiently motivated in “the fulfillment of the delivery contracts beyond the borders of the republic,” calling for “the increase of the contribution of Moldavian SSR working people to the development of the unique complex of the national economy of the USSR” [Documents 24, 25].

A second element differentiating the post-1985 anti-Romanian campaign from its predecessors was the requirement for heightened secrecy imposed by the Kremlin. Previously, for example, both CPSU CC decisions and the implementing Moldavian CP CC instructions made explicit reference to the Romanian target. Even those documents referring to KGB operations listed Romania with the US, FRG, and Israel as the “adversary.” [See, e.g., Documents 3, 11, 15] After 1985, Romania received a codename designation and the country gradually dropped out of KGB reporting (at least within this campaign), even though offensive “Romanian” actions continued to be labeled as such.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ Central instructions for heightened security to conceal anti-Romanian operations had been given to the East German intelligence service in the spring of 1983. According to the instruction delivered by the head of the analytic department (ZAIG), the *Stasi* was to “employ only absolutely trustworthy sources, operating under the strictest

By 1986, the KGB USSR and the KGB of the Moldavian SSR referred to Romania in their internal documents as "Objective 24" [Documents 26, 27]. For example, when reporting in July 1987 on the degree to which it had implemented decisions of the USSR KGB Collegium from the previous year, the KGB MSSR noted that the "modified entry and exit regime of the USSR" was being used by "the propagandistic and religious centers of Objective 24" for conducting its subversive activities [Document 26].¹¹⁹ Apparently, Section 5 of the KGB MSSR, which had responsibility (among others) for anti-clerical and anti-church operations, had

not yet utilized all possibilities for the intensification of ideological-educational work in the aim of actively counteracting the subversive actions of the special services and ideological centers of the adversary, [and] ending the negative activities of some persons on the territory of the republic. This work did not show enough aggressiveness, foresight, [or] orientation towards subversive centers and specific foreign anti-Soviet organizations, which frequently permitted them to implement their plans regarding the inspiration of nationalist manifestations [and] hostile pro-Zionism [Document 26].

General-Lieutenant G.M. Volkov, the Chairman of the Moldavian SSR KGB, maintained that an all-out offensive was required, including the use of "persons of trust from among the ranks of people of science, culture and art," in order to neutralize "the subversive activity of the adversary" by identifying and isolating the "emissaries of the adversary" and imposing "permanent and reliable operational control" over them [Document 26].

The character of new operations under conditions of an "aggravated" operational situation, new "modifications in the tactics of the adversary," and the shift "from the concept of fighting against ideological subversion to the concept of defending the Soviet constitutional regime" were described by the new Moldavian SSR KGB chief, Gheorghe Lavranchuk, in November 1989 [Document 27]. After citing "heightened social tensions, confrontations in the

requirements of conspiracy and secrecy, to obtain intelligence on the main problems and developments in the SRR [Socialist Republic of Romania]. It must in no case be observed that the MfS [Ministerium für Staatssicherheit: Ministry for State Security] has taken specific measures; the sources must not undertake any intelligence collection that could allow other persons or organs to discover or recognize the purposes they pursue." *Note of the Chief of the Evaluation and Information Group to the chiefs of Stasi units requesting the evaluation of the possibilities for the Stasi to inform itself with regard to the internal situation in the SRR*, 29 March 1983, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 7120, S. 282-3; Document No. 25 in Herbstritt and Olaru (2005), p. 354.

¹¹⁹ The KGB MSSR target list included alongside these "subversive" centers of "Objective 24" the "Romanian Section of Radio Free Europe," the Italy-based institute of wealthy Romanian-exile Iosif Constantin Dragan, the "Union of Jewish Women of Canada," the "Slav Mission," and the "NTS [National Alliance of Russian Solidarists] section in London."

domain of interethnic relations, and attempts to form parallel political authority,” KGB Chief Lavranchuk reported:¹²⁰

On the basis of the processes taking place in the republic, the reorientation of the aspirations of the special services of the adversary, principally the US, FRG, Israel, [and] the special organs of Objective 24, as well as other foreign subversive centers tied to them for obtaining information of a political nature, has been noted. Using the legal modifications in the domain of international relations, the open character of our society, their representatives seek, from the artificially exaggerated positions on the Bessarabian and Jewish questions, as well as under the mask of religion, to bring political prejudice, to create a network of informers, a basis for the realization of some anti-constitutional and other hostile actions, to transfer them onto the territory of Moldavia [**Document 27**].

Citing two central KGB decisions—one from September 1989 “About the Tasks of the State Security Organs of the USSR Regarding the Defense of the Soviet Constitutional Regime,” and another unnamed decision also issued by the KGB USSR in October 1989 on the implementation of the earlier decision—the KGB of the Moldavian SSR had decided that

the inspectorates, together with the operational subunits must elaborate by the first trimester of 1990, proposals for the continual improvement of the interaction and coordination of activities for the fight against the actions of adversarial special services and of the foreign anti-Soviet centers used by them. To complete, by the same term, with organizational and operational measures the lineal plans of the general committees for the fight against the special services of the US, FRG, Israel (“Kedr,” “Vektor,” “Foton”) and against the special organs of Objective 24 (“Zaslon”).

The leadership and operational personnel of Section I and of Section “3” must be established by 1 March 1990, in the aim of renewing the fight against the adversary, the subversive centers of the US, FRG, Israel, and other countries, as well as the propagandistic organs of Objective 24, which have the republic in their sights [**Document 27**].

Perhaps coincidentally, even the codename assigned the operations against “Objective 24” suggests a heightened degree of secrecy regarding the nature and aims of those operations. While the operations against the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Israel were given innocuous codenames such as CEDAR (“Kedr”), VECTOR (“Vektor”), and PHOTON (“Foton”), the operations against Romania were codenamed COVER or SCREEN (“Zaslon”).

A clear priority was to identify the means by which anti-Soviet information was introduced into the USSR, especially the “emissaries and missionaries of anti-Soviet centers and

¹²⁰ Lavranchuk blamed the “extremist wing” of the National “Popular Front of Moldova” as the principal culprit, alleging that it “systematically” provoked “mass disorder, anti-social actions,” and “disobedience towards authorities.”

organizations.” The KGB sought “to paralyze their political intelligence collection operations” and “to obstruct destabilizing operations, first of all, in the domain of international relations.” While the KGB’s Section 5 was dissolved, it appears that the new Section 3 inherited similar anti-clerical and anti-church responsibilities for preventing “attempts by foreign clerical centers” to inculcate Soviet citizens and groups with “an anti-socialist state of mind on the basis of clericalism” [Document 27].

In light of assumptions made in the West after 1989 about the co-identification of civilizations with perceived religious communities, and given post-communist revelations that the senior hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church worked for Soviet intelligence, the targeting of the Romanian Orthodox Church as a “subversive center” by the Soviet KGB is at least interesting.¹²¹ The instruction of the Moldavian SSR KGB to its new Section 3 to “neutralize the aims of the Patriarchy of Objective 24 of influencing the clerics in a pro-Romanian nationalist spirit” indicates that clandestine warfare rather than community characterized the relationship even between Russian and Romanian Orthodoxy [Document 27].

Conclusion

The timing of INTERKIT suggests that the development of the “China International” to counter the subversive activities of Beijing and the development of concurrent anti-Romanian operations involving several republics within the USSR were at least parallel preoccupations for Moscow. These Soviet documents suggest that prior experience in structuring anti-Romanian operations during 1964-1968 may even have influenced the structural evolution of INTERKIT during 1965-1969.

The dedication of resources within the intra-Soviet effort to counter Romanian policy and actions was impressive. Moscow marshaled central Soviet, Moldavian, and Ukrainian education institutions, and informational, ideological, economic, and security bodies in a joint effort to combat subversive currents both produced by and funneled through Romania. The consistency of

¹²¹ For Romania’s assimilation to the Russian Orthodox “civilization” see Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993). See also all the subsequent editions of his book by the same name, including the 2011 edition. Huntington also assigned the 80 percent Romanian Orthodox region of Transylvania to the Catholic and Protestant “civilization.” For KGB agents within the Russian Orthodox Church see Andrew and Mitrokhin (2001), pp. 486-507.

this resource allotment indicates that Romania was a much greater concern and higher priority for Soviet security policy than the West understood at the time.

The “enemy-imaging” of Romania by the USSR and Warsaw Pact that became manifest along intelligence lines by the mid-1960s soon extended to the level of party leaderships as well. Although an organized intra-Pact structure based on INTERKIT was proposed in 1971, more research is required to identify the specific elements of the intra-Pact operation vis-à-vis Bucharest, and ultimately its fate. Consistent references throughout the 1970s and at least until 1983 to a jointly-decided Warsaw Pact policy towards Romania underscore its central purposes as limiting the damage from Romania’s “separate course” and entangling the country within the alliance, both as a means of restricting its further bad behavior and as a means of isolating it from outside sources of presumably anti-Soviet support—particularly from China and the West.

Interestingly, Mikhail Gorbachev’s introduction of *perestroika* and liberalization of Soviet-Eastern Europe relations elsewhere made no discernible impact on the Soviet view of Romania as an actively subversive enemy in the same category as the US, West Germany, and Israel. Even if INTERKIT was indeed the last “International” launched by the USSR, it was not the last one standing at the end of the Cold War. Coordinated operations against the Romanian target—now designated “Objective 24” in KGB documents—continued past 1986 until at least the end of 1989. Whether or not they continued past 1989, and if so for how long, remains to be determined.

In spite of Western presumptions that Soviet-Romanian differences during the latter 1980s were motivated by the clash of Gorbachev’s relatively liberal reformism with Ceaușescu’s anti-reformist orthodoxy, these Soviet documents indicate that the reasons for Moscow’s confrontation with Bucharest remained exactly the same as they had been throughout the Cold War—control over Moldavian/Bessarabian territory and the ethnic identity of its majority population. Further research is necessary to determine whether the policy continuity evident in party leadership and KGB reports of the Moldavian SSR into the late 1980s accurately reflects central Soviet policy, or whether it better indicates the extent of the breach between the Gorbachev camp and Soviet hard-liners already manifest in Moscow.¹²²

¹²² For the dimensions of this conflict see, e.g., *Gorbachev’s Growing Confrontation with the KGB: A Coming Showdown?* (SOV 88-10045X), 1 June 1988 (declassified 20 January 2001), CIA.

Close study of the Soviet Union's Romanian operations may also shed at least indirect light on the otherwise anomalous anti-reformist obstinacy of the Ceaușescu regime. While the warm winds of Gorbachev's liberalization were felt throughout the rest of the Soviet bloc, the political atmosphere along the Soviet-Romanian border was as glacial as ever, and with no thaw in sight. In light of the relentless antagonism of actual Soviet policy in this corner of the world, essentially unchanged since the 1960s, Bucharest's tendency to perceive Gorbachev's *perestroika* as little more than a rhetorical exercise is hardly surprising.

APPENDIX: SELECTED DOCUMENTS

Document No. 1

Secret, MCP Central Committee, No. 101 s, 1 July 1966 [Chişinău] to CPSU Central Committee

[Source: Arhiva Organizațiilor Social-Politice a Republicii Moldova [Archive of Social-Political Organizations of the Republic of Moldova] (AOSPRM), fond. 51, inv. 27, dosar 98, filele 35-45; Document No. 3 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova" [The MCP and Nationalism: Documents Collected within the Research Program for the Commission for the Study and Evaluation of the Communist Totalitarian Regime in the Republic of Moldova], Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 31-37. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

Regarding the fact that, recently, in party and community circles in Romania one observes a tendency towards the revision and falsification of the most important theses referring to the historical past and present of the Moldavian people, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia considers necessary to express its attitude towards this and to expose the motives regarding the measures which should, in our opinion, be undertaken in order to prevent negative phenomena in Moldavia.¹²³

In the course of the last century, all the governments of Romania, regardless of their political orientation, have recognized the liberating mission of Russia in the Balkans, its decisive role in the liberation of the Danubian Principalities from under the Turkish yoke and their unification in the unitary Romanian state. This corresponds with objective reality. As the founders of Marxism rightly noted, the Balkan peoples "looked to Petersburg in anticipation of the Messiah that would liberate them from all evil," and saw "in Russia their real support, their liberation." (K. Marx and F. Engels, opera, ed. a 2-a, vol. 9, p. 9)

The hopes of the Balkan peoples were totally justified. At the price of enormous sacrifices and want, the Russians and the other peoples of Russia destroyed the military power of the Ottoman Empire, they undermined the multi-century foreign yoke, and they created the premise for the formation of the national sovereign states in this region.

The grateful peoples, among them the Romanians, raised numerous monuments to the liberating Russian soldiers to show their profound gratitude [and] gave Russian names to many villages. This strong sentiment is transmitted from one generation to the next.

¹²³ Translator's note: In conformity with common usage at the time, the terms "Moldavia" and "Moldova" are used to differentiate the territory and populations residing in the Moldavian SSR and in the northeastern province of Moldova in Romania. However, the Romanian language used in Romania proper as well as in Moldavia/Moldova employs the same term ("Moldova") for both, and before the Russian empire extended into the region in the 18th century the term "Moldova" referred to one territorial unit that included both Romanian Moldova and most of the territory that eventually comprised the Moldavian SSR (as well as the Bugeac region now in Ukraine). After 1989 the US State Department Geographer officially established the English name of the new independent state as the Republic of Moldova while referring to the Romanian province as "Moldavia" for purposes of differentiation, thus reversing previous practice.

Contrary to historical facts and accepted traditions, in recently published materials, especially on the occasion of 100 years of the formation of the Romanian state, this event is treated in a new manner, which comes into contradiction with the generally recognized historical reality, ostentatiously ignoring the liberating mission of Russia.

The newspaper *Scanteia* of 24 January 1966 writes, in the article consecrated to this event, that the neighboring countries of the Danubian Principalities "used every opportunity to intervene in its internal affairs, to occupy some parts of their territory, these factors over a long period of time impeded the unification of the Romanian lands (!) into a powerful unitary state." The same newspaper, in the number from 24 January 1966, notes "the union of 1859 constituted the first step in the process of the formation of the Romanian national state, which concluded in the second decade of the future century with the unification of all the territories populated by Romanians." In other periodical publications it is directly affirmed that "in 1918 the unification of all of the territories populated by Romanians was completed." As is known, in that year the Romanian kingdom occupied Bessarabia.¹²⁴

Such a reflection of the historical past of Romania, from our perspective, is not limited only to passing in silence over the historic role of Russia in the destinies of the Balkan peoples, but is done directly with the aim of discrediting the glory of Russia among the ranks of the peoples of this region and of demonstrating that it pursued the same aim as other great monarchies of occupying foreign lands and enslaving other peoples. An evident tendency of demonstrating that in 1812 Russia annexed a part of the territory of the Romanian unitary state is observable. As is known, up until 1859 no Romanian state existed. In the same order of ideas, the occupation of Bessarabia in 1918 is treated as an act of reunification of the Romanian lands, while the just solution of the Bessarabian question in 1940 is considered by broad circles in Romania as an unjust act of dividing the Romanian people.

In our opinion, these are grave accusations, which address important, principled aspects of the relations between the Romanian and Soviet peoples, which formed long ago. If a riposte is not given, such tendencies can weaken the sentiment of gratitude and the ties of friendship towards the Russian people from the other peoples of the Balkans.

Allow us to say that our Soviet historical science is far from doing all it can for convincing public opinion, as it is formed among the peoples of the world, regarding the liberation of the Balkans and the formation of independent national states in this region. This historical period of the Russian state is insufficiently clarified, an objective overview of the role of our fatherland in the destiny of the Balkan peoples that it merits in reality [is lacking]. On the contrary, many works exaggerate the policy of Tsarist annexation in this region, which, of course, took place, but not in the measure in which it is affirmed today.

History knows many facts of an inverse nature—the tendency of the Moldavian people to live with the Russian in a unitary state. In the course of the XIII-XIX centuries, Moldavian princes addressed requests for Moldavia to be received under its protection. One of these addresses terminated with the conclusion, in 1711, of an understanding regarding the passage of the entire principality of Moldavia into the body of Russia.

Such examples must be broached more widely by our historical science as incontestable facts of the aspirations and hopes of the Moldavian people.

¹²⁴ The form used by Soviet authorities for the Romanian kingdom was "royal Romania."

It would be opportune, for maintaining the noble sympathies of the Balkan peoples towards Russia and the consolidation of friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the East European countries, to publish a scientific work about the period of the Balkans under the Turkish yoke with the combined efforts of the savants of the USSR, Romania, Bulgaria, possibly Yugoslavia and Hungary.

The Romanian comrades call for the change of the decisions of their Third, Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses, they revise the decisions of the COMINTERN referring to the Romanian Communist Party and the situation in Romania. These documents, as is known, note the occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina [by Soviet forces] for the reunion with the Soviet Union, confirm the existence of an independent Moldavian nation, give a somber appreciation the Romanian Communist Party, and characterize the policy of aggression of the leaders of Romanian kingdom and their camarilla with German fascism against the USSR.

Now an attempt to justify the entrance of bourgeois Romania in the war on the side of fascist Germany is underway, placing doubt on the fact of the enslavement of the working peoples of Bessarabia by the Romanian imperialists and on the truthfulness of the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants of Bessarabia for reunion with the Soviet fatherland.

Comrade Ceausescu, speaking about the above-mentioned documents, declared that they raised the problem of the development of permanent and intense work oriented towards the so-called “liberation from Romanian imperialism” of “the repressed peoples” on the basis of the principal of the rights of nations to self-determination up to their full separation from the respective state. “The proposal in the party documents of slogans of self-determination up to separation from the unitary state, the indications given to fight for the breaking off from Romania of some territories, whose overwhelming majority population was made up of Romanians, failed to take into consideration the concrete conditions of Romania, which is a unitary state. They were profoundly in error, calling, in fact, for the dismemberment of the national state, for the separation of the Romanian people.” (*Informational Bulletin of the Romanian Communist Party CC*, no. 3, 1966, p. 34).

This is a gravely serious declaration, which radically harms the interests of our country and which merits, in our opinion, a rapid response.¹²⁵ It is necessary even from the beginning of the birth of such tendencies in order to prevent their dangerous consequences.

Taking into consideration the fact that the reevaluation of some absolutely correct deeds from the past radically harms, in the first place, the national and social interests of the Moldavian people, it would probably be opportune to expose the true character of this period, without adopting a polemical tone, and, on the basis of historical facts, to demonstrate the inconsistency of such declarations. In this sense, certainly only as an approximation, the following materials are annexed.

In the attempt to justify the occupation of Bessarabia at the beginning of 1918, the bourgeois ideologues of Romania complicated the question of the Romanian nation, they began to ignore the fact of the existence of the independent Moldavian nation, and to identify the Moldavians with the Romanians.¹²⁶

Public opinion in Romania concerning the national question is now formed in this same spirit as well.

¹²⁵ Bodiul's refers to the USSR when using the terminology “our country” rather to any of its component parts, e.g., the Moldavian SSR.

¹²⁶ The term “nation” as used in these documents is best translated as “people” or “ethnicity.”

To this end, recently, in official Romanian documents as well as in literature, on the radio and on television, materials have begun to appear, which give an incorrect characterization of many bourgeois personalities from the past, portraying them as great revolutionaries when, in reality, some of them (Nicolae Iorga, Octavian Goga, Constantin Stere, Titu Maiorescu) were a bunch of hardcore reactionaries, nationalist bourgeoisie, and traitors of the Moldavian people. In the periodical press excerpts from the works of men of culture from the past are systematically published, containing categorical affirmations such as that all Moldavians are Romanians. In spite of this, it is known that following the joining of Bessarabia to Russia and in connection with the beginning of the development of capitalist relations, in this region the process of the formation of the Moldavian nation began long before [the same process began] in Romania, where the debut of this process occurred only after 47 years.

By virtue of these circumstances, the Moldavian and Romanian nations formed independently, on different territories, in different conditions. The Moldavian nation formed under the influence of the Western countries, primarily France. As a result of these two directions of the development of nations, profound differences developed in the traditions, culture, language, [and] aspirations of these people.

Likewise, the process of the formation of the Moldavian socialist nation concluded much earlier than it began in the constitution of the socialist Romanian nation.

The Romanian Communist Party of the past, dedicated to the principles of proletarian internationalism, adopted an active attitude against the bourgeois-nationalist falsification of the history of the Moldavian people and of Soviet-Romanian relations, which found its reflection in numerous party documents, including the resolution of the Fourth Romanian Communist Party Congress (1928),¹²⁷ in which it is written that the Romanian bourgeoisie, desiring to justify the annexation of Bessarabia, sought to demonstrate that the Moldavians, which constitute the relative majority population of Bessarabia, are Romanians, at a time when the Moldavian population considered itself, even in reality, as an independent nationality, with its own culture, and fought together with the other nationalities of Bessarabia against its national and class repressors—the Romanian bourgeoisie. This struggle of the working people of Bessarabia was manifest in the tendency of union with RASSM.¹²⁸ Our party is obligated to support in every way the struggle of the working people of Bessarabia for the union with RASSM (Soviet Moldavia).

During the entire period of the occupation of Bessarabia, Romanian communists, all progressive proletariats, as well as progressive intellectuals in Romania supported the active and relentless struggle of the Moldavian people for liberation and reunion with the Soviet fatherland.

¹²⁷ Only one of the five official RCP leaders between 1924 and April 1944 held Romanian citizenship, and none were ethnically Romanian. The removal of the Hungarian RCP leader for "trying to serve the interests of the Magyar government in Budapest and not those of the International," and his replacement by a member of the Ukrainian Communist Party at the 1928 Fourth RCP Congress mentioned here (held in Kharkov, Ukrainian SSR), underscored the nature and degree of the problem. Ghita Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania 1944-1962*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 27.

¹²⁸ The RASSM—the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic, which preceded the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, was first proposed by a COMINTERN working group in the early 1920s as a platform for spreading communism into and over Romania, beginning with Bessarabia. It included part of what constituted the breakaway Transnistrian entity and a small portion of the Ukrainian SSR. When Soviet forces occupied Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina in 1940 the borders were quickly redrawn to include Bessarabia and return that portion of the Ukrainian SSR back to the Ukraine. Northern Bucovina was also annexed to the Ukrainian SSR.

In opposition to the objective aspirations of the Moldavian people, the Romania press often affirms the ancient hopes of the Romanians who populate Bessarabia, which, as noted, refers to the Moldavians, to unify with their fatherland Romania. Such an attitude towards the Moldavian people humiliates its national dignity, falsifies its true hopes, ignores the heroic revolutionary struggle for Soviet power and comes into contradiction with reality.

Long before the October Revolution, the proletariat of Bessarabia became involved in revolutionary activity. The Moldavian people defended with abnegation the Soviet power in the Civil War. It is proud of the deeds of the heroes coming from the peoples of this area: M. V. Frunze, Gr. I. Kotovski, S. G. Lazo, A. S. Krusser, I. E. Iakir, I. F. Fedko, the thousands of ordinary soldiers who fought together with the Russian proletariat against the occupiers and against internal counterrevolution in order to construct socialism in a united family of the Soviet peoples. During the entire 22 year occupation of Bessarabia, the struggle of the working people of the region for the reunification with the Soviet fatherland did not stop. The uprising of Tatarbunar (1924) was appreciated worldwide as the greatest manifestation of that time. The Moldavians also actively participated in the Great War for the Defense of the Fatherland for throwing out the [German] invaders and their Romanian allies from their native soil.

All of this constitutes a meaningful confirmation of the true aspirations of the Moldavian people, its fervent desire to remain forever together with the Great people of the USSR.

The Moldavian people remember with pride the patriotism of their forefathers who fought to join with Russia, for its economic and cultural progress. It attributes a beneficent influence to Great Russia. It sees itself happy to live and work in a powerful unitary state, in which it finds all of its friends and brothers.

It seems to us that the problem regarding the renunciation of their point of view and attitude towards the Moldavian people, towards the recognition of the Moldavian SSR, must be raised directly with the Romanian comrades. It is known that the Moldavian SSR does not exist on the geographic maps published in Romania. Nor does it exist in official relations, in literature, in Romanian art. This is considered by our people as an ignoring of Soviet Moldavian statehood, of the Socialist Moldavian nation. This incorrect attitude on the part of the Romanian leadership organs towards Soviet Moldavia, in our opinion, stands at the basis of the relations of reciprocity with our country, of its actions in international policy.

From our perspective, all of this attains major importance as more and more materials in which our historical past and present are falsified accumulate. Bourgeois propaganda uses this in order to incite hatred of the Romanian people towards the Soviet people, animating a nationalist state of mind in Romania, exerting a negative influence on the moral-political situation of the Moldavian people.

We believe that the revision of their attitude towards Soviet Moldova by the Romanian comrades would offer us the possibility of resolving many problems regarding the internationalist education of the people, and the consolidation of friendship between our peoples and between the other peoples of the Balkan states. It would liberate the Romanian people, many cadres, from the burden of hatred towards the foreign Moldavian people, of the consequences of nationalist tendencies, which are persistent enough in Romania among the déclassé elements, it would open up the possibility of organizing an exchange of experience in the construction of

socialism between the frontier counties, it would permit the resolution of many other problems.¹²⁹

Sooner or later however such a question will have to be raised, probably, directly with the Romanian comrades. We should not be afraid of it, because from everything it can be seen that many leaders of Romania have fallen victim to their illusions and could perceive such a sincere discussion in this regard positively. Certainly, this is our point of view, for which many aspects are not accessible, but it is based upon public opinion in Moldavia.

The negation, across our country's borders, of the independence of the Moldavian people, of its culture, and traditions, the falsification of its true desires and aspirations provokes the justified indignation of the republican public opinion.

The above-mentioned misrepresentation has had a direct influence over a certain portion of the population of the republic. Some representatives of the privileged intellectuals, in principle coming from the layers of the population that were privileged in the past, who finished their studies in educational institutions of the Romanian kingdom, praise everything that is Romanian, accept the affirmation regarding the total community of Moldavians and Romanians. They affirm, in every way possible, that the Moldavian people is losing its national specificity, thus admitting attacks against the Russian brothers.

Unhealthy deeds and attitudes were communicated to the CPSU CC in a series of information reports. The measures undertaken by the Moldavian CP CC regarding the intensification of internationalist education of the working people of the republic were explained.

The appearance in the republic of some unhealthy states of mind and of some extremely dangerous tendencies of a nationalist nature (of a pro-Romanian orientation), which were not signaled earlier, seriously worries the Moldavian CP CC, they provoke circumspection of persons of other nationalities who live in Moldavia, complicating the political situation.

In this atmosphere, probably, we find ourselves in the wrong position, when in order not to admit a negative reaction in Romania, we limit the Moldavian people in the development of national holidays tied with such remarkable dates as the joining of Bessarabia to Russia in 1812, the liberation of Bessarabia from under the Romanian bourgeois occupation in 1940, the passing over in silence of the merciless beatings by the bourgeois-landowner occupiers of the Moldavian people, the national privations and lack of national rights. This gives birth to some false rumors in the republic, the disorientation of public opinion abroad and is used by our ideological adversaries in anti-Soviet propaganda. In our opinion, it would be correct that the principal historical events which have taken place in the life of the Moldavian people, in its relations with Romania, should be objectively exposed from a class position and in the interests of the socialist community of nations.

The Moldavian CP CC is conscious of the responsibility which falls upon the party organization for the political education of the working people in the spirit of friendship and fraternity between peoples of the Soviet Union. We understand that the use in this aim of the facts from the historical past and from the present of the Moldavian people must take into account the general political situation in the world, the relations of reciprocity between the Soviet Union and Romania, profound Marxist-Leninist analysis and well-argued treatments. In order to assure such an approach and the correctitude of raising the above-mentioned issues,

¹²⁹ The term "county" is used here for similar administrative subunits in the Moldavian SSR and Romania. The former used the Russian term—"raion"—the latter the term—"județi." Soviet/Russian documents are inconsistent in their references to the Romanian administrative subunits, sometimes using "raion" and sometimes "județi."

taking into consideration all of the circumstances, we have need of certain assistance from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at the CPSU CC, and of a series of institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences and of the apparatus of the CPSU CC.

In our opinion, it would be opportune to prepare and to publish in the Moldavian language, Russian and in a series of foreign languages a series of historical studies (monographs, brochures, atlases, etc.) and articles in central periodicals, on the radio and television broadcasts that bring to the attention of wider public opinion—Soviet and foreign—the truth [p. 37] about the Moldavian people, about its authentic history and about the true reality of its contemporary life.

MCP CC Secretary, I. Bodiul (signature)

Document No. 2

Top Secret, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia, 3 June 1968 [Chișinău]

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 29, dosar 13, filele 3, 9-16; Document No. 4 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 37-44. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

Transcript No. 53

of the Meeting of the Central Committee Bureau of the Communist Party of Moldavia

Cde. Bodiul presided.

Participants:

Member Central Committee Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cdes. Voronin, Diorditsa, Iliashenko, Cornovan, Melkov, Pascari
Candidate Member Central Committee Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cde. Sidorenko
Member Party Commission in the CC of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cde. Berechet
Member Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cdes. Volosiuk, Corobceanu, Melnik, Dagai, Savochiko, Stepanov, Tarushkin, Cheban
Candidate Members Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cdes. Zhivaev, Parfentiev, Pasikovski
Deputies of Chiefs of CC Sections of Moldavian Communist Party	Cdes. Antoniuk, Bazin
Correspondent <i>Pravda</i>	Cde. Bogatenko
Deputy Editor <i>Sovietskaia Moldavia</i>	Cde. Sosnin
President State Committee for Radio Broadcasting and Television of the Council of Ministers of the Moldavian SSR	Cde. Lozan

2. On The Measures Concerning the Implementation of the CPSU CC Decision "With Regard to the Measures of Assistance to the Moldavian SSR for the Improvement of Ideological Work"

(Cdes. Voronin, Melkov, Diorditsa, Cornovan, Pascari, Iliashenko, Bodiul)

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia notes that the CPSU CC Decision of 6 May 1968, "With Regard to the Measures of Assistance to the Moldavian SSR in the Improvement of Ideological Work," approved measures oriented towards improving ideological work in the republic, amongst which:

1. It proposed to the central press organs (the newspapers *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, *Selskaia Zhizni*, *Ekonomicheskhaia gazeta*, the journals *Kommunist*, *Partiinaia Zhizni*, *Voprosi Istorii KPSS*, *Voprosi Istorii*, etc.), TASS, APN, and the Committee for

Press at the USSR Council of Ministers to improve propaganda about the achievements of Moldavia in the fraternal family of Soviet peoples, of the prospering of the Moldavian nation, of the revolutionary traditions of the Moldavian Communist Party, of the role of its leaders in the construction of communism. To draw into the publication of materials in the press leading figures of public life, publicists, and scientific and cultural workers in the republic.

2. To permit the re-launching, from 1 June 1968, of the monthly literary-artistic publication *Forests* in the Russian language and from 1 January 1969 of the newspaper of the CC of the Moldavian CP *Village Life* in the Moldavian language; to begin the publication, from 1 January 1969, of a Moldavian newspaper (of the *Smena*-type) in the Moldavian language.
3. To propose to the Union Association *International Books* to regulate the exchange of books and periodicals with the SRR [Socialist Republic of Romania]. To effect the regulation of the exchange of books, journals, and newspapers strictly on the basis of parity. To order Romania literature and to repatriate it in conformity with the requirements of the provinces, especially regarding the Moldavian SSR, where a great quantity of books, journals and newspapers ordered from the SRR come.
4. Taking into consideration the fact that many inhabitants of the Moldavian SSR subscribe to Romanian periodical publications, in the neighboring regions of the Ukrainian SSR, it was recommended that the CC of the Ukrainian Communist Party undertake the necessary measures in order to regulate the subscriptions to Romanian publications in the republic.
5. To oblige the State Planning Committee and the Committee for the Press at the USSR Council of Ministers to authorize the consolidation of a production and printing base for the newspapers, journals and publishing houses of the Moldavian SSR.
6. To propose to the Committee for Radio Broadcasting and Television at the USSR Council of Ministers, in the aim of increasing the effectiveness of radio broadcasts for Romania, to broaden the themes and to improve the quality of the respective broadcasts of the union radio, as well as the Chişinău radio. To intensify the informing of Romanian radio listeners on issues about which there generally exists no information or unilateral or insufficient information in the Romanian press and radio, especially on questions related to:
 - a. The great friendship between the Moldavian people and the Russians, Ukrainians and other peoples of the USSR, the most important historical-revolutionary events which occurred in the republic (the dates of the installation of Soviet power and the reunion of Bessarabia with the USSR, of the liberation of Soviet Moldavia from fascist occupiers, etc.) To pay special attention to the treatment of the history of the struggle of the working people for the installation of Soviet power and the reunion with the Soviet Union;
 - b. The achievements in the economic and cultural development of the Moldavian SSR, the growth in the standard of living of the people in the years of Soviet power;¹³⁰

¹³⁰ The alleged increase of the standard of living for Moldavians since their incorporation into the USSR was a point of particular sensitivity for Soviet authorities in both Moscow and Chişinău. Soviet insecurity regarding their hold on the region had resulted in central decisions not to invest seriously in the republic's infrastructure or economic

- c. The consolidation of the unity of the world Communist movement, the results of the [February 1968] consultative meeting in Budapest and the activity of the fraternal parties concerning the preparation of the international conference [of Communist parties], the joining together of the international and national objectives in socialist construction, the collaboration and mutual assistance of the countries of socialism;
 - d. The situation in Chişinău and the schismatic policy of the Chinese in the country and abroad, the criticism of their activities by the other Communist parties;
 - e. The policy in the Middle East regarding Israeli aggression, with its growing isolation in the world arena, the consolidation of the popular Arab forces for the struggle against the imperialist aggressors;
 - f. The progress of the negotiations with the goal of concluding a treaty on Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation, the ever-increasing support for this treaty in the entire world and the advantages that it would bring to the peoples of the world;
 - g. The danger of the West German revanchist spirit and militarism and the expansion of West German economic monopolies, the intensification of neo-fascist tendencies in West Germany.
7. To oblige the Committee for Radio Broadcasting and Television at the USSR Council of Ministers to increase the volume of local radio broadcasts in the Moldavian SSR, taking into account, especially, the necessity to extend the broadcasts on political themes in the Moldavian language, and to give assistance to the preparation and supplementary training of the cadres for republican radio and television.
 8. To propose to the State Planning Committee, to the Ministry of Telecommunications of the USSR, and to the Committee for Radio Broadcasting and Television at the USSR Council of Ministers to realize measures to ensure the reception of radio and TV broadcasts in the territory of Moldavia, taking into consideration the fact that these broadcasts are received in the territory of the SRR.
 9. To task the USSR Academy of Sciences to give necessary assistance to the scientific institutions of the republic in the preparation of works which scientifically treat from correct positions the questions related to the history of Moldavia, to the development of the Moldavian nation, language and culture, to Soviet-Romanian relations, subjected in Romania to a tendentious reevaluation (the liberating role of Russia in the Balkans, the influence of the Russian Revolution on Romania, the role of the Soviet Army in the liberation of Romania, etc.)
 10. To oblige the *Science* Publishing House to ensure the timely publication of literature about Soviet-Romanian relations, the history of Moldavia, the historical importance of the joining of Moldavia to Russia, the revolutionary movement and the installation of Soviet power in Moldavia, the formation and prosperity of the Socialist Moldavian nation.
 11. In the aim of familiarizing larger world public opinion with the achievements of the Moldavian SSR in Communist construction, to charge the USSR Foreign Ministry, the State Committee for Science and Technology of the USSR Council of Ministers, the

development. Consequently, the republic remained one of the least economically-developed—if not *the* least developed—of all the Soviet republics. A relentless propaganda campaign alleged major improvements in the standard of living since incorporation into the USSR.

- USSR Ministry of Culture, the Union of Sport Societies and Organizations of the USSR [DSO], the Union of Friendship Societies and Cultural Liaison with Foreign Countries and with other Community Organizations:
- a. To foresee in the plans of future social-political, cultural and scientific ties with foreign countries, the development in the Moldavian SSR of some symposiums, meetings and other international actions;
 - b. To draw more leading public figures, workers in the domains of science and culture from the Moldavian SSR into participation in international actions of Soviet organizations;
 - c. To send foreign delegations visiting the USSR, especially from Western European countries, more frequently to the Moldavian SSR, in order to familiarize themselves with the achievements of the republic in the domain of economic and cultural construction.
12. To oblige the *Novosti* Press Agency to publish more literature about the Moldavian SSR in order to disseminate it in foreign countries and among the ranks of the tourists that come to the USSR, the *Novosti* Press Agency and *Soiuzpecati* should assure the supply of the points of control and passage into the Moldavian SSR with literature and with other propagandistic materials in the Russian language.
 13. To propose to the Directorate for Foreign Tourism at the USSR Council of Ministers to use to a greater degree the touristic ties between the SRR and the USSR, as well as the travels of Romanian citizens with individual visas in the Moldavian SSR and in other republics of the country, in order to inform Romanian public opinion about the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government, as well as for familiarizing them with the achievements of the Moldavian people in Communist construction.
 14. To oblige the Committee of Popular Control of the USSR to verify the evolution of the implementation of the decisions of the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers regarding social-cultural construction in the Moldavian SSR.
 15. To task the CC propaganda section and the CC administrative directorate of the CPSU to examine the proposals of the Moldavian CP CC regarding the increase of personnel in the propaganda and agitation sections of the Moldavian CP CC, the creation at the municipal section of the Chişinău party of a scientific and cultural section, the construction in Chişinău of a building for the installation of a republic House of Political Education, the creation at the large party organizations of the republic of some bureaus of political education, the introduction of some directing budgetary units in the evening universities of Marxism-Leninism in Bălţi, Bender and Tiraspol;
 16. To send into the party organization of Moldavia a propagandistic group in order to hold lectures before the party *activ* and the working people of enterprises, institutions, *kolkhozes* and *sovkhoses* regarding the current problems of CPSU domestic and foreign policy, the giving of assistance to the party organizations in the elaboration of oral and written propaganda themes, the organization of seminars and lectures for propagandists and lecturers, in the improvement of mass political activities.

II.

In the aim of implementing the CPSU CC decisions of 6 May 1968 no. 51 §49 gs:

1. To oblige the municipal and county party committees, the ministries and republican departments, the party organizations, trade unions and komsomol organizations to significantly increase the level of ideological work in the republic. In the activity of Communist education of the working people to use more broadly the forms of organizational, political and cultural-educational activity with the aim of forming among all workers, peasants, intellectuals and youth greater commitment to principles, devotion to communism, the formation of class conceptions, the profound Marxist-Leninist understanding of the essence of the events that occur in the world.
2. To task the CC propaganda and agitation, and science and cultural sections of the Moldavian Communist Party, in two-weeks' time, to propose concrete measures for the intensification of ideological work in the republic, the struggle against the manifestation of hostile ideology, regarding the education of the working people in the spirit of Moldavian patriotism, proletarian internationalism and friendship among peoples, the activation of the work of savants in Marxism-based research of the problems connected with history and language, regarding the improvement of cultural construction, the conclusion as soon as possible of the expansion of radio coverage and equipment throughout the republic and the development of television, the setting in order of frontier localities.

To foresee the framework of these measures the publication of articles of some well-known savants, men of letters and art, workers in the leadership of party organizations, soviets, trade unions and komsomol organizations in union and foreign publications regarding the most current problems connected with the history of the republic, and the socio-economic and cultural achievements of the Moldavian SSR in the years of Soviet power.

3. The editors of the republican newspapers *Socialist Moldavia*, *Soviet Moldavia*, *Moldavian Youth*, the journals *Communist Moldavia*, *The Agitator's Tribune*, the State Committee for the Press of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers, ATEM together with the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences must elaborate measures foreseen for a prolonged period for a vast propaganda on the most current problems connected with the history, ethnography, language, and culture of the Moldavian people.
4. The propaganda and agitation section must make proposals referring to the beginning of the publication in July of this year of the monthly journal *Forests* in the Russian language, while from 1 January 1969, of the Moldavian CP CC newspaper *Village Life*. The Moldavian UTCL [Union of Communist Youth] CC (Cde. P. C. Luchinski) should make proposals to the Moldavian CP CC referring to the publication of a monthly journal (of the *Smena*-type) in the Moldavian language.
5. To task Cdes. P. V. Chivertko, V. P. Russu, E. F. Zhmerenetskaia, D. Stela, V. G. Shtiuka, within a month's time, to verify the implementation of the Moldavian CP CC decisions regarding the issues connected with the reduction within the republic of foreign literature and periodical publications and to present to the Moldavian CP CC proposals referring to the supplementary measures regarding the regulation of this problem.
6. The State Committee for Press of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers must elaborate and forward:

- a. To the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers proposals referring to the consolidation of a production and printing base of the republic, assuring the use of the allocated means;
 - b. To the Committee for Press at the USSR Council of Ministers proposals referring to the supplementary publication in union republic publishing houses of social-economic and political literature by Moldavian authors.
7. The State Committee for Radio Broadcasting and Television of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers must:
- a. Visibly increase the volume of radio broadcasts on political themes in the Moldavian language, paying special attention to the treatment of the problems as established in the CPSU CC measures;
 - b. In the aim of extending objective information about the situation in the International Communist and Workers' Movement in the countries of socialism, which is missing or is presented unilaterally in foreign press and radio broadcasts, to create a special editorial office for the preparation of the materials for the improvement of transmissions destined for foreign radio listeners [and] television audiences;
 - c. To elaborate and to realize measures regarding the preparation and on-going training of a necessary number of journalists, creative workers, other specialists in the aim of assuring the radical improvement of the content of materials on political themes disseminated in the Moldavian language.
8. The State Planning Committee of the Moldavian SSR (Cde. I. G. Dobândă), the Minister for Radio Broadcasting and Television at the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers (Cde. S. I. Lozan) must elaborate and forward to the republic Government proposals to ensure the implementation of the measures of the USSR Government directed towards the certain reception of radio and television broadcasts in the territory of Moldavia.
9. The Presidium of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences (Cde. I. S. Grosu), within a month's time, must elaborate and forward to the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences proposals:
- a. Referring to the preparation of some highly qualified scientific cadre — doctors and candidates in science;
 - b. Referring to the joint elaboration with Moldavian savants of the current problems connected with the history of the Moldavian SSR, of Moldavian linguistics and scientific literature;
 - c. Referring to the publication of scientific and popular science works regarding the questions connected with the history, language and culture of the Moldavian people at the *Nauka* Publishing House in Moscow.
10. The Presidium of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences (Cde. I. S. Grossu) should make proposals by 15 July 1968, coordinated with the respective ministries and departments, referring to the organization in Moldavia of some congresses, scientific sessions, symposiums, colloquiums, union and international scientific schools regarding social and natural sciences.
11. To task the Committee for State Control of the Moldavian SSR (Cde. P. V. Voronin) to verify the implementation of the decisions of the Moldavian Communist Party CC and

the Moldavian USSR Council of Ministers regarding the construction of some social-cultural institutions in the republic.

12. The Directorate for Foreign Tourism at the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers (Cde. N. K. Stepanov), together with the Moldavian Society of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries (Cde. A. C. Saltanovskaia), the State Committee for Press of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers (Cde. E. F. Zhmerenetskaia) must elaborate, within a month's time, coordinated measures which foresee:
 - a. The intensification of propaganda among the citizens who arrive from abroad, as well as of the tourists who leave for abroad;
 - b. The considerable growth of the publication of foreign language brochures, pamphlets about the economic, scientific and cultural development of the Moldavian SSR for dissemination in foreign countries.
13. The Ministry for Safeguarding Public Order (Cde. N. M. Bradulov) must regulate the evidence of citizens who arrive along private lines in the Moldavian SSR, to improve the organization of the perfecting of the documents of the citizens who leave for the republic with individual visas.
14. To oblige the municipal and county party committees to raise the level of activity of the commission for work with foreigners, of the propagandistic groups at enterprises, in *kolkhozes* and *sovkhoses*, to set in order the objectives that later will be shown to foreigners. To elaborate measures for the improvement of the content of work with foreigners at the tourist destination objectives, to inform [them] more profoundly and more broadly about the national economic and cultural development of the city and the county in the years of Soviet power.
15. The CC propaganda and agitation section of the Moldavian CP must provide help to the public branches of the *Novosti* Press Agency and to the workers acting as correspondents for APN in the intensification of propaganda of the achievements of the Moldavian SSR in foreign countries.
16. The CC propaganda and agitation section of the Moldavian CP must give systematic assistance to the municipal and county party committees, to the party organizations in the elaboration of oral and written propaganda themes, in the organization of seminars of the propagandists, agitators and political informers on the themes indicated in the CC decision.

To send propagandistic groups to the frontier counties more often in order to hold lectures about the questions which pertain to the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state before the working people and youth of the enterprises, *kolkhozes*, *sovkhoses*, and the educational institutions and organizations, to familiarize them more broadly with the successes of the Moldavian people in the economic and cultural construction obtained due to the fraternal assistance of the peoples of the USSR.
17. To task the CC sections of propaganda and agitation, of science and culture of the Moldavian Communist Party with the control of the implementation of the present decisions.

Secretary of the MCP CC, I. Bodiul (signature)

Document No. 3

Secret, MCP Central Committee, no. 210 s, 3 July 1972 [Chişinău] to CPSU Central Committee

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 33, dosar 82, filele 1-4; Document No. 8 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 51-53. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

The Moldavian Communist Party CC requests that the CPSU Central Committee examine our proposal regarding the organization of KGB organs in the frontier counties of the republic.

The necessity of creating such organs is determined by the intensification of subversive activities directed against the republic by the special services and ideological centers of the Western countries and Israel, which actively use Jewish Bessarabian émigré groups abroad and nationalist centers situated and acting in the capitalist countries. In addition, the anti-Soviet activity of Zionist organizations on Romanian territory has intensified, [as has that] of the traitors of the Moldavian people who had established themselves there in the post-war years.

Many inhabitants of the republic have numerous kinship ties in Romania, their reciprocal migrations annually constitute 20-25 thousand persons. Numerous cases of the hostile preparation of Moldavian inhabitants during their stay in the SRR have been recorded, as well as attempts of the Romanian nationalists to transfer their anti-Soviet activity onto our territory. Many citizens of the SRR, finding themselves in Moldavia as tourists or with individual visas, propagate the separate course of the Romanian leadership, the idea of breaking off the former Bessarabia from the USSR and uniting it with Romania, seeking to inculcate our citizens with a nationalist spirit. Romanian television exercises a negative influence over the population from the frontier counties.

The republic is actively visited by foreigners. Among those who arrive approximately 30 percent are persons of Jewish origin, having vast ties in Moldavia. In recent years, a great number of foreigners were identified who develop subversive activity on the territory of the republic, activity for which 19 foreigners, among them 10 Jewish emissaries, were expelled from the country.

Annually, the state frontier of Romania is crossed by 170-180 thousand travelers from different countries. A considerable part of them are implicated in hostile activity and contraband, in the attempt to bring materials and literature that are dangerous from the political perspective. In 1970-1971, 12,520 examples of such materials were confiscated, twice as much than in 1968-1969.

In connection with the insufficient density of the military coverage of the state frontier with Romania and the lack of KGB organs in a series of frontier counties, there have been cases of illegal border crossing by some criminal elements. Beginning in 1968, 82 perpetrators were retained at the state frontier, including 64 persons who tried to leave the USSR illegally, 13 of whom were found criminally responsible, while several were convicted for treason to the fatherland.

All along the frontier, on the territory of the republic, a significant number of persons have settled who have returned after serving time for state crimes, including former leaders and

active participants in anti-Soviet organizations, as well as Germans in a situation that nurtures dispositions to emigrate.

Under the influence of ideological subversion, in Moldavia the emigrationist and nationalist tendencies have intensified in the breasts of a certain part of the native Jews, which has led to the appearance of illegal groups, including of two anti-Soviet Zionist organizations, whose participants were found criminally responsible in 1971; cases of the dissemination of flyers, anonymous letters and inscriptions with hostile content have multiplied.

Shortly, the process of judging the participants of the discovered illegal nationalist organizations "The National Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Bessarabia, Bucovina, and the counties of Tiraspol, Dubăsari and Râbnița from Under the Russo-Soviet Yoke" and "The National Renaissance of Moldavia" will begin.

Along with the arrested, two typewriters were found and confiscated and, edited in the Romanian language: 9 examples of the report of the first congress of "The National Patriotic Front," 8 examples of the above-mentioned organization's program, "the decisions" of this congress, 9 examples, as well as draft of letters to the SRR [Socialist Republic of Romania] government, the list of inhabitants of Moldavia who were persecuted by the Soviet organs and over 5 thousand pages with all sorts of notes under the form of treatises, studies, letters with a pronounced hostile tendency judging from their contents.

The chiefs of these nationalist organizations have visited the Romanian Embassy in Moscow and sent letters, appeals, and so forth. In the name of the clandestine organizations that request "the return" of Bessarabia to the Romanian bosom, they met with fervent anti-Soviets, with counterrevolutionary Bessarabian Pan Halippa, the former Vice President of the Sfatul Țării [National Council], and with [Ion] Pantea, the former War Minister of this organization, the mayor of the city of Odessa during the German-Romanian occupation in 1941-1944.

Among the ensemble of measures realized by the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the local party organization and the ideological institutions of the republic regarding the intensification of political ideological work, and the patriotic and internationalist education of the working people, an important role in the struggle against subversive actions is played by the State Security [KGB] organs of the republic. However, of the 33 counties and 8 municipalities subordinated to the republic, KGB subdivisions exist only in 12, while at the same time, in five frontier counties out of eleven they are generally lacking. The great length of the state frontier with Romania (691.2 km) complicates the qualitative and timely resolution of existing problems, including those regarding the assurance of defensive operations along the state frontier.

Taking into consideration all of these circumstances, there is a stringent need for consolidating the presence of the republic KGB in all counties, creating seven new supplementary structures in the counties of Briceni, Glodeni, Fălesti, Vulcănești, Dubăsari, Călărași and Nisporeni, and increasing the number of operational personnel of the Committee for State Security (KGB) for the intensification of the fight against Zionism, which exercises an especially dangerous influence over the inhabitants of the republic.

In connection with what has been shown above, the Moldavian Communist Party CC must examine the question regarding the creation in the republic of some new KGB apparatuses and consolidate existing KGB subunits that fight against the ideological subversions of the adversary. Along these lines, we request that the KGB at the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers be supplemented with 59 state posts [positions], and 38 officers.

MCP CC Secretary, I. Bodiul (signature)

Document No. 4

Secret, MCP Central Committee, no. 189 s, 27 June 1975 [Chişinău], to CPSU Central Committee

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 36, dosar 110, filele 144-158; Document No. 11 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, “PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova,” special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 55-65. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

Memorandum

On the Falsification of Historical Events in the Socialist Republic of Romania and Measures for Preventing its Negative Consequences in Moldavia

The last decade has witnessed an evolution in Romanian conceptions regarding many of the principal questions connected with the history of the appearance and the development of the Romanian state, of the Romanian nation, of Russo-Romanian [and] Soviet-Romanian relations and of the history of Moldavia. The revision of positions was initially observed in the works of some authors, especially historians, who were expressing their personal point of view. Later, however, these tendencies began to be manifest ever more clearly in scientific publications (monographs, historical atlases, manuals, etc.), in artistic works, periodical press, on television programs and radio broadcasts, in verbal propaganda.

In works recently published in the SRR—*The History of Romania* (1970), *The History of the Romanian People* (1980), *The Great Conflagration—World War II* (1971), *Historical Atlas* (1971), *The Formation of the Romanian Nation and the Romanian Unitary State* (1974), as well as in many others—the historical conceptions of bourgeois-landowner Romania on the ethnographic provenience of the Danubian peoples and the continuity of the development of the Romanian nation from the earliest times up until our days are clearly and unequivocally reflected and, on the basis of these pseudoscientific theories, the fact of the formation in the feudal epoch of a series of [separate] eastern romance peoples, including the Moldavians, is negated.¹³¹

Acknowledged in the past, the facts that demonstrate the progressive role of Russia in the Balkans, which even the fascist government of Antonescu did not negate, is changing, under the conditions of anti-Soviet tendencies, of Romanian militant policies, into a spirit hostile to the Soviet Union. If during the 1950s and 1960s it was recognized that the Russo-Turkish wars of the XVII-XIX centuries played an objectively progressive role, weakening the Ottoman yoke and leading to the liberation of the Danubian Principalities, in the 1970s, especially in the last two-three years, the participation of Russia in the Balkan wars is reproduced in Romanian publications exclusively as aiming to annex territory at the expense of “the Romanian provinces.”

The joining of Bessarabia to Russia is treated as an occupation of Romanian territory, although, as is known, Romania as a state appeared 30 years after the events of 1812.

¹³¹ In the usage of Soviet authorities, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and its central zero-sum struggle between the classes, constituted the only legitimate basis for “scientific” historical research. Western non-class document-based methodology was thus branded as “unscientific” and “pseudoscience.”

The question of Bessarabia was passed over in silence in Romanian literature, while in the recent period it is treated from the position of territorial pretensions towards our country.

Developing the bourgeois concept of the formation of the Romanian nation from the Balkans to the northern Carpathians, Romanian historians present the forced annexation of Bessarabia by the Romanian kingdom in 1918 as "an act of the unification of all Romanians" and demonstrate that this reunion was produced by the will of the people, as a result of its long struggle for the recognition of this act, supposedly legitimized by the Paris Peace Conference.

This base falsification of the true aspirations of the Moldavian people is the most misrepresented in the official Romanian publication *Questions and Answers Regarding the History of the Romanian Communist Party and of the Workers' Movement in Romania*; destined for the network of party education.

In the Romanian journal *History Annals* (no. 1, 1975), which is the organ of the Institute for Social-Political Studies of the RCP CC, the [1812] joining of Bessarabia to Russia is presented as a transaction between Russia and Turkey, as the result of which the latter ceded territory from the body of the Romanian Principalities. In this number of the journal, Romanian pretensions toward some Soviet territory are exposed, essentially, in an overt manner.

In recent years, Romanian researchers search relentlessly in the classic works of Marxism-Leninism for references to Danubian and Balkan problems, to the Romanians and Moldavians, using these declarations tendentiously in order to confer an appearance of indisputable character to their revisionist conceptions.

Thus, the historian A. Otetea, well-known in Romania as a specialist in social-political processes, used quotes from K. Marx on the anti-Russian Bonapartist book *The Political and Social History of the Danubian Principalities*, published in Paris in 1855 by E. Regnault, a bourgeois French historian, and published them as a separate book—*K. Marx, Notes on the Romanians*. This work stirred up in Romania, and especially in the West, an unhealthy interest around the respective excerpts. Books began to appear, articles and reviews were published, that portrayed K. Marx as an adversary of the joining of Bessarabia to Russia, and almost as an adept of pan-Europeanism. Through this not only were the conceptions of K. Marx on the history of the Danubian Principalities misrepresented without scruple, an attempt was made to stir up an anti-Soviet spirit, to sow the seeds of mistrust and hostility between the Russian, Moldavian and Romanian peoples.

Confusion is awakened not only by the failure to condemn such misrepresentations of historical reality, but, on the contrary, their stimulation by the current leadership of the RCP, which used them as a weapon, as is reflected in an overt manner in party and state documents, on the basis of which they undertake ideological measures, [and] construct relations with our party and state. This is mirrored in the RCP program, adopted at the Eleventh Congress in October 1974, in which no distinction is made between Ottoman, Habsburg and Tsarist imperial policies, all of which are considered annexationist towards the Balkan peoples. The occupation by Romania of Soviet territory in 1918 is treated in the program as a triumph of truth, as the conclusion of the unification of the entire Romanian people. The unification of Bessarabia with the Moldavian Autonomous Republic in 1940 is similarly treated from the position of bourgeois-nationalist historiography. In the monograph *The Great Conflagration—World War II*, the peaceful resolution of the Bessarabian issue is explained in the following manner: "On 26 June as a result of the ultimatum sent by the Soviet Government to the Government of Romania, the

territory between the Prut and Nistru [Dniestr] Rivers, as well as a part of northern Bucovina entered as a component into the Soviet Union.”

In order to explain the events connected with the first period of the Second World War, Romanian savants have taken recourse to the reactionary bourgeois theory about “the two aggressors.” If in the works of Romanian authors published before 1970 the participation of Romania in the War against the USSR was, in some measure, condemned, in recent works this is excluded. Not only that, but the Romanian leaders have reached the point of affirming that Romania found itself in the fascist bloc as a result of the incorrect policies of the Soviet state.

Speaking in general about the war, Romanian authors recognize the merit of the Soviet Union in crushing Hitler’s Germany, but despite that, when it comes to speaking about the liberation of Romania, this role of the Soviet Union is not recognized.

Instead of the Iasi-Chișinău operation, the Romanian authors write about “the breaking of the German front in north-east Romania by the Soviet Army” (not the German-Romanian front, but only the German front). The respective breaking is considered only as an encouragement for the liberation struggle of the Romanian people, which was victorious on 23 August 1944. This armed revolt is considered one of the decisive turning points of the Second World War.

Much is written about the fact that “Romania was the fourth country according to the number of dedicated troops, which participated in the war against Germany (540 thousand men) and the regret is expressed that, in spite of its contribution to the war, Romania was not recognized as a cobelligerent country, but is considered a defeated country, which has given rise to many difficulties both along domestic policy lines and in the international arena. (*Historical Yearbook*, no. 1, 1975)

A new encouragement for the continued falsification of historical sciences in the SRR and the creation of tensions in the political situation around the so-called independent course of Romanian leadership policy was given in the discourse of the RCP Secretary General, N. Ceausescu, during the 30th anniversary festivities of the “Stefan Gheorghiu” Academy on 28.III.1975.

In the above-mentioned discourse, as is known, he declared that “currently in the world all sorts of deliberately erroneous interpretations are formulated, according to which the dismemberment of some states, the capricious separation of some peoples is represented as a legitimate manifestation of historical necessity, while the results of such artificially created situations are theorized and interpreted as being a natural process in the formation of a separate nation.” After this discourse, in the pages of the Romanian press, on the radio and on television a new campaign began of continual misrepresentation of the history of the Romanian nation, of the Romanian state, and of its neighboring peoples, of the falsification of the true events of the Second World War and, especially, of the events tied to the entrance of Bessarabia as a component of the Soviet Union. On top of that, in all publications a single aim is emerging—to demonstrate the illegality of the existence of the Moldavian nation and statehood.

In the framework of the course developed not long ago of raising the professional level of journalists at the above-mentioned academy, Professor Shevchebie declared: “I know that you will ask me the question which I am always asked—what is the position of our party regarding the problem of Bessarabia and Bucovina? I will respond in time. The [existence of the] Moldavian SSR does not presuppose a separate nation. The language of communication is Romanian. No matter how much the contrary is affirmed, it is clear to the entire world that this is the Romanian language. Regarding their ethnic provenience, the [majority] population is

Romanian. It is unfair that this territory was torn from Romania. Time will decide [regarding] this injustice.”

Such hostile concepts towards our country, which reemerge in both scientific treatises and in political discourse, creates an erroneous interpretation of the policies of the CPSU and the Soviet State among the Romanian people, and an unhealthy attitude towards the Moldavian SSR.

“The Romanians and the Moldavians are the same people,” “Bessarabia is a Romanian land from the time of Stephan the Great, it passed to the USSR only because Romania in 1940 and 1945 was weaker than the USSR”—all of this, as well as other similar declarations can be heard from Romanian tourists, members of delegations and groups that come to the republic, from Romanian citizens during their discussions with our people who find themselves in Romania.

From the synthetic analysis of the materials and declarations of Romanian citizens, the impression is created that the anti-Russian and anti-Soviet tendency in the activity of historians, philosophers and other Romanian savants, as well as among workers in the press, community/communal organizations is coordinated from the center and is developed with the assistance of some importance means of influence over the people, over world public opinion, with the aim of imposing the idea of unjust borders, the dismemberment of peoples, and of the artificial creation of the Bessarabian question.

To this end, in Romania and beyond its frontiers, the emigrants edit many books in the languages of different peoples. Particularly large amounts of anti-Soviet literature were published during the preparation for the Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties in Europe, [and] the General Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In April of the current year, on the streets of Paris, in the metro, flyers were put up, in which the return to Romania of “the territories of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina annexed by the Soviet Union” was requested.

In recent years the sending into Moldavia of some Romanian publications in which territorial pretensions towards the Soviet Union are exposed has intensified. These provocative actions are effected by ideological organizations within Romania—the Central State Library of Bucharest, some institutions which send to the addresses of librarians, newspaper and journal editors, to the churches, to the priests in Moldavia, books, newspapers, journals and other materials that contain nationalist, anti-Russian conceptions. Among others, the works of N. Ceaușescu in eight volumes were sent into Moldavia, which include his speeches in Beijing, the well-known protest against the assistance accorded to the Czechoslovakia people during the counter-revolutionary events in that country, and other discourses in which the Romanian political leader disagrees with the Marxist-Leninist positions of the socialist countries of Europe, of the workers and progressive communist movements in the world, and [in which he] approaches a hostile bourgeois and Marxist [sic] ideology.

The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee has elaborated and is implementing complex measures oriented towards preventing the penetration into the republic of both the inadmissible negative influence on our people of the renegades’ anti-Russian and anti-Moldavian conceptions, and of the Romanian falsifiers of objective historical truth, [and the] Soviet patriotism of the Moldavian people.

In the last five years, the publishing houses of Moldavia have prepared and published over 80 works which contain criticisms of the positions of Romanian authors and their contemporaries that falsify the past and present of the Moldavian people. In works such as *The*

Outline of the History of the Moldavian Communist Party, Soviet Moldavian Statehood and the Bessarabian Problem, Against the Bourgeois Falsifiers of the History and Culture of the Moldavian People, The Nationalist Policy in Action, Facts and Presumptions, Pages from the History of Soviet Moldavia, International Solidarity in the Struggle of the Working People of Bessarabia for the Reunion with the Soviet Fatherland, [and] Beyond the Façade of Bourgeois Theories, as well as in many other works, the attempts of Romanian authors to avoid and pass over in silence the expansionist tendencies of the former Romanian leaders is unmasked, [as are their attempts] to deprive the Moldavian people of their statehood and of the possibility of constructing socialism in a united family with the Soviet peoples.

These works decisively reject the tendency of impressing the revolutionary struggle of the region with a pro-Romanian character, unmasking the traitorous role of the Sfatul Țării, the counterrevolutionary bourgeois-landowner organ, exposing it to the whole world through reference to the documents of the Romanian Communist Party referring to these and other questions—the revisionist character of the current policies of the leadership in Romania, unmasking the affirmations regarding the “forced” *russification* of Moldavia. The true aspirations of the Moldavian people are demonstrated eloquently and convincingly, its unity with the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, and with the other fraternal peoples of our country, in which they acquired liberty, stability, national self-determination and happiness.

Unmasking the confabulations of the Romanian chauvinists is always at the center of attention in the Moldavian press. The press organs of the republic—the newspapers *Soviet Moldavia*, *Socialist Moldavia* and the others—oppose the torrent of lies and calumnies with the scientific treatment of Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations, the Leninist nationality policy of the CPSU, the fraternal relations of the Soviet peoples with all of the socialist countries, its revolutionary solidarity with repressed peoples, the active defense of the sovereignty and independence of all countries and peoples.

Moldavian television, radio and cinema also give a certain riposte to the Romanian revisionists. Recently, the achievements of the Moldavian people during the years of Soviet power are propagated more eloquently and more convincingly, the preoccupation of the CPSU CC and Soviet Government with the development of the region, with the spiritual qualities of our people, their strong Soviet and internationalist patriotism, is evident. The International Life Section of the Radio and Television prepare daily broadcasts designed to neutralize the confabulations spread about by the Romanian falsifiers.

A long-term plan for ideological work has been drawn up in the republic in which are foreseen measures for inculcating working people with a communist conception of the world, with an internationalist consciousness and high Soviet patriotism. This work is developed beginning with the pre-school educational institutions and with the schools, and terminates with the work collectives, as well as in the home.

In Chișinău, the Museum of the History of the Communist Party of Moldavia functions with success, elucidating the appearance of revolutionary movements in the Bessarabian Gubernia, the struggle of the Moldavian people for Soviet power, the organic tie with Russia and the aspirations of the people for unity and fraternity with all the peoples of the USSR. On the basis of numerous materials the decisive disagreement of the Moldavian people with the occupation of Bessarabia, its unending struggle for the liberation and reunion with the motherland, is demonstrated in a convincing manner. The Museum is visited with interest not

only by the working people of the republic, but also by Romanian citizens who arrive in Moldavia.

Currently, the Museum of Military Glory is being created, which will reflect the indestructible brotherhood in arms of the Moldavian, Russian and Ukrainian people in the fight against the foreign invaders of the region from the XVth to the beginning of the XXth centuries, the manliness and spirit of sacrifice manifested by the working people of our fatherland in the defense of the victory of Soviet power from foreign intervention and internal counterrevolution, the undying heroism of the Soviet peoples in the years of the Great War for the Defense of the Fatherland, including during the crushing of the groups of German-Romanian invaders in the Iasi-Chișinău operation.

The Directorate of Foreign Tourism at the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers and the Moldavian Society of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries exerts considerable efforts for the extensive information of Romanian tourists during their stay in the republic. Guide-translators have been instructed in the framework of special preparation courses to this end. Along with excursions of a general nature, the visiting programs include meetings with working people from the republic, with veterans of the Great War for the Defense of the Fatherland, viewings of cinematic films about Moldavia are arranged, as well as the attendance of concerts, [and other] shows. In recent years tens of thousands of examples of folders and pamphlets were published and disseminated among the ranks of tourists, a publication plan for publicity literature for Romanian tourists has been elaborated for the years 1976-1980.

From the information in our possession, the work undertaken in Moldavia has become a serious obstacle to the separate course of the Romanian leadership. Our information unmasks the defamatory essence of the Romanian publishing houses and publications, creating amongst the ranks of the Romanian people a righteous idea about history, the revolutionary struggle of the Moldavian people and the construction of socialism in our region, about the foreign policy of the CPSU CC, [and about] the friendly attitude of our people and state towards Romania.

Unfortunately, the complicated relations between Moldavia and Romania are not taken into consideration by some of the central [Soviet] ideological organizations. Sometimes, works appear which are in solidarity, to a certain measure, with Romanian publications. Thus, in the guide *Populations of the Countries of the World*, published in Moscow in 1974, under the editorship of Professor B. C. Uralnis, in the enumeration of the peoples of the Romance language group (pp. 317-318), the Moldavian people are not named, as if they did not exist. Such an unforgivable error is wonderfully convenient for the Romanian falsifiers, which impose exactly this idea on everyone.

The well-known ethnographer V. I. Naulko affirms that the Moldavians of Bessarabia are newcomers, foreign colonists, while the Ukrainians are the native population (*The Development of Interethnic Relations in Ukraine*, Kiev, Naukova dumka, 1975).

In the monograph *The Tatarbunar Revolt*, published in 1974 by the Political Publishing House in Ukraine, the author P. I. Smishko affirms that the insurgents advocated for reunion with Soviet Ukraine. In reality, as is known, the revolt in Tatarbunar of 1924 proclaimed the Soviet Moldavian Republic and advocated for reunion with the Soviet Union. P. I. Smishko badly complicates things also in the work *The Struggle of the Working People of the Ukrainian Danubian Principalities for Reunion with the Ukrainian SSR (1917-1940)*, Lvov, 1969. Basically, this entire book is oriented against the *Outline of the History of the Moldavian Communist Party*.

N. I. Lebedev, doctor in historical sciences, in the outline of documentary publications in the journal *Problems of History*, no. 9, 1968, names the Moldavian cities and villages as Romanian. “On 28 June—Lebedev relates—after receiving the agreement of the Romanian Government, the Red Army began the campaign to liberate Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, while on 30 June our troops arrived at the Prut River. The local inhabitants of the Romanian cities and Romanian villages welcomed with joy and hope the liberating Red Army.” (p. 147)

According to the opinion of P. D. Kazakov, explicated in the book *The Liberation of the Right Bank of Ukraine and of Crimea* (Moscow, Voienizdat, 1974), the Moldavian SSR did not even exist: “...Soviet troops, liberating the right bank of the Ukraine, arrived at the frontier with Romania.” (pp. 27-28) This error is committed by Colonel G. Kozlov, candidate in historical sciences, in the article *The Great Victor*, published in the newspaper *Sovietski patriot* on 24 March 1974.

In the [Soviet] central periodical press and in some publications—*The Desk Calendar, 1975* edited in Leningrad, *In the World of the Beautiful* (Moscow, Politizdat, 1974), *The Youth Calendar 1975* (Moscow, Politizdat), *The Press Book of the Union Chamber of Books*—the classic Moldavian writer Mihai Eminescu is described only as a Romanian poet.

In the Romanian cinematic film *Michael the Brave*, the Moldavian people are presented as being one in the same with the Wallachian [Vlah] people and are named *Romanians*. In spite of our objections, USSR GOSKINO (State Cinematography) acquired it and presented it throughout the entire country, popularizing this falsification of historical reality.

All of this and many other events complicate the ideological work connected with the dangerous tendencies that have occurred in official Romanian policy and social life, reducing the efficiency of our propaganda against the misrepresentation of the facts by militant Romanians, [against] their efforts to recast in falsified form the history of the republic.

Numerous requests by intellectuals from the domains of science and the creative arts are addressed to the Moldavian Communist Party CC which rightfully express confusion regarding these facts, which lead to divergences in the treatment of some questions of principal importance connected with the ethnography, history and life of the Moldavian people.

Regarding the attempt of the Romanians to artificially create the territorial problem between our countries and to build relations with the CPSU and the Soviet state on this superficial theme, it seems to us that it would be proper to prevent this provocation. In order to do that, in our opinion, comprehensive measures must be undertaken, coordinated on the basis of a single plan. In a series of problems in these complex measures, referring first of all to the centuries-old friendship between the Moldavian, Russian and Ukrainian peoples, to the unity of the Soviet peoples, to the perception by the Moldavian people of the Leninist theory about the construction of socialism and the loyal respect for it, as well as in other questions, the republican party organization, the scientific community, the entire Moldavian people can be actively implicated. To this end, the scientific institutions of social science and the intelligence services of the republic must be extended and consolidated.

Firstly, in the activity of scientific research the confusion existing in the domain of publishing houses must be eliminated immediately and a unique and clear position must be elaborated referring to the historical past of the Moldavian people and its statehood, to the revolutionary movement in our region, to the role of the liberating wars of Russia in the Balkans and to the contribution of the Soviet Union in the liberation of the Romanian people from

fascism. The scientific publications regarding these questions have neutralized in large measure the significance of the erroneous interpretation of these questions in Romania.

There is a need for an organization, especially good in informational and publicity practices, which could exercise influence, well-argued, from a realistic position, to affirm the truth and fairness [of the Soviet position] acting upon Moldavian and Romanian public opinion, to inform them systematically about the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU CC and the Soviet Government. To this end, it is necessary to coordinate the actions of the organs regarding the problems of ideological work.

Unfortunately, the number of newspapers and journals in Moldavia is extremely limited for fulfilling these functions. The necessity is imposed of publishing a literary newspaper and a pedagogic newspaper, a journal for youth, which could be occupied with the concrete problems of the education of intellectuals and youth, as well as exert a positive influence over this category of working people in Romania.

In the aim of neutralizing the negative influence of Romania over our republic, it would be opportune to put into practice the subscribing of Romanian periodical publications only through the Moldavian SSR or of permitting that these publications should come to us from other republics. Now the persons who are refused the possibility of subscribing [in Moldavia] do so freely in other cities of our country.

The most powerful means of reaching the masses in ideological work is, as is known, through radio and television. However, the joint Television-Radio center that currently functions in Chişinău is supplied with a 1958-type apparatus, which is both physically and morally obsolete. In the powerfully irregular territory of the republic only four re-transmitters have been installed with a wave-length of one meter and a total power of 36 kilowatts. Because of the low power of the transmitter, Moscow radio broadcasts cover only 90 percent, and Moldavian broadcasts only 40 percent, of the population of the republic. At the same time, Romania has installed five re-transmitters with a range of one meter and a total power of 90 kilowatts along our frontier. As a result, all of the population of the Moldavian SSR can freely receive Romanian radio broadcasts, and a great part of the republic can receive those of Romanian television as well. These broadcasts are penetrated with the spirit of nationalism, anti-Russianism, they frequently transmit the hostile calumnies of the Maoists, as well as diverse Western information, they present films from bourgeois countries, etc. We do not have one re-transmitter at the frontier.

The Moldavian Communist Party CC considers that it is extremely necessary to consolidate a television and radio broadcasting base. In order to achieve this the current complex of equipment and studios at the radio-television center in Chişinău must be reconstructed and the means of transmission must be intensified to the maximum, in order to ensure the Moldavian SSR with three programs of radio and television broadcast, assuring their reception in the entire territory of the republic and in a significant part of Romania as well.

In order to assure quality propaganda through the intermediary of the press, radio and television, well-prepared Journalists are necessary. These are few and far between in Moldavia, especially among the ranks of the native population, a considerable part of the workers in newspapers and journals do not correspond to contemporary conditions. In order to resolve this important problem, the Moldavian Communist Party CC has addressed a request to the USSR Ministry of Specialist Education to open a Journalism Faculty at the University of Chişinău.

The falsifications of historical truth expressed in the ignorance of the role of the Soviet Army in the liberation of Romania would be unmasked through a cinematic film about the Iasi-Chișinău operation, which led to the liberation of Romania. Likewise, the making of a film about the great liberating mission of Russia in the Balkans would be welcome. The showing of the film and other measures can be implemented through the Societies of Friendship with Bulgaria [and] Hungary, through the development of the Days of Moldavian Culture in France, Italy, FRG and in other countries that have influence over Romania and in which live many emigrants from Bessarabia and Romania.

There is also a necessity for perfecting the current manner of working with Romanian tourists. In the aim of treating the same way a series of complicated problems connected with Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations, and of realizing a single line of work with Romanian tourists, it would be correct to concentrate on the preparation of Guide-Translator Romanian specialists in the Moldavian SSR.

There is a necessity for regulating the visit to Moldavia of Romanian citizens with individual visas. Travelling alone through the republic, these persons engage in provocative discussions, etc. At the request of our people, these persons are expelled, however this does not always happen in time. It would be opportune to limit the entrance of Romanian citizens into our republic with free visas and to allow the visiting of Moldavia in organized groups [only].

Scientific activity and solidly-argued propaganda regarding the correct treatment of the processes of historical formation, developed in the spirit of objectivity and good-will, from the principled position of equitability and exigency, without a doubt, will exercise a positive influence over Romanian and world public opinion, will influence also the Romanian leadership in order to bring it back to reality.

The Moldavian Communist Party CC considers that in our relations with Romania we should finally obtain their recognition of the Moldavian SSR. The ignoring of the Moldavian nation offends our people, expresses an attempt against vital and moral principles which have formed and developed in the Leninist spirit of the fraternity and unity of the Soviet peoples. The principal problem is that Romania constructs its relations with our party and country, and defines its domestic and foreign policies, on the basis of these errors.

Our lack of reaction to such an unnatural situation is perceived in Romania as a weakness, as a lack of the possibility of the Moldavian people to defend its right to exist. Not receiving the proper riposte, the Romanians add to their pretensions, resorting to all types of forms and methods for misrepresenting the truth and for disseminating some false conceptions with the aim of deliberately misinforming world public opinion, compromising the national policies of the CPSU, which assure the prosperity of the Socialist Moldavian nation and its statehood.

MCP CC Secretary, I. Bodiul (signature)

Document No. 5

Top Secret, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, MCP Central Committee, 12 January 1976 [Chişinău]

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 39, dosar 16, filele 1-6; Document No. 15 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 70-75. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

Transcript No. 100

of the Meeting of the Central Committee Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party

Cde. Bodiul presided:

Participants:

Members, Central Committee Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cdes. Antoseak, Grossu, Voronin, Luchinski, Merenishchev, Pascari, Steshov
Candidate Members, Central Committee Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cdes. Dâgai, Eremei, Zaichenko
Members, Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cdes. Berezhnoi, Golubitski, Dieur, Zagadailov, Ivashchiuk, Calin, Kanikovski, Kacheanov, Lozan, Lukianov, Pleshko, Stepanov, Tiunov, Shlehtich, Iakubovski
Candidate Members, Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cdes. Gesmegian, Paskovski, Petrash
President of the Revision Commission of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cde. Iordanov
Chiefs of Central Committee Sections of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cdes. Zavtur, Chiriac, Terehov, Shtiuca
Administrator, Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cde. Leshchinski
First Deputy Chief of Central Committee Section of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cde. Mumji

3. CPSU CC Decision "With Regard to the Supplementary Measures in the Domain of Ideological Work in Connection with the Intensification of Romanian Nationalist Propaganda which Harms USSR Interests"

(Cdes. Merenishchev, Bodiul, Luchinski)

1. To take a firm directive head-on and to bring to fulfillment the CPSU CC Decision St-188/2s of 15 October 1975 "With Regard to the Supplementary Measures in the Domain of Ideological Work in Connection with the Intensification of Romanian Nationalist Propaganda, which Harms the Interests of the USSR." To approve the measures of the

Moldavian Communist Party CC regarding the fulfillment of the respective decision of the CPSU CC (annexed below).

2. The State Committee of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers for Radio Broadcasting and Television, [and] the editors of the republican newspapers must systematically transmit on the radio and television, as well as publishing in the press, articles and materials that unmask the efforts of the Western and Romanian information organs to misrepresent the past and present of the Moldavian people, the essence of Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations, the most important events of contemporary international life, and the issues of CPSU domestic and foreign policy. (Annex No. 1)
3. The Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Party History at the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Houses and Commerce with Books of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers must prepare and publish a series of monographs, collections, articles and documents regarding the questions connected with the history of Moldavia and Romania, of Russo-Romanian, Soviet-Romanian and Moldo-Romanian relations (Annex No. 2).
4. The Moldavian SSR Ministry of Public Education, the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences must review the content of the program, should re-edit manuals for all levels of education, of the history and geography of Moldavia, of Moldavian literature in which the questions connected with the formation and development of the Moldavian nation, of its statehood, and the role of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples in the destiny of the Moldavian people should be treated in a meaningful and convincing manner, and they should criticize the bourgeois-nationalist conceptions on these questions.

In social science courses in the institutions of higher education and in those specialty secondary education, the misrepresentations, falsifications and revisions allowed by the political figures and historians of the SRR in the problems connected with the Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations, with the Communist movement in the Balkans, and with the decisions of the COMINTERN will be subjected to well-argued scientific criticisms.

5. The Moldavian SSR Ministry of Culture, the creative unions of the Moldavian SSR must take measures for increasing the thematic orientation of works of literature and art that reflect from a Marxist-Leninist position the historical-revolutionary events of Moldavia, the friendship between the Moldavian people and the Russian and Ukrainian peoples and all the other peoples of the USSR, the struggle of the Moldavian people for the liberation from under the yoke of Romanian occupation.
6. The Moldavian SSR State Cinematography, the Moldavian SSR Film-Makers Union must broadly reflect, in artistic films and documentaries, the most important historical and historical-revolutionary events in Moldavia—the Bender uprising, the fight of the marines of the Danube Fleet against the military intervention of the Romanian kingdom in Soviet Bessarabia, the fight of the Moldavian people against the Romanian-Boyar occupation, the Komsomolist illegality in Cahul, the life and activity of eminent persons P. D. Tkachenko, M. V. Frunze, I. E. Iakir, I. F. Fedko.

To create cycles of documentary films about the achievements of the Moldavian people in the economic and cultural domains in the years of Soviet power, about the contemporary transformations in the socio-economic life of the Moldavian people.

7. The Directorate for Foreign Tourism at the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers, the republican Council of Trade Unions of Moldavia, the UTCL CC of Moldavia, the Society for Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries of Moldavia must:
 - Assure the growing ideological level of information and propaganda activities among the ranks of the foreign tourists, multilaterally familiarizing them with the history of the birth and formation of the Moldavian nation, with the struggle of the Moldavian people for Soviet power, with the achievements of the working people of the republic in economic and cultural development;
 - Renew the description of tourist itineraries, foreseeing in them a lively explanation, from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint, of the events connected with the revolutionary past and present of the Moldavian people, as well as of the architectural monuments of the past and of the contemporary period, offering them to all tourists and foreign guests that visit our republic;
 - Practice the systematic development of friendship evenings and of meetings of foreign tourists with well-known men of science and cultural figures, with workers in positions of authority in the state organs and community organizations;
 - Take measures to assure the effective utilization of tourism ties with Romania for propaganda about CPSU and Soviet Government policies, the achievements of the USSR and the Moldavian SSR and for the neutralization of the attempts by the Romanians to use these contacts for nationalist propaganda.
8. The State Committee of Publishing Houses, Printing Houses and Commerce with Books of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers must assure the preparation and publishing, at a high politico-ideological, artistic and printing level, in the Russian, Moldavian and foreign languages, of some guides about the cities and county centers of the republic which relate about the achievements of Moldavia in the domain of the construction of cities, industry, agriculture and culture, of some prospects about the leading enterprises, the agro-industrial complexes and the cultural institutions that constitute objectives to be shown to foreigners, of some polychromatic albums which propound on the achievements of Moldavia, of some colored illustrations about the curiosities of the republic and other informational-propagandistic literature and publicity.

To present the proposals regarding the title and size of printing run of the informational-propagandistic editions and publicity to the sections for propaganda, information and liaison with foreign countries of the Moldavian Communist Party CC each year, around 1 September.
9. The Institute of Party History of the Moldavian CP CC, the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Houses and Commerce with Books of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers must prepare and publish in the Romanian language a series of brochures about Moldavia, placing the accent on issues subjected to falsification abroad, especially in the SRR [Socialist Republic of Romania].
10. The Information Agency of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers (ATEM), the Moldavian branch of the *Novosti* Press Agency, must improve the preparation of materials and the presentation of the achievements of the Moldavian SSR in the economic, scientific and cultural domains during the years of Soviet power in the foreign media (the means of foreign information). To elaborate a special plan to this end, in which the propagation of Marxist-Leninist theory in the domain of Leninist national

- relations must occupy center stage, the unmasking of any tendencies or ideas, including the Romanian revisionist one of today.
11. The State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printers, and Commerce with Books of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers, the Moldavian SSR Ministry of Telecommunications must elaborate and undertake measures for restricting the importation and dissemination in the republic of Romanian literature and periodical publications that contain nationalist, revisionist ideas and tendencies.
 12. The County Party Committee, the Moldavian Society for Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries must increase the amount of informational material and photo-documents (photo exhibitions) sent to the Socialist Republic of Romania, especially to the bordering county with which relations of permanent friendship have been established, about the history of Moldavia, about the achievements of the Moldavian people in economic and cultural construction in the years of Soviet power, scientific and popular literature which treats the problems connected with Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations from a Marxist-Leninist perspective.
 13. The Moldavian SSR Foreign Ministry must undertake measures regulating the invitation of Romanian citizens to Moldavia and of the departure of citizens of the republic to the SRR and for the introduction of the same limitations on circulation and temporary dwelling on the territory of the republic as are established for Soviet citizens in the SRR, on the basis of reciprocity.
 14. The Ideological Sections of the Moldavian Communist Party CC must elaborate and present for examination to the CC Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party by 1 April 1976 the measures for the preparation of the celebration of 100 years since the liberation of Romania and Bulgaria from under the Ottoman yoke.
 15. To request the CPSU CC:
 - To resolve the problem connected with the publication in Moldavia, beginning in 1976, of a literary newspaper and of a periodical journal *Questions of History and Culture of the Moldavian SSR* (appearing three times a year) in the Russian and Moldavian languages;
 - To permit the opening at the Institute of Party History of the Moldavian Communist Party CC—a branch of IML [The Institute of Marxism-Leninism] of the CPSU CC of a specialized sector for studying the history of communist movements in the Balkans, the relations between communist organizations of the Balkan countries and the CPSU, COMINTERN.
 16. To take notice of the fact that the CPSU CC has charged that:
 - a. The USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR MAI [Interior Ministry], together with the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, should elaborate on the issue of problematic science research science research in the domain of the history of the Moldavian SSR and Romania, as well as in that of Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations;
 - b. The corresponding sections of the CPSU CC together with the USSR MAI, together with the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences should coordinate the activities of the scientific, propagandistic and informational institutions and organizations of the USSR specialized in the neutralization of Romanian

nationalist propaganda with the aim of avoiding erroneous interpretations or imprecisions;

- c. The USSR State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Telecommunications, the State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting of the USSR Council of Ministers should prepare and present, within two month's time, to the CPSU CC proposals for the consolidation of a technical-material base of Television and Radio Broadcasting in the Moldavian SSR, taking into consideration the assurance of quality reception for the central television broadcasts, the republican television programs and the two radio programs in the entire territory of the Moldavian SSR and the increase of the capacity of the television stations in the frontier counties, having in view the creation of possibilities for the reception of television programs on Romanian territory.

The State Radio and Television Company should adopt supplementary measures for the improvement of the content of informational materials sent to the Committee for Radio and Television, giving assistance in the organization of the works regarding the raising of the qualifications of television and radio broadcasting journalists. Preparing radio broadcasts for Romania, enriching the information about life in Moldavia, its history, the successes of the Moldavian people;

- d. The USSR Academy of Science, the USSR Ministry of Public Education for higher and specialist secondary education, taking into account the real necessities of the departments and organizations, should expand the training of Romanian specialists in history, economy, philosophy and philology and should improve their use in practical work in conformity with their respective specialty;
- e. The State Committee for Publishing Houses and APN (*Novosti*) should increase the publication of scientific and popular literature which treats the problems connected with Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations from a Marxist-Leninist perspective, and take measures for the dissemination of the above-mentioned literature in foreign countries.

17. To oblige the municipal and county party committees to take measures for the improvement of internationalist and patriotic education of the working people.

18. To entrust the propaganda and agitation sections, and the section for Information and Relations with Foreign Countries, science and education institutions of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, with control over the execution of the present decisions:

MCP CC Secretary, I. Bodiul (signature)

Document No. 6

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 39, dosar 16, filele 22-25; Document No. 16 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 75-78. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

Transcript No. 100, §3 Annex

Activities of the Moldavian Communist Party CC Regarding Execution of the CPSU CC Decision "On the Supplementary Measures in the Domain of Ideological Work Connected with the Intensification of Romanian Nationalist Propaganda which Harms the Interests of the USSR"

1. To hold a meeting of first secretaries and secretaries who lead ideological work in the municipal and county committees, of the leaderships of the ministries and departments, the editors of republican newspapers and journals, the presidents of municipal and county executive committees at which should be analyzed the tasks of the party organizations for the execution of the CPSU CC decision "With Regard to the Supplementary Measures in the Domain of Ideological Work Connected with the Intensification of Romanian Nationalist Propaganda which Harms the Interests of the USSR."

Trimester I, 1976

Propaganda and Agitation Sections, Sections for Science, Educational, and Cultural Institutions, the Section for Information and Relations with Foreign Countries of the Moldavian Communist Party CC

2. To hold an assembly of the ideological worker *aktiv* of the republic with the order of the day: "With regard to the situation and measures referring to the intensification of ideological work and the struggle against foreign anti-Soviet propaganda."

Trimester II, 1976

Propaganda and Agitation Sections, Sections for Science, Educational, and Cultural Institutions, the Section for Information and Relations with Foreign Countries of the Moldavian Communist Party CC

3. To hold a republic meeting-seminar with sociology professors of the institutions of higher education, the institutions of specialty secondary education, the schools of general culture regarding the question of improving the teaching of the history of Moldavia.

February 1976

Section of Science and Educations Institutions of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, Moldavian SSR Ministry of Public Education

4. To hold in the counties and cities seminar-meetings of the secretaries of the primary party organizations with the examination of the tasks of the party organizations for the improvement of internationalist and patriotic education of the working people.

Trimester I, 1976

CC Sections of Party Organizational Work, Propaganda and Agitation, municipal and county party committees of the Moldavian Communist Party

5. With the aim of giving practical assistance to the municipal and county party committees in the domain of intensifying propaganda among the ranks of the working people in the republic connected with questions of the history of Moldavia, the formation and development of the Moldavian nation and statehood, the centuries-long ties between the Moldavian and Russian people and the other peoples of the USSR, to send into the republic's counties and cities propaganda groups to include state and community party organization workers, savants, cultural figures.

1976-1977

Propaganda and Agitation Sections, Sections for Science, Educational, and Cultural Institutions, the Section for Information and Relations with Foreign Countries of the Moldavian CP CC, the Republican Society *Știința [Science]*

6. To study the question "With regard to the political educational situation of the working people in the republic's frontier counties and to present materials for examination by the CC Bureau of the Moldavian CP."

Trimester IV, 1976

Sections for Propaganda and Agitation, and for Information and Relations with Foreign Countries of the Moldavian Communist Party CC

7. To make proposals in the country's central organs:
 - With regard to the organization in Chișinău, in 1980, of the XIVth Congress of Romanianists;

1976

The Scientific and Educational Institutions Section of the Moldavian CP, the Moldavian SSR AS [Academy of Sciences]

- With regard to the organization in Chișinău of the union-wide scientific-theoretical conferences:
 - a. "The Role of Russia in the Liberation of the Balkan Peoples from Under the Turkish Yoke";

April 1977

- b. "Against the Falsifiers of the History of the Installation of Soviet Power in the Peripheral Regions of Russia":

October 1977

The Science and Educational Institutions Section of the Moldavian CP CC, the Moldavian SSR AS

- With regard to the organization of the Days of Soviet Literature in the Moldavian SSR;

1976

The Writers Union of the Moldavian SSR

- With regard to the organization in Chişinău of the union-wide conference on the theme: “Multinational Soviet Literature and Scientific Literature during the Contemporary Period”

1977

The Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, the Moldavian SSR Writers Union

8. To accelerate the works of restoration at the Soroca fortress and to examine the issue of restoring Orheiului Vechi and their preservation as historical monuments

1976

The Moldavian SSR Ministry of Culture

9. To examine with the corresponding judicial authorities [instantele] the possibility of relocating the military garrison and transforming it into an historic memorial.

1976

The Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers

10. In the aim of creating some normal conditions for the activity of the Museum of the Institute of History of the MSSR AS [Academy of Sciences] and for the widest possible visitation of its exhibits by Soviet and foreign citizens, to install the museum in the location made available by the [departure of] the Museum of the History of the Moldavian Communist Party from Kiev St.

1978

The Executive Committee of the Soviet of the municipal deputies of the working people, the MSSR Ministry of Culture, the AS of the Moldavian SSR.

11. To examine and to resolve the problem regarding the installation of monuments:

- The January 1918 Defenders of Soviet Power Against the Romanian Interventionists (in the region of Ghidighicilor);
- The Members of the Local Soviet of Deputies of the Working People Shot in 1917 by the Romanian Occupiers (in the city of Leova);
- The Activists of Dubăsarii Vechi Shot by Romanian Occupiers (in Dubăsarii Vechi.)

1976-1980

Moldavian SSR Ministry of Culture

Conforming to the original: (signature)

Document No. 7

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 39, dosar 16, filele 26-32; Document No. 17 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, “PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova,” special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 78-83. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

**Annex No. 1
 Transcript No. 100, §3**

Approximate Themes for Republic Press, Radio & Television Interventions Oriented towards the Neutralization of Romanian National Propaganda that Harms the Interests of the USSR

Problems & Events Treated Incorrectly in SRR	Themes of [Soviet] Interventions
1. Romanian historians write much about events connected with the occupation of Moldova by Wallachia in 1600, interpreting it as “the first union of the Romanian principalities into a unitary state.”	The Campaign of Michael the Brave in Moldova in 1600. Michael the Brave and Moldova.
2. Romanian historiography exaggerates the role of the Romanian Army in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) and underestimates the role of Russia in the liberation of the Balkan peoples from under the Turkish yoke.	The role of Russia in the liberation of the Balkan peoples from under the Turkish yoke and the formation of independent statehood. K. Marx and F. Engels about the progressive role of Russia in the destinies of the Danubian and Balkan peoples. The classics of Marxism-Leninism about the participation of Romania in the anti-Turkish wars. K. Marx and F. Engels about the Moldavian people. The union with Russia—the principal aspiration of the Moldavian people in its long struggle against the Ottoman yoke. Bessarabia was joined to Russia 47 years before the Romanian state was formed.
3. The joining in 1812 of Bessarabia to Russia is characterized in Romanian literature as an act of occupation of Romanian territory.	The progressive results of the joining of Bessarabia to Russia. The criticism of the bourgeois falsifiers about the results of the joining of Bessarabia to Russia. The importance of the joining of Bessarabia to Russia for the development of the culture and public education of the Moldavian people. Drawing the Moldavian people into the bourgeois-democratic and proletarian-revolutionary movements—the most important results of the joining of Bessarabia to Russia. The first book printed on Moldavian soil—a result of the beneficent influence and assistance from the

	<p>progressive circles of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples.</p>
<p>4. Romanian linguists and literati try to demonstrate that in the Romanian language there are almost no Slavonic elements and that the Moldavian language is the Romanian language.</p>	<p>The role of the Russian, Ukrainian languages, and of the other Slavic languages in the formation and development of the Moldavian and Romanian languages. The unity and difference between the Moldavian and Romanian languages. The language and the people. The language and the nation. The language is an important but not a decisive characteristic of a nation.</p>
<p>5. Romanian historiography assesses the decision of the traitorous Sfatul Țării and the occupation of Bessarabia by Romania in 1918 as an expression of the will of the Moldavian people.</p>	<p>The Sfatul Țării is the center of bourgeois-nationalist counterrevolution in Bessarabia. World public opinion about the 1918 occupation of Bessarabia by the Romanian kingdom. The struggle of the working people of Bessarabia against the Romanian occupiers and the local exploiters for reunion with the Soviet fatherland.</p>
<p>6. The events connected with the struggle of the working people of Bessarabia in 1918-1949 under communist leadership for the reunion with the motherland, as well against the occupation of Soviet Moldavia by the Romanian kingdom in 1941 are passed over in silence in Romanian historiography. At the same time, the achievement of centuries-long aspirations of the Moldavian people—the reunion of the region with the country of Soviets in 1940—is interpreted by SRR party historians even as an occupation of Romanian territory by the Soviet Union: “On 26 June, as is known, following the Soviet ultimatum, the Government and Carol II ceded the territory between the Prut and Nistru Rivers, as well as northern Bucovina, which was annexed by the Soviet Union.”</p>	<p>Who benefits from the falsification of the history of the Moldavian people? World public opinion about the crimes of the Romanian occupiers on Moldavian soil. International support for the struggle of the working people for reunion with the motherland. The Moldavian people do not need “bourgeois compassion that stands in contradiction to its aspirations.” A series of articles consecrated to the anniversaries of the beginning of the largest political demonstrations (strikes), as well as armed manifestations (strikes), clashes and uprisings of the Moldavian people against the Romanian oppressors. The reunion of Bessarabia in 1940 with the Soviet fatherland—a realization of the aspirations of the Moldavian people. The active support and joy of the progressive elements of the Moldavian people in connection with the liberation of Bessarabia from under the yoke of the Romanian capitalists and landowners.</p>
<p>7. In Romanian literature nothing is mentioned about the participation of Romania in the war against the USSR on the side of Hitler’s Germany.</p>	<p>The Romanian bourgeois-landowners are the vanguard of fascism against the Soviet Union. The crimes of the Romanian occupiers on the occupied territory of Bessarabia, the center of subversionist acts against the MASSR [Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 1924-1940]. Illegality and the partisan movement in Moldavia in the period of the region’s occupation by Romanian-German oppressors. The solidarity of the Romanian communists with the</p>

	struggle of the working people of Moldavia for the liberation of the region from the Romanian occupiers. The struggle of the progressive workers and peasants in Romania against the participation of the royal dictatorship in the imperialist anti-Soviet war.
8. Romanian literature exaggerates beyond all bounds the role of Romania in the final stage of the Second World War, [and] the importance of the military revolt in Bucharest on 23 August 1944 in destroying Hitlerism in Southeast Europe.	The destruction of the German fascist army and its allies during the Iasi-Chișinău operation—an important moment in the liberation of the peoples of Europe from under the fascist yoke. The destruction by the Soviet Army of the group of German-Romanian troops—an important condition for activating the struggle of the peoples of the countries of Southeast Europe for national and social liberation.
	The Iasi-Chișinău Operation led to the liberation of Romania from under the fascist yoke and created a necessary condition for the transfer of power into the hands of the working people. Series of speeches by some well-known army commanders with memories about the battles for the liberation of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary.
9. In the SRR the works of bourgeois Romanian militants (Kogalniceanu, Balcescu, Iorga, Goga, etc.) are widely disseminated, with no critical evaluation of their reactionary political and philosophical conceptions.	The Class Approach—an indispensable condition for the objective evaluation of the creations of past leaders. K. Marx and F. Engels about the activity of Kogalniceanu, Balcescu and of other past militant of Romania.
10. All of the ideological work in the SRR is oriented towards the education of the population and especially the youth “in the spirit of the millenary traditions of the Romanian people,” in the spirit of availability “at any moment and at the price of any sacrifice to defend the sovereignty of their nation and national independence from the danger of any aggression.” The form and content of this activity erases the boundary between patriotism and nationalism.	The solution of the national problem in the countries of socialist Europe. National sovereignty from proletarian and bourgeois perspectives. Proletarian imperialism against chauvinism and racism. V. I. Lenin on Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism. V. I. Lenin on the attitude towards the legacy of the past. Nihilism and bourgeois national cosmopolitanism. Leninist traditions and the struggle against bourgeois ideology and its contemporary importance. The Leninist legacy and contemporary revisionism. The work of V. I. Lenin <i>Marxism and Revisionism</i> against contemporary “national communism.”
11. In Romania there is much talk today about European security, but the fundamental principle of this security such as the permanence of existing European borders and the renunciation of territorial pretensions is not even mentioned.	The permanence of existing European borders—a keystone of European security. The socialist countries in the struggle for security in Europe.
12. In party and state documents, in press and	The Class Approach—a fundamental principle of

<p>oral propaganda of the SRR, the fact that the principle of peaceful coexistence of the countries with different social regimes is a special form of class warfare, and that the active development of relations with the capitalist world must in no way prejudice the coordinated policy of the socialist countries [and] their principal common interests, is passed over in silence.</p>	<p>theory and practice for the Marxist-Leninist parties. Peaceful coexistence—a special form of class warfare between two social systems. The unity and proletarian sovereignty of the friendly countries—a principal guarantee of the process of socialism. Socialist integration—a principal lever for accelerating the economic and social progress of the countries of world socialism.</p>
<p>13. At the same time Romanian authors speak in an undifferentiated manner about the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and do not underscore that the first has an aggressive character, and the second—a defense character.</p>	<p>The Warsaw Pact—a guarantee of the independence and sovereignty of all member states. The radical difference between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The consolidation of the power of the Warsaw Pact—a daily preoccupation of the member countries. The participation of the socialist countries in the defensive Warsaw Pact—a real contribution to the cause of proletarian internationalism.</p>
<p>14. The SRR leadership underscores at every opportunity the importance of taking into consideration and making use of specific [national] particularities in the construction of socialism in Romania, but takes a dismissive attitude towards the general legitimacy for itself of all the other socialist countries. The organs of bourgeois information, especially <i>Radio Free Europe, Voice of America</i>, etc., justifiably appreciate such a position as an appeal to “national socialism.”</p>	<p>Criticism of the revisionist concepts of “the plurality of models of socialism.” “National socialism”—a revision of Marxism-Nationalism.</p>
<p>15. The Romanian comrades do not criticize the erroneous conception of the Maoists regarding “superpowers” and, at the same time, they propagate with every means another idea, likewise not lacking in evident defects, about the role and increasing importance of the small and medium-sized states in world events.</p>	<p>The inconsistency of the Marxist concept of “the superpowers.” Equality in rights, non-interference in domestic affairs and mutually advantageous collaboration—extremely important principles in the international policy of the CPSU. The countries of socialism in the struggle for equality of rights in relations between states. The struggle of the Soviet Union and of other countries of socialism for the liquidation of the imperialist policies of discrimination in international life.</p>
<p>16. The Romanian leadership has a negative attitude towards the idea of convoking a conference and regional or international meetings of the communist and workers parties.</p>	<p>The role of conferences and meetings of the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties in the struggle for peace, social progress and socialism.</p>
<p>17. In the SRR the assistance granted Romania by the Soviet Union and other friendly countries in the formation and development of its economy is passed over in silence completely.</p>	<p>The disinterested assistance of the Soviet Union and of all socialist countries in the formation and development of the economy, science and culture of Romania.</p>

In conformity with the original: (signature)

Document No. 8

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 39, dosar 16, filele 33-36; Document No. 18 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 83-85. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

Annex No. 2 Transcript No. 100, §3

List of Works on the Problems Connected with the History of the Formation and Development of the Moldavian Nation and Statehood, and of Russo-Romanian, Soviet-Romanian and Moldo-Romanian Relations that Subsequently will be Prepared and Published in 1976-1980

The following works are to be prepared and published:

1. Bobeiko, I. M., Brâseakin, S. C., Levchenko, B. C., *Communist Organization in Bessarabia—The Vanguard of the Struggle of the Working People in the Region in the Fight for Reunion with the Soviet Fatherland (1918-1940)*.
2. Bobeiko, I. M., *The Formation and Activity of the Balkan Communist Federation*. Monograph, 1979
3. Brâseakin, S. C., *The Cultural Situation in Bessarabia (1918-1940)*, 1977.
4. Ghitsiu, M. M., *The Moldavian Soviets and the Soldiers Committees on the Romanian Front During the Preparation and Achievement of the Great October Socialist Revolution*. Monograph, 1980
5. Esaulenko, A. S., *The Socialist Revolution in Moldavia and the Failure of Moldavian Bourgeois Nationalism*. Monograph 1977.
6. Zavtur, A. A., *The Social Structure of Moldavia: From Class Antagonism to Social Unity*, 1976.
7. Zavtur, A. A., *The Social Structure of Moldavia: From Social Unity to Full Societal Homogenization*, 1978.
8. Istrati, E. N., *The Economic and Political Situation of the Working Class in Occupied Bessarabia (1925-1940)*. Monograph, 1980.
9. Kustreabova, S. F., *The Social-Economic Situation of the Working People and Demographic Progress in the Cities of Occupied Bessarabia and the Factors that Conditioned them (1918-1940)*. Monograph, 1976.
10. Levit, I. E., *The Failure of the Romanian Kingdom's Plans of Annexation of Soviet Territories in the Years of the Second World War*. Monograph, 1979.
11. Morari, A. G., *Premeditated Myopia (Against the Bourgeois and Revisionist Falsification of the Diplomatic Struggle of the CPSU and the Soviet Government for the Liberation of Romania. 1918-1940)*. Brochure, 1976.

12. Rozhko, V. M., *The Socio-Economic Situation and the Revolutionary Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Peasants in Occupied Bessarabia in the Years 1925-1928*. Monograph, 1980.
13. Semionova, I. V., *Russia and the Liberation Struggle of the Moldavian People Against the Ottoman Yoke at the End of the XVIIIth Century*. Monograph, 1976.
14. Semionova, I. V., *Russo-Romanian Relations in the Last Quarter of the XVIIIth Century*. Collection of Documents, 1979.
15. Multiple authors, *The History of the Moldavian SSR in Contemporary Foreign Historiography (A Critical Outline)*. In two volumes, 1977-1979.
16. Multiple authors, *The Formation of the Bourgeois Moldavian Nation*. Monograph, 1977.
17. Multiple authors, *The Moldavian SSR in the Years of the Great War for the Defense of the Fatherland (Collection of Documents and Materials)*, vol. 2, 1976.
18. Multiple authors, *The Ethnogenesis of the Moldavian and Slavic People*. Monograph, 1981.
19. Multiple authors, *The Moldavians*. Monograph (in the Russian language—in 1976, in the Moldavian language—in 1979).
20. Multiple authors, *Soviet Moldavian Successes and the Myths of Anti-Communism*. Collection of articles, 1976.
21. Collection of authors, *Soviet Moldavia as Seen by Foreign Guests*. Collection of opinions, affirmations, 1975.
22. Multiple authors, *The History of the Balkan Peoples. The Criticism of Anti-Communist Conceptions*. Collection of articles, 1975.
23. Multiple authors, *The Political and Socio-Economic Situation of Bessarabia in 1918-1940 in Bourgeois Historiography*. Collection of articles, 1977.
24. Multiple authors, *The Typology of Similarities and Differences between Related Languages*. Collection of articles, 1977.
25. Collection of authors, *Romanian-Slavonic Linguistic Relations and Parallels*. Collection of articles, 1978.
26. Multiple authors, *Studies of Moldo-Russo-Ukrainian Literary Ties*, 1978.
27. Multiple authors, *The Problems of Moldavian Language and Literature in the Interpretation of Contemporary Romanian Scholars* (article), 1976.
28. Multiple authors, *Studies on the History of Philosophical and Socio-Political Thought in Moldavia*. Collection of articles, 1979.
29. Multiple authors, *Studies in the History of the Moldavian Komsomol*, 1978.
30. Multiple authors, *The Victory of Soviet Power in Moldavia*. Monograph, 1978.
31. Multiple contributors, *The Cultural Situation in Moldavia (in the Period of Romanian Occupation)*. Collection of Documents, 1976-1978.
32. Multiple contributors, *Documents on the Illegal Communists in Bessarabia*. Collection of documents, vol. 1 (1918-1928); vol. 2 (1929-1940), 1977.

To Translate into the Moldavian language and to publish the following works:

1. Bodiul, I. I., *Socio-Economic Relations in the Village in the Stage of Developed Socialism*.
2. Iliashenko, C. I., *In the United Family*
3. Lazarev, A. M., *Soviet Moldavian Statehood and the Bessarabian Question*.
4. Afteniuk, S. I., Shemeakov D. E. et al., *The Victory of Soviet Power in Moldavia*.

To Revise and Republish the following works:

1. Antoniuk, D., Afteniuk, C., *The Traitorous Role of the "Sfatul Țării."*
2. Antoniuk, D., *The Development of Culture in Moldavia.*
3. Antsupov, I., Babii, A., Zhukov, V., Ivanov, I., *The Year 1918 in the Destiny of the Moldavian People.*
4. Brâseakin, S., Sâtnic, M., *The Triumph of Historical Truth.*
5. Grecul, A., *The Flowering of the Soviet Moldavian Nation.*
6. Fiodorov, G., *The Regime of Bloody Repressions.*
7. *For the Power of the Soviets (A Chronicle of the Revolutionary Events in Moldavia [March 1917-January 1918])*

To translate from Moldavian into the Russian language the works of

Vizer, B., Stratievski, C., Sâtnic, M., Tsaranov, V., *Through Cooperation To Communism.*

In conformity with the original: Chief of Protocol Service,
General Section of the MCP CC (signature)

Document No. 9

**Secret, Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union at the USSR Soviet of Ministries, TASS,
No. 105 s, 10 February 1976 [Moscow], to First Secretary of the MCP CC, Cde. I. I. Bodiul**

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 40, dosar 26, fila 13; Document No. 19 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), p. 86. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

Esteemed Ivan Ivanovich,

As V. N. Ignatenko reported to me, you are in agreement with the opinion regarding the necessity of intensifying the activity of the Moldavian Agency of Information [ATEM] in the preparing of materials about the life of the republic for the foreign press. This was conditioned by the necessity of counteracting the more active attempts by Western means of information to misrepresent the past and present of the Moldavian people, of combating certain tendencies of Romanian propaganda.

We believe it would be opportune to organize, within the framework of the agency, a Special Editor of Information for Abroad whose collaboration could prepare material, both qualitatively and operationally, with a propagandistic character. TASS requests the Moldavian CP CC to assist the agency in the formation of this editor's office.

With respect

General Director of TASS, L. Zamiatin (signature)

Document No. 10

Secret, MCP Central Committee, No. 125 s, 5 April 1976 [Chişinău], to CPSU Central Committee

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 40, dosar 24, fila 86; Document No. 22 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 90-91. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

On the Creation of a Sector on the History of the International Communist Movement within the Institute of Party History at the Moldavian Communist Party CC

In connection with the propaganda which intensifies against the Moldavian SSR and with the necessity of adopting supplementary measures in the domain of ideological work in the ranks of the population of the republic, of the profound elaboration of the problems of the revolutionary movement and the victory of the socialist revolution in Moldavia, of the Marxist-Leninist treatment of the history of the communist movement in the Balkans, of the relations between the communist parties of the Balkan countries and the CPSU, Comintern, of the neutralization of bourgeois and imperialist revisionist propaganda and the unmasking of the falsifiers of the historical events and phenomena by Romanian sociologists, the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party considers necessary and requests permission to open, within the framework of the Institute of Party History at the Moldavian Communist Party CC, a specialized sector of 8 persons (1 sector chief, 3 senior scientific collaborators and 2 junior collaborators, 1 laboratory assistant and 1 typist).

In order to organize such a sector, a group of specialists prepared with a stage of scientific activity in this domain, familiarized with the works of Romanian authors, knowing the languages of the countries whose parties made up the Balkan Communist Federation, has been created.

MCP CC Secretary, I. Bodiul (signature)

Document No. 11

Top Secret, MCP Central Committee, No. 145 ss, 26 May 1976 [Chişinău], to CPSU Central Committee

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 40, dosar 24, filele 98-109; Document No. 23 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 91-98. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

Information on New Falsifications of Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian Relations in the Publications of the Socialist Republic of Romania

The Moldavian Communist Party CC first of all informs the CPSU Central Committee about the deeds of gross misrepresentation of the historical events connected with the problems of the formation and development of the Moldavian people, its statehood, of Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations committed in the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Recently, the mass organs of information, scientific and propagandistic institutions of the SRR have increased the number of publications that contain a willful falsification of the above-mentioned events, such as the revolutionary activities of the workers and communist organizations from the Balkan region and of the Communist International. Attracting attention [is] not only the numerical increase in the published materials, but also the intensification of their anti-Russian, anti-Moldavian and anti-Soviet orientation, many historians of the SRR sharing the bourgeois national-chauvinist conceptions of both the current imperialist and Maoist adepts of anti-Sovietism.

The principal sense of the publications comes down to the argument of the ethnic unity of peoples who live between the Danube and the Nistru Rivers, the community of traditions, of cultures, of languages, etc. Through them is negated the legitimacy of the independent existence of the Moldavian nation and statehood outside of Romania, the unanimously accepted evaluation of the reactionary essence of the Turkish yoke is revised and the Imperial Ottoman defense of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Danubian principalities is demonstrated. At the same time, the liberating mission of Russia in the Balkans is now characterized as being as being one of overwhelming the region. In the opinion of many Romanian authors, "the aggressive intentions of Russia concluded with the 1812 annexation of Bessarabia" and the total annexation of the Danubian principalities was only stopped due to the attitude of France against Russian expansionism and the resistance of the Danubian peoples. In the same order of ideas, they demonstrate the inconsistency seen in the policies of contemporary states that, through all possible means, evaluate the injustices of the past as a perfectly acceptable state of affairs.

In the publications the participation of Romania in the First World War is justified completely. As candidate member of the RCP CC, deputy of the Grand National Assembly, Pascu, affirms, "it had neither an unjust nor an imperialist character, but rather the noble pursuit of 'national and state unification.'" In his opinion, "the Romanian people were overcome by an unprecedented enthusiasm, when it found out about the entrance into the war on the part of the Entente."

Recently, Romanian historians have been characterizing the annexation by the Romanian kingdom of Soviet Bessarabia in 1918 even as “the union of Bessarabia with Romania as a result of the decisions of the Sfatul Țării.” Now this act of annexation is interpreted as the result of a national movement of liberation in Bessarabia for union with “its motherland—Romania,” fixed through the decision of the Sfatul Țării.

The decisions of the COMINTERN, which supported the unending struggle of the Moldavian people for reunion with the Soviet fatherland, have been subjected to outrageous attacks. In the opinion of contemporary Romanian authors, the decisions of the COMINTERN, supposedly, “were directed towards the dismemberment of the Romanian national unitary state and the separation of the Romanian people.”

Rejecting the decisions of the RCP’s IVth and Vth Congresses as being wrong, imposed by the COMINTERN, Romanian historians today declare that the principal component of the party always considered and considers still the [Romanian] annexation of Bessarabia and of Bucovina as a natural process of the unification of a nation, a process which reached its logical conclusion in 1918. The act of the liberation of Bessarabia in 1940 is treated by Ionița, the deputy secretary of the Agitation and Propaganda Section of the RCP CC, as “an annexation by the Soviet Union of Romanian territory,” being equivalent with the fascist Hungarian diktat.¹³²

The policy of the Romanian fascist state is being radically revised, it is affirmed that Romania found itself in the fascist camp, so to speak, because of the territorial pretensions of the Soviet Union towards it.

This and other confabulations constitute a gross falsification of historical truth, of the true aspirations of the Moldavian people, which directly participated in the revolutionary struggle for the installation of Soviet power in the former Gubernia of Bessarabia, and heroically defended it in the period of the Civil War. Finding itself after the intervention and treason under occupation, it did not stop the insurrectional fight until the liberation of the right bank of Moldavia in 1940.

Contemporary Romanian historical, socio-political and artistic literature, treating the events connected with the Second World War, not only pass over in silence the savagery of the Romanian army on occupied Soviet territory, but demonstrates that it accomplished a heroic deed in the aim of returning lost territories and preserving national unity. It sees the error of the leading circles not in the participation in the war against the USSR, but in the fact that the Romanian Army went further than the Nistru River.

If in earlier times the confabulations of the Romanian falsifiers figured only in the works of savants, currently they can be found in the written and oral discourses of party and state working people, of leaders of community organizations, of literary and artistic figures, they are printed in the pages of party, state and community publications—in the newspapers *Scanteia* [*The Spark*] and *Romania Libera* [*Free Romania*], in the journals *Era socialista* [*Socialist Era*], *Anale de istorie* [*Historical Annals*], etc. Ionița, deputy secretary of the Propaganda and Agitation Section of the RCP CC, Popescu-Puțuri¹³³ and Voicu, members of the RCP CC, Pascu, candidate member of the RCP CC, etc., have dedicated special efforts to this end.

¹³² Whereas the annexation of Bessarabia was accomplished on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, the “Hungarian diktat” decided by Ribbentrop and Italian Foreign Minister Ciano did not involve the USSR.

¹³³ Ion Popescu-Puțuri was also President of the Romania-China Friendship Society, which enjoyed broader liberties and Romanian state support in carrying out its activities in contrast to the competing and considerably restricted Romanian-Soviet Friendship Society (ARLUS), thus already establishing Popescu-Puțuri as a Soviet *bête noire*.

Only in the months of March and April of the current year, the newspaper *Scanteia*, the organ of the RCP CC, hosted 8 articles that contained chauvinistic opinions of a purposeful nature. On 16 April of the current year, the newspaper published the article *Testimony to Romanian Continuity* and inserted a map with frontiers of the Romanian state marked as comprising the current Soviet territories up to the Nistru River and further, in northern Bucovina.

In essence, overt territorial pretensions towards the Soviet Union are manifested in the monograph of Mușat and Ardeleanu, *Political Life of Romania: 1981-1921*, published at the beginning of 1976, in the articles: Pascu, "Moments of the Struggle of the Romanian People for the Formation of the Romanian Unitary State" (the journal *Magazin istoric*, no. 2, 1976), Popescu-Puțuri, "From the Past of the Struggle of the Romania People for the Defense of Sovereignty and the Independence of the Fatherland," Mușat and Ionița, "The Fundamental Problems of the History of Our People," (the journal *Anale de istorie*, no. 1, 1976).

The number of publications with a similar chauvinistic and nationalist character continues to grow, especially in connection with the launching of the campaign for preparations for the celebration, in 1977, of those 100 years since the proclamation of Romanian independence. From them there emerges the clear tendency of the Romanian ideological services to induce the idea among world public opinion of the illegal entrance of Moldavia and northern Bucovina as a component part of the USSR, to stir up nationalist, pro-Romanian states of mind among the ranks of the Moldavian population. To this end, they send a large quantity of literature of all types, treating contemporary Romanian conceptions on territorial problems, ethnography, etc., to the addresses of editors, librarians, houses of culture, scientific institutions, writers and scholars in the Moldavian SSR. Romania is becoming the place where, through different channels, reactionary literature published in the USA, FRG, Israel, China and other countries in which the most extravagant anti-Sovietism prospers penetrates into the Soviet Union. In 1975, 13,600 examples of ideologically dangerous publications were sent from Romania to different institutions in Moldavia, a considerable part of which from Romanian publishing houses.

Along with sending literature, Western countries transmit to Moldavia dangerous broadcasts through the intermediary of 11 radio stations, for a total time of 13 hours a day.

Romanian citizens who arrive in Moldavia on tourists visas openly provoke discussions connected with the territorial problems, etc. In particular, they demonstrate with firmness that the USSR imposes on the small countries, Romania included, in various ways, inequitable economic relations, as a result of which the Romanians suffer material difficulties.

From the general analysis of the increased number of publications and radio broadcasts with a nationalist, anti-Soviet character, as well as the tendentious discussions of Romanian citizens creates the impression that the anti-Russian, anti-Soviet orientation in the activity of the historians, philosophers, literary personalities, workers in the Romanian party and community organizations is assisted by the center and developed with vast means of influence over the masses, over world public opinion with the aim of creation a unique opinion about unjust borders, about the allegedly artificial separation of the Romanian people.

This and other tendencies in Romania, which have attained an increasingly clear character of territorial pretensions, naturally, finds active support in the West, especially in the revanchist circles of West Germany, as well as among the rabid Maoists. These circles use them for unjustifiably accusing our state of expansionism, for subjugating peoples and for other calumnious confabulations.

For instance, in one of the recent broadcasts of the radio station *Deutsche Welle* it is affirmed that, in the book of Mușat and Ardeleanu *Political Life in Romania: 1918-1921*, "we find a large dose of political material with an explosive character." Using quotes from the entire book, the radio station praises the Romanian authors who engage polemics with "foreign Marxist historians that try and justify the annexation of Romanian territories."

Recently, the West German journal, *Der Spiegel*, published a review of the book written by Romanian novelist Preda, *Delirium*, with the title, "Antonescu, the military dictator and the friend of Hitler, is romantically rehabilitated because he fought against the Russians." In this work, Antonescu is presented in the figure of a "courageous and incorruptible leader, burdened by the noble preoccupation of improving the well-being of his people and preserving the territorial integrity of Greater Romania."

In the atmosphere of intensified hostile propaganda around our republic, the Moldavian Communist Party CC, in full conformity with the CPSU CC directives, is raising the vigilance of the working people, their intransigence before the attempts at [undermining] their statehood, at their ancient friendship with all of the peoples of our great fatherland. In the vast ideological activity, which is developing according to an elaborate plan, the grandiose economic and social successes of the Moldavian people, obtained due to the indestructible union and brotherhood of the USSR peoples, to the greatness and power of our Soviet fatherland, are widely disseminated. The Moldavian people, devoted to the end to the Leninist party and to its great Soviet fatherland, is full of decisiveness for the consolidation, with all of its intentions and deeds, of the friendship and brotherhood with the Great Russian and Ukrainian peoples, and with the other peoples of the USSR, in order to construct with trust and faith a communist society. However, unfortunately, under the influence of Western and Romanian propaganda, some persons among the ranks of intellectuals [and] among the youth, not sufficiently prepared for the critical perception of the diverse anti-Soviet confabulations, permit themselves, in their circles of relatives and intimates, and sometimes in public places, to make demagogic pro-Romanian affirmations, spreading provocative rumors.

Persons of Jewish and German nationalities who wait to depart the USSR but who, for various reasons, were not allowed to leave the country have engaged in especially unpleasant and irresponsible discussions and manifestations. At the current moment, there are 87 such families of Jewish nationality and 587 of German nationality comprising approximately 2 thousand persons. In total, 100 thousand citizens of Jewish nationality and around 12 thousand of German nationality live in Moldavia. Around 15 thousand people have emigrated, principally to Israel and the FRG. The retained persons, in the aim of extorting visas, employ Romanian and bourgeois insinuations regarding the Moldavian SSR in order to create an unhealthy atmosphere, stimulating hunger strikes, sending through delegates of various institutions many calumnious letters to the UN and to the ambassadors of capitalist countries accredited to Moscow.

Much work is done with persons disposed to emigrate, and in this way many citizens renounce their departure. At the same time, a part of this group does not interrupt its hostile activity within the interior of the republic, as the result of which the negative influence of bourgeois propaganda over persons of Moldavian nationality increases.

The essence of the unhealthy manifestations on the part of nationally marginalized Moldavians is expressed in the spirit of Romanian publications and Western bourgeois anti-Soviet propaganda. The most dangerous declarations, openly pro-Romanian, have been made by some writers, especially Strâmbeanu, Vodă, Marinat and several others. Their ideological teacher

is the Moldavian writer Ion Druță, who lives in Moscow and who, in an entire series of his works published by Moscow publishing houses, throws calumny upon CPSU policy, misrepresents the national relations in our country, denigrates the Soviet way of life, its economic system and socialism, [and] demonstrates the lack of viability and of humanity of the socialist order. The publication of his works, which are being published also in Romania, creates serious difficulties in the ideological task of forming an international consciousness among the working people.

The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee reacts operationally to all of the smallest manifestations of nationalism, localism and pro-Western orientations, giving a principled evaluation and undertaking decisive measure for liquidating them.

The issues connected with the patriotic education of the working people, of the class approach to evaluating social phenomena, of intolerance towards manifestations foreign to our regime, ideology and morals, other issues connected with ideological work are systematically realized at the CC plenums and at the meetings of the republic's party *active*, are studied in the system of Marxist-Leninist education, are translated into life by all of the republic's communists.

[To provide] for propagandistic and journalistic cadres, savants and workers in the creative domains, ongoing permanent seminars explain the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU, give vast information about the achievements of our country, unmask the confabulations of the Maoists and of other renegades of contemporary opportunism, [and] the provocative character of bourgeois propaganda, at the CC, municipal and county committees, where the cadres are initiated into the best methods of ideological work among the ranks of the working people.

In conformity with the CPSU CC decisions, "With regard to the supplementary measures for the continual intensification of ideological work among the ranks of the population in the Moldavian SSR and in the Cernăuți region of the UkSSR" and "With regard to the supplementary measures in the domain of ideological work in connection with the intensification of Romanian nationalist propaganda which harms the interests of the USSR," the Moldavian Communist Party CC has elaborated and undertaken measures for increasing the print-runs of literature, and number of radio and television broadcasts, in which the events of the past and present of the Moldavian people, its centuries-long aspirations that were crowned with the joining of Bessarabia to Russia through the will of the great masses of the population, are treated from a [Marxist-Leninist] scientific position, the attempts of the Western and Romanian information/intelligence organs to misrepresent the true essence of Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations, [as well as] the contemporary foreign policy activities of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, are unmasked with all decisiveness.

Up to this moment, there were published over 150 monographs, collections of articles, documents and other publications regarding the questions connected with the formation of the bourgeois and socialist Moldavian nations, the revolutionary movement and construction of socialism in our region and in other regions.

Given that in some of the secondary school manuals published in the past the role of the feudal state in the consolidation of the Danubian people was exaggerated and other errors were committed, their re-editing is being organized. In the new manuals the questions regarding the formation and development of the Moldavian nation [and] its statehood are treated in an expressive and convincing manner on the basis of a rich factual material showing the progressive role of Russia in the liberation of the peoples in the Danubian basin, in their union into

independent states, illustrating the edifying force of Leninist nationalities policy, showing the achievements obtained in the construction of socialism on Moldavian soil.

The museums more broadly explain the activity of the communist illegals, of the Bolshevik organizations in our region, the participation of the Moldavian people in the proletarian revolutionary movement, in the victory of the October Revolution, in the creation of the Soviets for the proclamation of the Soviet Bessarabian Republic, the formation of the Moldavian SSR as a component of the unitary Soviet Union. Activities were launched for the creation of the Museum of Military Glory, in which the participation of the Moldavian people in the Civil War and the War for the Defense of the Fatherland will be illustrated. This and other cultural institutions are destinations for visiting tourists. Unfortunately, many Romanian groups refuse in an organized manner to visit the museums.

Within the Moldavian Information Agency (ATEM), a principal Editorial Office of Information for Abroad, prepares well-argued materials about the realization of the Leninist nationalities policies in Moldavia, familiarizing [foreigners] with the achievements of the Moldavian SSR and unmasking the confabulations of foreign falsifiers.

The Moldavian Society for Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries increased the amount of informational materials about the Soviet Union sent abroad to the addresses of related institutions, the majority of which discuss the life of the issue of the Moldavian people, [and] Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations.

In conformity with the planned measures of the CPSU CC regarding the consolidation of a technical-material base for Moldavian television and radio broadcasts, currently work is underway for increasing the power of the television stations taking into account the assuring of quality broadcast reception throughout the entire territory of the republic. Measures are being undertaken for the regulation of tourism, which has attained a mass character from Romania.

In conformity with the political objectives outlined at the XXVth Congress of the CPSU, the Moldavian Communist Party CC has drawn up a complex plan of ideological measures, in which is foreseen the organization of some scientific-practical conferences, republican meetings of propagandists in the framework of which the question connected with mass political work are analyzed. In May of the current year, there will take place a republican assembly of ideological workers. At the Moldavian Communist Party CC [and] in the municipal and county party organizations meetings with journalists, faculty heads from the social sciences, and workers from the creative unions are being organized. The seriousness of the political-ideological level of the published materials has increased. The entire spirit of the periodical publications is oriented towards the internationalist and patriotic education of the working people, towards affirming the Leninist way of life and Leninist activities. In the case of mistaken works, critical reviews are organized, while referring to especially dangerous literary and film works, the Moldavian Communist Party CC had adopted special decisions.

The Congresses of the Writers and Film-makers this April has developed under the enormously positive influence of the remarkable document of our epoch, as it has entered into the consciousness of all Soviet people, namely the highly scientific report of L. I. Brezhnev at the XXVth CPSU Congress. The authors who depart from class criteria in their evaluation and treatment of social-political problems, and who become exponents of opinions foreign to the ideology of socialist realism, tolerating ideological confusion and apoliticism, received a well-earned riposte at the above-mentioned forum.

The creation of a series of documentary films about the triumph of Leninist nationalities policies was foreseen, [as was] the organization of a film festival with the theme of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, completing the repertoire of the theatre and musical collectives with works about the friendship of the peoples of the USSR.

In May-June there will be municipal and county seminars of the primary party organizations, at which the new forms and methods of patriotic and internationalist education of the working people will be studied.

We know that the countermeasures undertaken in Moldavia for the neutralization of foreign propaganda have created serious difficulties for the Romanian and bourgeois intelligence services. Thanks to the principled position of the CPSU Central Committee towards the activity of the Romanian organs that harm the interests of our country and, similarly, to the ideological work of the party, the Moldavian people follow with devotion the course traced by V. I. Lenin, preserving and consolidating with fidelity the great friendship of the USSR peoples, fully supporting the policy of the CPSU, being proud of its social-economic achievements and considering it a great happiness to live and to create in a powerful state such as our great fatherland.

The strong patriotism of the Moldavian people is now meaningfully manifested in the successful translation into life of the tasks outline by the XXVth Congress of the CPSU.

Along with the above-mentioned information with a political character, the Moldavian Communist Party CC announces that the Romanian side, unilaterally, [and] grossly transgressing the provisions of the Soviet-Romanian Hydro-Technical Agreement, is raising a levee of earth along the Prut River for a length of over 100 km. The raising is accomplished by paramilitary subunits working at an accelerated rhythm. After the termination of the construction of the above-mentioned levee, during periods of rising water levels the railway hub at the frontier at Ungheni and 12 localities on our side will be flooded.

The repeated appeals from USSR government authorities regarding the execution of the provisions of the Soviet-Romanian Hydro-technical Agreement have not enjoyed understanding. The Romanian side declares that it will accept the coordinated decision on the works begun regarding the building of levees along the Prut River in the sector mentioned only on the condition of the revision of all the decisions adopted earlier conforming to which the reclamation of our side in the course of the Prut also should be made in full accord with the Romanians.

Probably, according to the agreement concluded with China, a large number of Romanians and Chinese specialists occupied with the cultivation of rice and vegetables are working along the Soviet-Romanian frontier.

The leaders of the frontier counties in Romania accept without hesitation contacts with our frontier counties, the exchange of delegations is made, as a rule, only on the initiative of our side, as a result of which the meetings rarely take place. The Romanian representatives, when they visit the frontier counties of Moldavia, are shown all that is important and valuable from our advanced experience, while our delegations are especially officially received, they are shown principally historical places, concerts, they spend much time in restaurants.

The Moldavian Communist Party CC is fully conscious of the exclusive importance of the measures undertaken in connection with the Romanian nationalist and chauvinist propaganda which harms the interests of the USSR, and it translates into life, with all responsibility, the CPSU CC directives connected with the internationalist and patriotic education of the working

people, of the formation within it of strong moral qualities and patriotic fidelity to their great Soviet fatherland.

MCP CC Secretary, I. Bodiul (signature)

Document No. 12

Secret, Council of Ministers of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, No. 16-115, 7 April 1978 [Chişinău], to MCP Central Committee

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 47, dosar 11, filele 63-67; Document No. 66 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 201-205. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

**About the Implementation of the Decisions Adopted
with Regard to Consolidating the Technical-Material Base of TV-Radio Broadcasting in
the Moldavian SSR and the Regulation of Subscriptions to Literature and Periodicals from
the SRR and of the Entrance into Moldavia of Romanian Tourists and Citizens for Private
Purposes**

In view of the implementation of the decision of the CPSU CC of 5 November 1970 "Regarding Measures of Continual Intensification of Ideological Work among the Ranks of the Population in the Moldavian SSR and in the Cernăuți region of the Ukrainian SSR" and of the disposition of the USSR Council of Ministers of 7 April 1976, No. 681-rs, as well as of the respective decisions of the Moldavian Communist Party CC and of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers, it was established that a series of concrete measures would be undertaken in the republic for the consolidation of the planned technical-material base of television and radio broadcasting by 1980.

In particular, it is planned:

- To finalize construction and begin operation of the Bălți-Edineț radio-relay line;
- To construct the retranslation television station in Edineț and the 150 kW medium-wave radio-transmitter;
- To conclude in 1976 the construction of the bloc for studios and color television equipment and film production of the Radio-Television Center in Chişinău;
- To realize, during 1977-1980, the construction of the Republic House of Radio Broadcasting and sound stage;
- To realize the reconstruction (in the first stage), during 1978-1980, of a complex of studios and equipment of the Radio-Television Center in Chişinău;
- To construct and to begin operation in Rezina, during 1977-1979, of a television station and a radio-relay line;
- To install a transmitter for radio broadcasting in two programs in ultra-short wave at the Television Station in Ungheni;
- To assure the re-allocation of supplementary capital investment for the reconstruction during 1978-1980 of television stations in the cities of Cahul and Bălți and the installation, during 1978-1979, of transmitters in order to assure the transmission of televised broadcasts in two programs in Ungheni and in the city of Cimislia;
- To reallocate, in 1978, a medium-wave transmitter with a 500 kW capacity for amplifying the audibility of the first republic radio program in the territory of the Moldavian SSR.

The realization of these measures is accomplished, however, with great delay, through the fault of both the organization of construction and assembly, and of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of the Moldavian SSR and of the Moldavian SSR Ministry of Telecommunications.

The Bălți-Edineț radio-relay lines were installed as was the 150 kW medium-wave radio-transmitter. In 1977, the construction of the bloc for studios and color television equipment and film production was concluded at a cost of 7.1 million rubles and the construction of the Republic House of Radio Broadcasting was begun with a detailed estimate of costs of 6.43 million rubles. In the current year, the reconstruction of the complex for studios and television equipment at the Radio-Television Center in Chișinău and the construction of the television station in Rezina were started. Up until the end of the year, the second transmitter at the television stations in Ungheni and the city of Cimislia is planned to be set up.

As a result of the measures adopted regarding the consolidation of the technical-material base of television and radio broadcasting in the republic, the fixed funds of this undertaking [*ramuri*] have increased in the new five-year plan and in two years of the current five-year plan from 3.5 million rubles up to 14.1 million rubles, or four times.

This has created the possibility of expanding the duration of televised transmissions for the two principal programs, from 18 hours per day, as it was in 1970, up to 29 hours in the current year, the total volume of radio transmissions growing from 24.1 hours to 30.6 hours.

In the 10th five-year plan, for the continued development of the technical-material base of television 10.07 million rubles in investment capital are foreseen. However, as a result of insufficient capitalization in 1976-1977, the real danger appears that, up until the end of the five-year plan, the construction of the Republic House of Radio Broadcasting and the reconstruction of the complex for studios and equipment at the Radio-Television Center in Chișinău will not be concluded.

The alarming fact is that at present in many villages situated on the border with Romania the reception of programs one and two of the republic television is not assured. In the best of cases, these transmissions can be received with the condition of installing some high antennas, while for program two an adaptor that costs 45 rubles is also necessary. Concerning the transmissions of Romanian Television, they are received in all of the villages in the border zone with only a room antenna, and their image is always clear and stable.

In the aim of continually increasing the efficiency and quality of television and radio broadcasts and of intensifying their ideological influence over the masses, it would be opportune to realize a series of organizational measures and, first of all, of increasing the volume of TV and radio broadcasts, especially prolonging the program of the Republic Television up until 24-01.

For that, it is necessary to solve the following problems:

- To undertake a demarche in the respective Union organs for obtaining an expansion of the volume of TV and radio transmissions;
- To increase the TV-Radio offerings with films, shows, video concert programs, recordings with transmissions of the TV-Radio Broadcasting Center, etc.;
- To assure the reception with special destination from the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of the USSR and from the State Committee for

Cinematography of the USSR of copies of artistic films and documentaries produced in studios around the country, in order to be shown on (Moldavian) television;

- To find supplementary financial means, of approximately 1.2 million rubles per year, for the costs connected with prolonging the hours of transmission.

Regarding the longer-term perspective, conforming to the specialists of the USSR Ministry of Telecommunications and the State Committee for TV and Radio Broadcasting of the USSR, in time, a new station will be constructed in the area of the city of Straseni, with a higher dimensions than the currently existing one, on a tall pylon of 360 meters which, taking into account the topographic relief of the locality, will be taller by 240 meters than the television tower in Chişinău. This is even more important because the television towers of Romania are in dimension considerably higher than those of Moldavia.

The procurement of published literature in the SRR and the subscription to Romanian newspapers and journals can be characterized through the following data.

Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, from the account of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has procured the Romanian publications:

	1975	1976	1977
Books (copies)	1,042	1,414	1,241
Journals (titles)	83	85	87

“N. K. Krupskaia” State Library of the Republic has procured:

	1975	1976	1977
Books (copies)	712	1,590	1,052
Journals (titles)	160	162	178
Newspapers (titles)	33	29	28

For 1978, the “Soiuzpechiat” organizations arranged subscriptions for 61 newspapers and 195 journals. The subscription was effected through coordination with the Section of Information and Foreign Relations of the Moldavian Communist Part CC. 15 newspapers and 252 journals, including the fashion magazine—in 200 copies—will be for sale in 1978.

105,689 SRR citizens visited the republic during 1970-1977 through the intermediary of the “Intourist” network, including in 1976—26,612—and in 1977—14,837. Entry into Moldavia is planned by “Intourist” USSR. Along with Moldavia, Romanian tourists visit other Soviet republics as well.

In this same period, 2,821 persons left Moldavia for Romania as tourists, including 656 in 1976 and 621 in 1977. As a rule, aside from Romania, the tourists also visit Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Only in 1977 did a group of tourists leave for Romania without visiting another country as well.

During 1970-1977 56,651 SRR citizens arrived in Moldavia for private reasons, while, during the same years, 33,499 MSSR citizens visited Romania.

Taken by year, the data are the following:

	Entry into the MSSR	Departure to the SRR
1970	10,617	7,778
1971	7,382	2,793
1972	6,576	2,994
1973	6,554	3,410
1974	7,338	3,666
1975	6,331	4,255
1976	7,023	3,625
1977	4,380	4,978

The departure documents are completed by the MIA [Ministry of Internal Affairs] in conformity with the Soviet-Romanian accord of 30 June 1969 on the exchange of visas for business, tourism and personal travel.

The above data demonstrate the fact that the field work for reducing the number of travelers for private purposes is insufficiently developed and that, in the majority of cases, departures are permitted that are not strictly necessary.

With the aim of regulating the acquisition of Romanian literature and periodical publications, as well as for reducing the entrances of Romanian citizens into Moldavia and the departure of the inhabitants of Moldavia into the SRR, it would be rational to accomplish the following:

- To task the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences and the Moldavian SSR Ministry of Culture to review the list of periodical publications ordered from the SRR, to supervise and ensure that the departmental libraries should make subscriptions to the necessary publications only with the permission of the leadership of the Academy and of the Ministry. Concurrently with this, a strict manner of utilizing Romanian literature [should] be established;
- To oblige the Moldavian SSR MIA to examine, in the strictest manner, the documents referring to the entry into Moldavia of Romanian citizens and to the departure of inhabitants of Moldavia [for Romania]; to coordinate these with the Soviet [state security] organs and with those of the party. To approve them only in the case of sufficient motive. To place the responsibility for the justification of issuing the exit and entry documents on the appropriate personnel in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
- To go to "Intourist" USSR with the proposal to reduce both the number of tourists from the SRR who visit Moldavia, and the term of their stay in the republic.

First Vice-President [Locitor] of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers, Gh. Eremei
(signature)

Document No. 13

Top Secret, MCP Central Committee, No. 179 ss, 20 July 1978 [Chişinău], to CPSU Central Committee

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 47, dosar 3, filele 79-84; Document No. 28 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 109-112. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

Information Regarding the Intensification in Romania of a Propaganda Campaign that Harms the Interests of the USSR

Recently, according to the information at our disposal, the campaign of falsifying principal historical events and objective conceptions about Moldavia, [and] about Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations has been activated and extended considerably in the Socialist Republic of Romania, highlighting more clearly its anti-Moldavian, anti-Russian and anti-Soviet orientation.

Leading Romanian historians, the mass information and propaganda organs of the SRR, misrepresenting from the positions of bourgeois chauvinism and nationalism many events and entire periods from the history of Moldavia, categorically negating the Moldavian nation, demonstrating the illegality of the existence of the Moldavian national state, affirming that the Moldavians are Romanians, and that the territory between the Prut and Nistru Rivers, as well as Bucovina are historically Romanian territories torn away with force by the Tsarist empire.

The principal theoretical premise for such falsifying confabulations serves the theory, consecrated in recent years in Romanian historiography, of the autochthonous nature and continuity of the Romanian people in the whole of the area of the Geto-Dacian tribes, which, in the opinion of Romania authors, comprised from the western lands up to the Bug, as well as the western coast of the Black Sea.

From anti-Soviet positions, with direct territorial pretensions on the USSR, are treated the 1917-1918 events in Bessarabia, where "the Romanians between the Prut and Nistru Rivers," repressed by the Tsarist empire, "decisively rose to fight for their national and social liberation," formed "freely elected representative organs in the country," locally, as well as the "Sfatul Țării"—at the center, which "expressing the will of the broad popular masses," made the decision regarding the union of the Moldavian republic with motherland Romania. In order to rehabilitate the treasonous role of the "Sfatul Țării," to justify the aggressive action of the Romanian kingdom against the young country of the Soviets in 1918, to confer legality upon it, from the international perspective, to link it to the recognition of the annexation of Bessarabia by the system of international treaties.

With the aim of demonstrating "annexationist intentions" of Russia towards Romania, Russian state policy in the Balkans is treated in an extremely tendentious manner, as are the events of the First World War. Romanian authors totally negate the objective-progressive role of Russia in the liberation of the Balkan peoples from under the Ottoman yoke, hyperbolizing the expansionist policy of the Tsarist empire, underscoring the perfidy of Russian diplomacy, which "always had something of the instinct of a large predatory animal," accusing Russia of not

respecting international accords concluded by it, that it was "an annexationist and insatiable country, which took Bessarabia from the Romanians." Also attributed to it is the responsibility for the military failures of Romania in the Autumn-Winter campaign of 1916, because "the defeat of the Romanians was foreseen and planned by Stürmer, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs."

These and other anti-scientific conceptions and falsifying fabrications are expressed in the collections and monographs *Romania in 1877*, *The Romanian Land of Moldova* (N. Grigoras), *Burebista and His Epoch* (I. Crisan), *The Complete Works of Dobrogeanu-Gherea*, the pages of the journals, *Anale de istorie*, *Magazin istoric*, *Era socialista*, *Romania: Pagini de istorie*, *Revista de istorie*, and in a series of other publications, they abound in the radio and television broadcasts of the SRR. The entire propagandistic campaign, promoted conforming to some elaborate plans, have, in our opinion, the final aim of forming the necessary public opinion for the RC [Romanian Communist] leadership both inside the country as well as beyond its borders, in order to educate the Romanians in hatred towards our country and towards its people. In our opinion, it has already generated among a certain part of the Romanian population, especially among the youth, sentiments of bad-faith or even hostility towards the USSR, of hatred towards Moldavian statehood, toward the successes of the Moldavian people in the construction of communism.

This conclusion is confirmed by Romanian citizens who visit Moldavia through various channels of foreign relations, among whom many seek with increasing frequency to provoke discussions with Soviet people on the so-called "Bessarabian question," imposing their nationalist conceptions. The stories of guide-interpreters, of leaders and specialists from industrial and agricultural enterprises, organizations and institutions, about the enormous achievements of the Moldavian people in the development of the economy and of culture are perceived by many Romanians with irritation and they declare that their people have known difficulties in their social-economic development up to the present because the former Bessarabia was missing from the territory of Romania.

"Only yesterday...did I learn what a large territory, which was before Romanian, had been annexed by the Soviet Union," declared N. Georgetu, the leader of a group of tourists, while I. Dandu, a tourist from Bucharest, confessed: "As people, we respect you, but in the political sense we hate you to death because of Bessarabia." The tourist B. Steriaș, in reply to the story of the guide about the republic, affirmed that Romania did not annex Bessarabia in 1918, it united itself with its fatherland, while G. Popa, another tourist, exclaimed with irritation: "Bessarabia is a part of Romania, as is the land around Cernăuți. Because in 1918 the Government of Bessarabia proclaimed its autonomy and decided to unify with Romania, while in 1940, when Stalin and Hitler divided Europe, the USSR gave Romania an ultimatum and our troops were forced to leave Bessarabia." Some tourists mention in discussion that in Romania it is said that N. Ceausescu will raise the problem of returning the former Bessarabia to Romania. There have also been cases when some Romanian comrades, who were visiting Moscow along the lines of local party ties, in unofficial conversations with our party workers, expressed opinions about the unity of the territory of Romania and Moldavia, of the Romanian and Moldavian nations, about the desire to be together once again within the framework of Romania, etc.

The ideological organs of the SRR continue to send to the address of higher education institutions, libraries, as well as private persons in the republic a large amount of historical,

philosophical, artistic literature, etc. (in general, around 100 thousand pages monthly), which contain ideas and conceptions that are dangerous for the Moldavian people. Only in 1977 and in the first half of the current year over 2.5 thousand examples of such publications were confiscated.

Along the border with the USSR, Romania has installed five re-transmitters with a range of metric waves, with a total power of over 90 kW. As a result, the entire population of the Moldavian SSR can freely receive Romanian radio broadcasts, and a large part of the republic can receive [Romanian] television broadcasts as well. These broadcasts are penetrated with the spirit of nationalism, of anti-Russianism and anti-Sovietism, they frequently contain the hostile calumnies of the Maoists, they proselytize the ideas of Eurocommunism, they transmit diverse Western information, they present films from bourgeois countries, etc.

Many Romanian publications translated from West European languages are sent into the republic, which demonstrates that the Romanian ideological organs promote an intense activity regarding the formation of public opinion abroad connected with the problem of Romanian territorial pretensions. "The Bessarabia Question" is always trumpeted in the journal *România: Pagini de istorie*, edited by the Romanian press agency "Agerpres" in five foreign languages, of the newspaper *Știri române* (appearing in the English and French languages) and in other publications.

The broad diffusion by Romania abroad of historical literature and other actions undertaken with the participation of the SRR in capitalist countries generates, in our opinion, intentional misrepresentations regarding "the Bessarabian question" among a series of members and leaders of communist and workers parties in Western Europe. Relevant, in this sense, are the questions all the more frequently raised in the recent period by the representatives of those parties with the CC workers who have accompanied them. Thus, Joime Sera, the leader of the group of party workers from the Portuguese Communist Party, member of the PCP CC Executive Committee, during his visit in Moldavia this year, showed himself interested even on the first day, in an unofficial conversation, in the following questions: "Does discrimination exist in the republic?" "Are nationalities such as the Romanians, Bulgarians persecuted?" "What does Bessarabia represent and what are its old boundaries?" "Who are the Moldavians: the same Dacians [as the Romanians]?" "Is there any difference between the Moldavian and Romanian languages?", etc.

The organs of mass information in the West "savor" in different ways the Romania press interventions regarding "the Bessarabian question," engaging in all sorts of political speculation around them. Thus, in February of this year, the Viennese newspaper, *Die Presse*, under the pretentious headline: "Bucharest activates the dispute over Bessarabia," published an article in which it was said that: "After a prolonged silence, the Romania leadership has taken recourse again to the thorny question of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940... The well-known historian M. Mușat treats the union of Bessarabia with Romania as a victory of the self-determination of peoples and condemns the interwar congresses of the Romanian Communist Party which, under the pressure of the COMINTERN, requested the return of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union." The same newspaper later writes that the placing on the order of the day of thorny questions "regarding the annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina by the Soviet Union, as well as the preceding discords connected with this region have already provoked speculation in the sense as to whether Ceausescu might not have given the 'green light' for the continuation of the polemics with Soviet historians?"

Recently, the Romanian press and other means of mass information widely proselytize the ideas of Eurocommunism. This year they published the "Political proposals (theses) of the IXth Congress of the Communist Party of Spain" and the communication of S[antiago] Carillo at the PCS CC Plenum on "The Definition of the Party." Today, [they publish] revolutionary Marxism (the journal *Era socialista*, no. 4), as well as a multitude of other interviews, etc. "The separate position" of the RCP leadership towards Eurocommunism is savored in different ways by bourgeois propaganda with eulogies addressed to Ceausescu. The Austrian newspaper, *Die Presse*, writes on 8 May of this year that, "N. Ceausescu promotes an amazing foreign policy even at the party level, ...he defends Eurocommunism, he receives S. Carillo, the leader of the Spanish Communist Party, while the press organs of the other East European communist parties intensely bombard the ideological positions of this party." The radio station "Radio Free Europe" has mentioned with pleasure on 18 May that "President Ceausescu has again confirmed his point of view regarding Eurocommunism in an interview given to the Italian newspaper, *Il Popolo*." Recently, *Deutsche Welle*, evoking the discussion of N. Ceausescu with [French Communist Party leader] G. Marchais while vacationing in the SRR, and about the awaited arrival in Romania of S. Carillo, has mentioned that it is not excluded that N. Ceausescu will try "to be an intermediary in the conciliation of these two Western communist leaders." The radio station further affirms that: "Ceausescu would have saluted the formation of Eurocommunist solidarity, because that could consolidate his position towards Moscow."

Annually, in the SRR, in the month of December, a large celebration is organized for "the Great Union of the Romanians" in 1918. It is not excluded that this year, in connection with the 60th anniversary of that event, the campaign organized by the ideological organs of Romania in the interior of the country and abroad will intensify, as well the attempt to exercise a negative influence over the population of the Moldavian SSR through foreign relations channels, the radio, television and through the expediting of dangerous political literature.

MCP CC Secretary, I. Bodiul (signature)

Document No. 14

Secret, MCP Central Committee, No. 294s, 6 December 1978, Chişinău, To Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU CC, President of the USSR Committee for State Security (KGB), Cde. Andropov I. V., Moscow

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 47, dosar 4, filele 20-21; Document No. 31 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 119-120. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

**Regarding the Necessity of Increasing the Number of Personnel of the Moldavian SSR
KGB**

Recently, the special services and ideological centers of the imperialist states, intensifying their intelligence and undermining activity against the Soviet Union, have considerably increased their hostile efforts towards the Moldavian SSR.

The adversary accords a special attention to undertaking ideological subversion including along the lines of the so-called "Bessarabian question." These provocative actions are, basically, shared by the position of the SRR leadership, whose official organs are engaged on the path of negating the existence of the Moldavian nation and statehood, underscoring the historical injustice of the reunion of Bessarabia with the USSR. All of this is treated widely in historical publications, in the periodical press sent from the SRR into the Moldavian SSR, as well as in radio and television broadcasts [from Romania].

Attempts are undertaken to spread these ideas through the intermediary of tourism, the private arrivals from the SRR, and mail correspondence which has surpassed 500 thousand letters per year. The indoctrination of Soviet people by Romanian citizens in an anti-Soviet, anti-Russian spirit has been reported.

In addition, some formations of Zionist and clerical nuance employed on the territory of the SRR try through the same channels to develop intense subversive activity among persons of Jewish nationality, who number in the republic over 100 thousand. All of this complicates the operational situation in the Moldavian SSR.

The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, taking into account these particularities and in conformity with the CPSU CC requests, will develop heavy activity regarding Internationalist, patriotic education and the increasing of political vigilance of the working people in Moldavia. However, the many problems connected with the curbing of subversive activity requires that they be resolved with means specific to the state security, something for which the Moldavian SSR KGB does not dispose of sufficient operational forces.

In connection with that explained above, please examine the question regarding the increase in the number of personnel of the Moldavian SSR KGB with 40 units for the consolidation of the Committee's subunits, of some municipal and county KGB apparatuses and for the creation of some new county KGB organs.

MCP CC Secretary, I. Bodiul (signature)

Document No. 15

Top Secret, Section for Information and Relations with Foreign Countries of the MCP Central Committee, 3 December 1979 [Chişinău], to MCP Central Committee

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 51, dosar 7, filele 2-4; Document No. 68 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 206-208. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

INFORMATION

On the Activity of the Radio-Interception Group of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of the Moldavian SSR ...

...in the aim of improving the efficiency of the activity of the radio-interception group, the CC Section for Information and Relations with Foreign Countries considers that it would be rational (1) to orient the group towards studying the following problems:

- Questions related to the falsification of the history of Moldavia, the economy, the culture of the republic, other moments which relate to Soviet realities;
- Soviet-Romanian relations;
- Romanian-Chinese relations;
- American-Romanian relations;
- The ties of the SRR with Western European countries, especially Western tendencies to create cleavages between the USSR and the SRR;
- The relations of the SRR with Israel and with Egypt in the problems that pertain to the initiative of the Romanian leadership in resolving the crisis in the Middle East;
- The internal situation of the SRR, Romanian reality;
- About the Romanian leadership;
- Discourses of the former USSR citizens who have emigrated from Moldavia;
- Questions related to the actions which are foreseen to be undertaken in the West by Zionist and other centers.

(2) To take supplementary measures for intensifying the clandestine regime of the activity of the interception group.

(3) To form a circle of the best prepared journalists—in both a theoretical and political sense—who could be allocated the task of presenting the final analysis of the materials....

Section for Information and Relations with Foreign Countries of the Moldavian Communist Party CC

Document No. 16

Secret, Principal Directorate for Foreign Tourism at the USSR Council of Ministers, No. 53/492, 20 February 1981, [Moscow], to MCP Central Committee Secretary, Cde. P. P. Petric

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 56, dosar 7, fila 8; Document No. 81 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), p. 254. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

Regarding the Arrival of Romanian Tourists into the Moldavian SSR

We inform you that through the Union Society "Intourist," in 1981, the city of Chișinău will be visited by 20,000 Romanian tourists with the condition that the travel routes of all these tourists include in an obligatory manner also cities in other republics of the Soviet Union.

The reception of Romanian tourists for visits only to the Moldavian SSR will not be confirmed.

Chief of the Principal Directorate for Foreign Tourism, S. S. Nikitin (signature)

Document No. 17

Top Secret, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, MCP Central Committee, 29 December 1981 [Chişinău]

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 55, dosar 121, filele 1, 12-15; Document No. 33 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 125-129. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

Transcript No. 24 Of the Meeting of Central Committee Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party

Cde. Grossu presided

Participants included:

Members, Presidium of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee	Cdes. Voronin, Eremei, Kalenik, Calin, Merenishchev, Petric, Savochiko, Stepanov, Ustian
Candidate Members, Presidium of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee	Cdes. Dagai, Kiktenko
Members, Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee	Cdes. Zazimko, Panfilov
Section Chief, Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee	Cde. Zhorneak
First Deputy Chiefs of Sections, Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee	Cdes. Angheli, Liubatsin, Riabov

4. Regarding the Continual Intensification of the Struggle Against Bourgeois and Revisionist Propaganda Targeting The Moldavian SSR (Cdes. Petric, Merenishchev, Grossu)

Recently, bourgeois and revisionist propaganda has abruptly intensified [its] hostile actions against the Moldavian SSR. It tries to discredit the Leninist nationalities policy of the CPSU, it falsifies the history of the formation and development of Moldavian statehood and of the formation of the Moldavian nation, it tends to stir up nationalist, professionalist, [and] anti-Russian dispositions among the ranks of a certain part of the Soviet people, to oppose the Moldavian people to the Russians and other peoples of the USSR, to identify politically unstable persons and to draw them into anti-Soviet activity.

Nationalism has become one of the principal means of the imperialist secret services in their subversive actions against real socialism. Implementing an ideological subversion based on bourgeois nationalism, foreign anti-Soviet centers propagate the ideas of "national exclusivity" and "national spirit."

The adversary implements subversive actions taking into account the concrete situation of different regions of the country, it uses all the more frequently veiled and concealed methods of exerting political and ideological influence over the Soviet peoples. It does not purely or simply disseminate ideas aimlessly into space; it sends them to specific addresses. Among the preferred

destination audiences, its efforts, in the first place, are concentrated on the massive ideological preparation of technical and creative intelligentsia, of students and of other categories of youth.

The hostile activities of imperialism against the Moldavian SSR recently have been actively using the procedure based on foreign recognition of the achievements of our republic. At the same time, these are not considered as legitimate phenomena within the prevailing social conditions of the Soviet regime. It is affirmed that the achievements of the Moldavian SSR would have been much greater if its economic relations with the other republics would have had a reciprocally advantageous character.

In the pages of scientific editions in the Moldavian SSR, some works in which the independence of the Moldavian people as a separate ethnic community is negated continue to be published, and the history of Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations is misrepresented. The coincidence of points of view shared by the reactionary historians of the West and by some researchers in the Socialist Republic of Romania on the so-called Bessarabian question, and in the treatment of a series of problems which harm the interests of our country has been noted.

The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee has DECIDED:

- 1) The municipal and county party committees, the primary party organizations, the trade unions and komsomol organizations must assure the continued growth in the level of internationalist and patriotic education, of their political vigilance, to permanently and insistently educate in the Soviet peoples a constant intransigence before bourgeois and revisionist propaganda. This activity must be developed systematically, with the corresponding competence, drawing in the experienced party and state workers [and] savants. It must be organized taking into account the concrete situation of the various counties of the republic and on the basis of a profound analysis of the degree of influence of bourgeois and revisionist propaganda over certain groups of people. The party committees must give serious attention to the preparation of propaganda cadres.
- 2) The Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, the Party History Institute at the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the Ministry of Higher and Specialty Secondary Education of the Moldavian SSR must:
 - Direct the efforts of the savants towards the elaboration of the most current problems connected with the history and contemporary social life of Soviet Moldavia, towards more profoundly argued scientific criticism of the falsifications and revisions of the questions that pertain to Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations, to the national liberation movements in the Balkans;
 - Analyze the procedures and methods of bourgeois and revisionist propaganda, to make proposals for its effective neutralization;
 - Practice the study of the public opinion of diverse groups of the population of the republic with the aim of clarifying their reaction to the hostile information that penetrates into the Soviet listener, the degree of their information about the true aims and methods of the activity of bourgeois and revisionist propaganda which is undertaken against the republic.
- 3) The editorial boards of the newspapers and journals, ATEM, State Television and Radio Broadcasting of the Moldavian SSR, [and] the Moldavian affiliate of APN must:

- Develop well-argued propaganda about the advantages and historic achievements of real socialism;
- Demonstrate the broadly anti-popular character of capitalist society, the relationship between economy and morality in socialism and capitalism;
- Unmask the anti-socialist, hegemonic policy of the Chinese leaders, their actions of solidarity with imperialism, of undermining the existing détente between the socialist countries and China in broaching the questions connected with war and peace, of European disarmament;
- Exposing the harmful character of Beijing's course for the cause of peace and international security.

State TV and Radio Broadcasting of the Moldavian SSR must enrich its literary and artistic programs on the radio and television, including in radio broadcasts of fragments of works that reflect the multi-century ties of the Moldavian people with the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, the liberating mission of Russia in the Balkans, the struggle of working people of Bessarabia for reunion with the Soviet fatherland, [and] present films on historical and historical-revolutionary themes created at "Moldova-Film" on Moldavian television.

- 4) The Moldavian SSR Ministry of Higher and Specialty Secondary Education, the Moldavian SSR Ministry of Education, the State Committee for Professional-Technical Education of the Moldavian SSR must undertake concrete measures for the continual improvement of the ideological orientation of the education process, the formation in studious youth of a scientific conception of the world, the education of ideological convictions and of a firm political vigilance of a class-oriented intransigence towards bourgeois and revisionist propaganda.
- 5) The Moldavian SSR Ministry of Culture, the State Cinematography of the Moldavian SSR, the creative unions of the republic must organize competitions for the creation of some literary-artistic and musical works, that should show in a meaningful and convincing manner the centuries-long ties of Moldavia with Russia and the Ukraine, the struggle of the Moldavian people for its national and social liberation and reunion with its motherland, [and] should create cycles of documentary films about the achievements of the Moldavian people in all domains of life during the years of Soviet power, and foresee their dubbing into foreign languages.
- 6) The Directorate for Foreign Tourism at the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers, the Republic Council of Trade Unions of Moldavia, the UTCL CC of Moldavia, the Moldavian SSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Moldavian Society of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries must:
 - Assure the constant growth of the political-ideological level of informational-propagandistic activities among the ranks of foreign citizens, familiarize themselves by all means with the history of the birth and formation of the Moldavian nation, with the struggle of the Moldavian people for the installation of Soviet power in the region and the reunion with the motherland, with the accomplishments of the working people of the republic in the construction of communism;
 - Practice the systematic organization of friendship evenings and of meetings of foreign tourists with well-known scientists and cultural figures, with workers holding

- functions of responsibility in the state organs and community organizations, as well as the presentation of some documentary films and news journals about the republic;
- Undertake necessary measures of influence regarding the curbing of anti-Soviet and anti-Moldavian declarations made by a certain part of the Romanian tourists; assure the effective utilization of touristic ties with Romania for propagandizing the policies of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, the achievements of the USSR and of the Moldavian SSR in every domain of life;
 - Undertake supplementary measures for the continual improvement of the activities of Soviet organs, trade unions and soviets regarding the selection and instruction of Soviet citizens for travel abroad.
- 7) The State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Houses and Commerce with Books of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers must assure the preparation for printing, at a high political-ideological, artistic and graphic design level in the Russian, Moldavian and foreign languages of a scientific and informational-propagandistic literatures that will evince the Leninist national policy of the CPSU, the history of the formation and development of Moldavian statehood, of the friendship between the Moldavian people and the Russian [and] Ukrainian peoples and with the other peoples of the USSR, of its struggle for national and social liberation and reunion with the motherland, the successes of the republic in the construction of communism, on the tourist itineraries presented to foreigners; photo albums; colored illustrations about the rarities of the republic and other publicity literature.
 - 8) The county party committees of Vulcănești, Cahul, Leova, Fălești and Ungheni must use all forms of frontier county ties of Moldavia with the SRR [Romanian] counties in order to actively propagate the achievements of the USSR and the Moldavian SSR [and] the foreign and domestic policies of the USSR among the ranks of the Romanian working people. Sending into these [Romanian] frontier counties more informational material and photo expositions regarding the achievements of the Moldavian people in the economic and cultural construction in the years of Soviet power.
 - 9) Approve the measures regarding the continual intensification of the struggle against bourgeois and revisionist propaganda targeting the Moldavian SSR (in annex).
 - 10) Inform about the course of implementation of the present decision of the Moldavian Communist Party CC in the IVth Trimester of 1983.
 - 11) Task with the control of the implementation of the present decision the sections for information and relations with foreign countries, propaganda and agitation, culture, science and educational institutions of the Moldavian Communist Party CC.

MCP CC Secretary, S. Grossu (signature)

Document No. 18

Secret, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Moldavian SSR, No. 24 s, 3 November 1982 [Chişinău] to MCP Central Committee

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 59, dosar 7, filele 69-71; Document No. 41 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 149-150. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

ABOUT

The Creation of the Council for the Coordination of Foreign Policy Propaganda

In recent years, the social-political, economic, techno-scientific, cultural, touristic, and other relations of the Moldavian SSR with foreign countries have expanded significantly, which has brought a growth in the number of visits of foreign delegations and citizens into the republic, as well as an increase in the number of travelers from our citizens to foreign countries. In 1981, approximately 65 thousand foreign citizens visited Moldavia along the line of the Foreign Ministry, of other ministries, departments and organizations in the republic as part of different delegations, as tourists and on personal travel. Over 50 official delegations were received in the republic, [and] 11 international symposiums, conferences and meetings were organized.

The number of foreign citizens who visited the republic in 1989 was no less and it continues to grow. It is sufficient to mention that in the first 9 months of the current year over 42 thousand foreign citizens [and] approximately 50 official foreign delegations have come into Moldavia, [and] 12 international symposiums, congresses, meetings and other actions with the participation of representatives from over 40 foreign countries were organized.

The volume of relations with foreign countries along ministerial and departmental lines continues to grow. Only along the line of the MSSR Ministry of Agriculture in 1981 were received 121 delegations of savants and specialists, numbering in total 570 persons from 34 foreign countries, and in the first nine months of the current year—43 delegations numbering 209 persons from 20 foreign states. A large number of foreign savants and specialists arrive, likewise along the line of MSSR AS [Academy of Sciences], the Council of Kolkhozes of the MSSR, the Ministry of Forestry and Vineyards, AAI [the Agro-Industrial Association], "MOLDVINPROM," "MOLDTABAKPROM," etc. All of this data gives proof of the fact that the republic has great potential for developing well-oriented and effective propagandistic-informational activities abroad. However, as has been shown in practice, these activities have not yet been given the attention they deserve.

In the majority of cases, the programs of visits in Moldavia by foreign delegations and foreign specialists foresee only business meetings with Soviet colleagues, their familiarization with scientific and technical-scientific achievements and with production technologies. For all practical purposes these meetings are not used in order to obtain necessary intelligence for our country from foreign interlocutors regarding the latest accomplishments in the domain of science and technology abroad.

These programs still contain few measures that contribute to the familiarization of guests with Soviet reality, to the diffusion of propagandistic-informational materials regarding the

achievements of the Moldavian SSR in economic and socio-cultural construction. The shortcomings mentioned above reduce the political character and efficiency of work developed with foreign citizens [and] the opportunity of personally winning over a certain part of our guests as spokesmen of objective information about the Soviet Union is lost.

In addition, the organization of the reception of foreign guests along the lines of the ministries and departments, because of the lack of experience of the latter, have permitted cases of transgressing instructions regarding the model of reception and the work with foreign delegations, as well as transgressions of Soviet diplomatic protocol and of civil etiquette.

It must be especially noted that, under the conditions of the sharpening of the ideological struggle in the international arena, when the USA administration has announced the organization of a new “crusade” against communism and has placed itself in the lead of the psychological war against the countries of the socialist community, the questions of the continual intensification and perfecting of the entire foreign policy propaganda attain an extraordinary importance. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that, recently, the possibilities of our representatives for propaganda there regarding the mode of Soviet life, the familiarization of broad public opinion with the accomplishments of the USSR peoples in the construction of communist societies, [and] with the foreign peace policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state have been reduced.

The task of permanently counteracting the subversive activity of all sorts of falsifiers of the history of the Moldavian people, statehood, language and culture continues to remain current, as do the attempts of Romanian propaganda of exercising a certain negative influence over Moldavian society within the political course of the SRR leadership, which is oriented towards negating the existence of the independent Moldavian nation.

In the same order of ideas, the problems connected with the use of all possibilities for developing an efficient propagandistic-informational activity abroad regarding the accomplishments of the Moldavian SSR in all domains of socialist construction, including through the intensive use and orientation towards this aim of visits to our republic by foreign delegations, savants, specialists and other foreign citizens, becomes especially current.

Nevertheless, as we know, because of the lack of orientation experience and respective assistance, each ministry and department of the republic, which has ties with foreign relations, are partially unable to broadly and efficiently develop propagandistic-informational work and efficient counterpropaganda among the ranks of foreign delegations and foreign citizens. This important political work necessitates a complex approach, constant attention and constant improvement. All of the ministries and departments should henceforth exert united and combined efforts in this sense.

Starting off from what has been explicated above, we consider that creation of a center for the coordination of foreign policy propaganda among the ranks of the foreigners who visit our republic, as well as through [our] citizens who travel abroad, has become an imminent necessity. In our opinion, such a center could become the Council for the Coordination of Foreign Policy Propaganda at the Moldavian Communist Party CC or the Moldavian SSR Foreign Ministry.

Moldavian SSR Foreign Minister, P. V. Comendant (signature)

Document No. 19

Secret, Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, No. 0266, 17 June 1983, Chişinău, to Vice-President USSR AS [Academy of Sciences], Academician P. N. Fedoseev (Moscow), [cc] MCP Central Committee

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 62, dosar 4, fila 71; Document No. 43 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), p. 152. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

We report that, in view of the implementation of the disposition of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences [AS] of 24 March 1983, No. 068, "On the Scientific Measures of the USSR Academy of Sciences Regarding the 'New Historical Concept' in the SRR," the Presidium of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences has elaborated and approved, through its decision of 8 June 1983, No. 04, the measures of the social science section of the MSSR AS regarding the implementation of the above-mentioned USSR AS disposition.

Annexed: The Decision of the Presidium of the MSSR AS of 8.VI.1983, No. 04 on 2 pages and the measures foreseen in the decision, on 4 pages, Secret, registration no. 0262.

Vice-President of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, Academician of the MSSR AS, D. T. Ursul (signature)

Document No. 20

Secret Annex, Presidium of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, No. 04, 8 June 1983, Chişinău

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 62, dosar 4, filele 72-73; Document No. 44 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, “PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova,” special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 153-154. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

DECISION

Regarding the Measures of the Social Science Section of the MSSR AS for Fulfilling the Disposition of the Presidium of the USSR AS of 24.03.1983, No. 068: “On the Scientific Measures of the USSR AS in Connection with the ‘New Historical Concept’ in the SRR”

After hearing and analyzing the information of MSSR AS Academician D. T. Ursul with regard to the scientific measures of the Social Science Section of the MSSR AS for fulfilling the disposition of the Presidium of the USSR AS of 24.03.1983, No. 068: “On the Scientific Measures of the USSR AS in Connection with the ‘New Historical Concept’ in the SRR,” the Presidium of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences DECIDES:

- 1) To approve the scientific measures of the Social Science Section of the MSSR AS regarding the implementation of the disposition of the Presidium of the USSR AS of 24.03.1983, No. 068: “On the Scientific Measures of the USSR AS in Connection with the ‘New Historical Concept’ in the SRR” (Annex).
- 2) To task the editorial board of the journal *News from the MSSR AS Social Science Series*, to expand the publication of materials referring to the history of Russo-Romanian, Soviet-Romanian relations and to key problems from the history of Romania and Moldavia, as well as of reviews written by Soviet historians of the works of Romanian authors that contain erroneous historical appreciations.
- 3) The Bureau of the Social Science Section, the Central Scientific Library of the MSSR AS should undertake urgent measures regarding the completion of the special collection of the library with modern artistic, scientific and popular science literature, and with periodicals from the Socialist Republic of Romania, beginning with 1984.
- 4) The Bureau of the Social Science Section of the MSSR AS, the leadership of the scientific institutions of the section should assure the reception and analysis of the literature edited in the SRR, involving in this aim the best prepared workers in the institutions of the section.
- 5) To draw the attention of the Bureau of the Social Science Section and of the leadership of the History Institute of the MSSR AS to the necessity of improving the quality of analysis and of the scientific generalization of the information from Romanian publications; taking measures regarding the improvement of the standard of work in the Sector for socio-political research and scientific information of the History Institute. The Institutes of the Social Science Section of the MSSR AS should utilize more widely the possibilities of mass political-educational work among the ranks of the population

(lectures, publications in the periodical press, evaluations on radio and television) in order to unmask the "New Historical Concept" in the SRR regarding the problems of the history, language, literature, ethnography and culture of the Moldavian people; of Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations.

- 6) To recommend to the Bureau of the Social Science Section to make proposals to the Presidium of the MSSR AS by 1 January 1984 on carrying out supplementary research in the problems of Romanian sociology in connection with the "New Historical Concept" in the SRR.
- 7) The Publication-Editorial Council of the MSSR AS and the *Science [Stiinta]* Publishing House should foresee in the thematic publication plans of the MSSR AS the respective page/publication sheet requirements for the publication of the works referring to the history of Russo-Romanian [and] Soviet-Romanian relations and to the key problems of the history of Romania and of Moldavia.
- 8) To place responsibility for controlling the implementation of the present decision on the Bureau of the Social Science Section of the MSSR AS.

Vice-President of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, MSSR AS Academician, D. T. Ursul (signature)

Principal Scientific Secretary of the Presidium of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, Corresponding Member of the MSSR AS, D. V. Ghitu (signature)

Document No. 21

Secret, Annex to the Decision of the Presidium of the MSSR AS of 8 June 1983, No. 04

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 62, dosar 4, filele 74-77; Document No. 45 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 154-158. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

The Projected Measures

For the Scientific Institutions of the Social Science Section of the MSSR AS for Fulfilling the Disposition of the Presidium of the USSR AS of 24.03.1983, No. 068: "On the Scientific Measures of the USSR AS in Connection with the 'New Historical Concept' in the SRR"

- I. To participate in the preparation of general works and documentary collections realized under the leadership of the central institutions of the USSR AS.**
- 1) *The History of the Peasantry in Europe* (principal organizer—the Institute of Universal History of the USSR AS; coexecutor—the History Institute of the MSSR AS).
 - 2) *Russia and the National Liberation Movement of the Bulgarians (During the 50s and 70s in the 19th Century)* Collection of documents in 3 volumes (principal organizer—the Institute of Slavistics and Balkanistics of the USSR AS; co-executor—the History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1974-1984).
 - 3) *The History of the Literatures of the Soviet Peoples in the Period Up to the October Revolution* in 3 volumes (principal organizer—the "A. M. Gorki" Institute of Universal Literature of the USSR AS; co-executor—the Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1983-1984).
 - 4) *The Carpathian General Dialectological Atlas* (principal organizer—The Institute of Slavistics and Balkanistics of the USSR AS; co-executor—the Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1981-1985).
 - 5) *The Foundations of Balkan Linguistics* (principal organizer—the Leningrad Section of the Institute of Linguistics of the USSR AS; co-executor - the Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1982-1986).
- II. To prepare and publish the following works:**
- 1) *Studies in the Political History of Romania (1859-1944). Collective monograph*; 30 sheets [4 pages per sheet] per author (History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1984)
 - 2) *Problems Regarding New and Contemporary History of Romania*; 16 sheets per author (History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1986).
 - 3) *Soviet-Romanian Relations (1917-1928). Collective monograph*, 15 sheets per author (History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1986).

III. To prepare and publish collective works and individual monographs with historical, social-political and philosophical themes about the literature and art of the Moldavian people:

- 1) *The History of the Moldavian SSR (From Ancient Times To Our Days)* in 6 volumes (History Institute of the MSSR AS, other scientific institutions of the Social Science Section of the MSSR AS, the faculties of social science of the institutions of higher education in the republic, 1985-1988).
- 2) *Studies on the History of Foreign Policy of the Moldavian State Up to the Beginning of the 19th Century*; Collective monograph; 35 coli per author (History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1986).
- 3) *The Historical Importance of the Joining of Bessarabia and the Left Bank of the Nistru to Russia*. Collective monograph; 25 coli per author. (History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1986).
- 4) *Progressive Russia and the Social-Political Movement in Moldavia in the First Half of the 19th Century*. Collective monograph; 16 coli per author (History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1984).
- 5) *Moldavia During Feudal Times (The Premises of the Formation of the People and the State)*. Monograph; 16 coli per author (History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1984).
- 6) *Studies Referring to Russo-Bulgarian Social-Political and Cultural Relations (During the 50s and 70s of the 19th Century)*. Collective monograph; 25 coli per author (History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1984).
- 7) *The History of the Moldavian SSR. Manual for Classes VII and VIII of the Moldavian SSR Middle School*. 13, 5 coli per author (History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1983).
- 8) *Russia and the Struggle for the Liberation of the Moldavian People (During the Second Half of the 18th Century and Beginning of the 19th Century)*. Documentary collection (History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1984).
- 9) *History of Moldavian Literature* (in three volumes), 120 coli per author (Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1984-1985).
- 10) *Social-Historic Conditionality in the Appearance and Development of the Moldavian National Languages*, 15 coli per author (Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1983).
- 11) *The Formation of the Literary Romance Languages. The Moldavian Language* (Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1983).
- 12) *The Folklore Legacy of the USSR Peoples and the Contemporary Period*, 30 coli per author (Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1984).
- 13) *Popular Moldavian Creation: "The Heroic Moldavian Epoch," "Historic Moldavian Songs,"* 50 coli per author (Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1983-1985).
- 14) *Soviet Moldavian Literature in the Context of the Union-Wide Literary Process*, 15 coli per author (Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1984).
- 15) *The Literature of the Years of Fire*, 10 coli per author (Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1985).
- 16) *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Social Thought in Moldavia*. Collective monograph; 25 coli per author (Section of Philosophy and Law of the MSSR AS, other

institutions of the Social Science Section of the MSSR AS, the faculties of social science of the institutions of higher education of the republic, 1983-1984).

- 17) *The Problem of Humanism in the Philosophical Thought of Moldavia in the 17th and 18th Centuries*. Monograph, 7 coli per author. (Section of Philosophy and Law of the MSSR AS, 1983-1985).
- 18) *From the History of Social Thought of Moldavia*. Collections of articles; 10 coli per author (Section of Philosophy and Law of the MSSR AS, 1983-1985).
- 19) *The Social-Political and Juridical Conceptions of Costache Negruzzi*. Monograph; 7 coli per author (Section of Philosophy and Law of the MSSR AS, 1982-1985).
- 20) *The Social-Political Conceptions of Andronache Donici*. Monograph, 6 coli per author (Section of Philosophy and Law of the MSSR AS, 1983).
- 21) *The National and International Dialectic*. (Section of Philosophy and Law of the MSSR AS, 1984).
- 22) *The Ethnogenesis of the Moldavian People*. (Section of Ethnography and Study of Arts of the MSSR AS, 1983-1985).
- 23) *The Literature and Art of Soviet Moldavia* (The Soviet Moldavian Encyclopedia, The Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, the Section of Ethnography and the Study of Arts of the MSSR AS, 1983-1986).
- 24) *Studies on the Origin of the Moldavian People*, 20 coli per author (Section of Ethnography and the Study of Arts of the MSSR AS, 1984).
- 25) *Slavo-Moldavian Relations and the Periodic Stages of the Ethnic History of the Moldavians*. Collections of articles, 12 coli per author (Section of Ethnography and the Study of Arts of the MSSR AS, 1984).

IV. To prepare and publish a series of works popularizing science in the domain of the history, language and literature of the Moldavian people:

- 1) *V. I. Lenin and the Victory of Soviet Power in Moldavia*. Popular science brochure, 5 coli per author (History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1984).
- 2) *The Truth about the "Sfatul Țării" [Council of the Country]*. Popular science brochure, 4 coli per author (History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1984).
- 3) *The Struggle of the Soviet Government for the Peaceful Solution of the "Bessarabian Problem."* Popular science brochure, 5 coli per author (History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1985).
- 4) *The Moldavian Language Today*. Popular science brochure, 5 coli per author (Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1983).
- 5) *The Rebirth of Ancient Moldavian Cultures*. Popular science brochures, 4 coli per author (Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1985).
- 6) *Foreign Authors on the Moldavian Language and Literature and the Contemporary Ideological Struggle*; 6 coli per author (Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1984).
- 7) *The Theme of 20 June 1940 in Soviet Moldavian Literature*; 5 coli per author (Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1985).
- 8) *At the Well-Spring of Friendship Among Peoples* (in the Moldavian language). Brochure, 28 coli per author (History Institute of the MSSR AS, 1983).

V. To re-publish [these] previously published works:

- 1) *Years of Struggle* (in two volumes), 50 coli per author (Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1986).
- 2) *Brothers in Arms*, 28 coli per author (Institute of Language and Literature of the MSSR AS, 1985).
- 3) *The Formation of the Moldavian Bourgeois Nation*. Collective monograph (in the Moldavian language) (Section of Ethnography and the Study of the Arts of the MSSR AS, 1983-1984).
- 4) *The Moldavians*. Collective monograph (in the Moldavian language) (Section of Ethnography and the Study of the Arts of the MSSR AS and other scientific institutions of the Social Science Section of the MSSR AS, 1985).
- 5) *The Formation of the Moldavian People*. Monograph (in the Moldavian language); 7 coli per author (Section of Ethnography and the Study of the Arts of the MSSR AS, 1983).

VI. To prepare a series of articles and reviews referring to key sections from the works of Romanian authors, for the central scientific reviews and republic-wide press.

VII. To analyze the materials published in the pages of the Romanian periodical press which refer to the problems of the history of Moldavia; the progressive role of Russia in the Balkans; Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations; Moldavian language, literature and folklore; [and] to theoretical problems of Marxist-Leninist science.

Document No. 22

Secret, Presidium of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, No. 178/02, 13 November 1984, Chişinău

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 71, dosar 221, filele 269-270; Document No. 48 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 165-167. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

DECISION

Regarding the Counteracting of the Falsifications of Romanian Sociologists

The Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Decision No. 174 of 07.06.84) notes that, recently, the Romanian press, especially history journals, publish more and more articles in which transgressions from the fundamental principles of scientific communism are tolerated, interpretations of a nationalist spirit appear, [as well as] misrepresentations of a series of key-problems tied to the history of Romania, to Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations, to the falsification of the so-called "Bessarabian question," to the history of the liberation of Romania by the Soviet Army, etc. In the journals *Socialist Era* and *Historical Annals* articles have appeared that express disagreement with the notion of "real socialism," [and] "the socialist community," [and] which incorrectly treat the problem of the passage from capitalism to socialism and propagates the so-called "new correlation of forces in the world," etc.

The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences has tasked the History Institute of the USSR, the Institute of Military History, the Institute of Slavistic and Balkanistic Studies, the Institute of Universal Literature, the Institute of General History, the Linguistic Institute, the Institute of Philosophy, the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in close contact with the corresponding scientific institutions of the Ukrainian AS and the Moldavian AS, with undertaking measures for the intensification of the counteracting of the falsifications in the works of Romanian sociologists ([through] the publication of books, brochures, [and] articles of a counter-propagandistic nature).

The Council for International Collaboration in the Domain of the Social Sciences in the USSR, together with the Directorate for Scientific Collaboration with the Socialist Countries of the USSR AS, should more broadly practice, within the framework of the joint preparation and development of the activities of Soviet and Romanian sociologists, the exchange of views with Romanian colleagues, opposing their erroneous positions with a scientifically argued analysis of the most acute problems.

In the aim of fulfilling the decision of the Presidium of the USSR AS (Section for Social Sciences) of 07.06.84, no. 174 "On the Counteracting of the Falsifications of Romanian Sociologists," the Presidium of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences DECIDES:

- 1) The Section for Social Sciences:

- 1.1. To take as the guiding line the fulfillment of the decision of the Presidium of the USSR AS (Section for Social Science) of 07.06.84, no. 174 "On the Counteracting of the Falsifications of Romanian Sociologists";
- 1.2. Prepare, by 15 December of the current year, a note with the necessary argumentation for the coordination in the Section of Social Sciences of workers recommended for publication in the MSSR regarding questions connected with the history of Romania, of Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations, as well as of some aspects of the history of Moldavia.
- 2) The Section of Social Sciences, the scientific institutions and the scientific councils must seriously increase the quality of the scientific production; not allowing the appearance of any publications with erroneous interpretations on the questions connected with the history of Romania, [and with] Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations; to raise the level of re-censorship.
- 3) To approve the measures of the scientific institutions of the Sector for Social Sciences of the MSSR regarding the decision of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences no. 174 of 07.06.84 "On the Counteracting of the Falsifications of Romanian Sociologists."
- 4) To assign the responsibility for the control of the implementation of the present decision to the Academician-Secretary of the Section for Social Sciences of the MSSR AS, D. T. Ursul.

President of the MSSR Academy of Sciences, Academician of the MSSR AS, A. A. Zhuchenko
(signature)

Ad-interim Principal Scientific Secretary of the Presidium of the MSSR Academy of Sciences,
Corresponding member of the MSSR AS, A. M. Andries (signature)

Document No. 23

For Internal Use, Annex to the Decision of the Presidium of the MSSR AS of 13 November 1984, No. 178

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 71, dosar 221, filele 271-273; Document No. 49 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 167-169. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

MEASURES

**Of the Institutions of Education of the Section for Social Sciences of the MSSR AS
 Regarding the Execution of the Decision of the Presidium of the USSR AS of 07.06.84, No. 174**

Nr de ord.	Measures	Responsible Parties	Deadline	Remarks
1	2	3	4	5
1.	<p>I. Publish: Outline of the Political History of Romania (1859-1944)</p> <p>II. Prepare and Publish: A cycle of articles regarding the questions connected with the history of Romania, with Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations: -modern SRR historiography on Romania's participation in the First World War;</p>	<p>History Institute of the MSSR AS; <i>Science [Stiinta]</i> Publishing House</p> <p>History Institute</p>	<p>September 1985</p> <p>1984</p>	<p>Publish in the journals: <i>Problems of History, USSR History, New and Contemporary History, Communist Moldavia, the Annals of the MSSR AS</i></p>
	<p>-connected with the question of the participation of fascist Romania in the aggression against the USSR; -the policy of the Antonescu dictatorship in the temporarily occupied USSR territories; -the historic conditions of the victory of the 25 August 1944 armed revolution in Romania.</p>		<p>1985</p> <p>1985</p> <p>1985</p>	
2.	<p>A cycle of articles regarding the historical particularities and contemporary development of the Moldavian language, literature and folklore: -the national and international traditions of contemporary Moldavian poetry and the critique of foreign bourgeois</p>	<p>MSSR AS Institute of Linguistics and Literature</p>	<p>1985</p>	

	Sovietologists; -the contemporary ideological struggle and the position of the writer; -the dialectic of the national, the interethnic and the international in treating linguistic phenomena.			
3.	Articles: -Philosophical Thought in Bessarabia during 1918-1940. Facts and Fabulations; -Religion and Church in the History of Moldavia; -The Means of Defeating the Churches; -Economic Progress of the Moldavian SSR in the unitary national economic complex of the country; -The Formation and Evolution of the Ethnicity of the Volohoi. ¹³⁴	Section of Philosophy and Law, MSSR AS Section of Philosophy and Law, MSSR AS Economic Institute of the MSSR AS Section of Ethnography and the Study of the Arts, MSSR AS	1984 1985 1985 1985	
4.	Collection of articles <i>Questions Connected with the History of the Foreign and Domestic Policies of Romania in New and Modern Times</i>	History Institute of the MSSR AS	1985	
5.	Brochure <i>The Slavs and the Valachs [Wallachs] in the Eastern Carpathians (XII-XIV centuries)</i>	Section of Ethnography and the Study of the Arts of the MSSR AS	1987	
6.	To present on radio and television a cycle of broadcasts regarding the current problems of Moldavian philology.	Institute of Linguistics and Literature of the MSSR AS	1984-1985	
7.	To create at the Institute of Linguistics and Literature of the MSSR AS a group for counterpropaganda and for propagandizing the achievements of Moldavian philological science	Institute of Linguistics and Literature of the MSSR AS	1984	

Ad-interim Principal Scientific Secretary of the Presidium of the MSSR Academy of Sciences,
 Corresponding Member of the MSSR AS, A. M. Andries (signature)

¹³⁴ Moscow attempted to redefine the Romanians in Moldavia as an ancient Slavic people by creating a “Volohoi” ethnicity separate from the Vlachs or Wallachians—the name commonly applied to the Romanians in Wallachia (Muntenia), Oltenia, and Transylvania.

Document No. 24

Top Secret, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, MCP Central Committee, 19 August 1986 [Chişinău]

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 64, dosar 489, filele 1, 10-17; Document No. 99 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 290-299. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

**Transcript No. 14
Of the Meeting of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party**

Cde. Grossu presided

Participants included:

Members, Central Committee Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cdes. Voronin, Eremei, Kolesnik, Mocanu, Semionov, Smirnov
Candidate Members, Central Committee Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cdes. Pshenichnikov, Tsau
Members, Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cdes. Vlasov, Vorotilo, Grossu, Danilenko, Caraion, Cojhari, Cozub, Kutârkin, Leshinski, Lozan, Roşca, Stratulat, Shatohina, Iakubenko
Candidate Members, Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cdes. Gesmegian, Nedit, Patrash
President, Commission of Revision of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cde. Nezhivoi
Member, Commission of Revision of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cde. Muntean
First Deputies of Heads of Sections of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party	Cdes. Istratii, Motspan, Railean, Tesliuk, Ciobu

3. With Regard to the Situation and Measures for the Intensification of Internationalist and Patriotic Education of the Population of the Republic [and] the Fight Against Manifestations of Nationalism (Cdes. Roşca, Muntean, Semionov, Mocanu, Eremei, Smirnov, Voronin, Grossu)

The Moldavian Communist Party CC notes that, guided by the decisions of the XXVIIth Congress of the Party, the June (1986) Plenum, the Plenum of the CPSU CC, and the XVIth Congress of the Moldavian Communist Party, the organs of the party, soviets, trade unions, komsomols, ministries, state committees, departments and creative unions of the republic develop heavy activity for the consolidation of friendship and brotherhood, the social units of the representatives of all the nations and peoples that live in the republic, the consolidation of the sentiment of a united family, of general Soviet pride, the clear understanding of the high social importance of assuring a maximum contribution to the resolution of the problems of accelerated social-economic development of the country, the turning point in the life of Soviet society.

The questions connected with the education of the working people in ideological firmness, political vigilance, of the sentiment of Soviet patriotism, as well as of the realization of offensively unmasking, arguing against the bourgeois and revisionist falsifications of the CPSU's Leninist national policies are examined in the primary party organizations, trade unions, komsomols, [and] in the ranks of the ideological *activ* [militants].

The forms and methods of counterpropaganda are improved, of the struggle against bourgeois ideology and morals through other means of mass information and propaganda, through the system of political and economic education, propaganda through lectures, political and intuitive oral agitation, and musical and literary-artistic creation.

It has increased the attention of savants in the republic towards the elaboration of current problems connected with the history of Moldavia, economic, social and cultural construction, the development of bilingualism, the creation and consolidation of the Soviet national statehood of the Moldavian people.

In spite of all that, the content and depth of international and patriotic education of the multinational population of the republic does not correspond to the demands of the day regarding intolerance towards narrow manifestations of nationalism, the necessity of intensifying counterpropaganda, the fight with the ideological adversary, the increase of political vigilance and class intuition. As a result of passive and non-interventionist attitudes cases of narrow nationalism, of arrogance and secretiveness have appeared in a series of municipal committees, departments, institutions, primary party organizations and komsomols in the work collectives, among the ranks of representatives of the native nationalities, autonomist tendencies are tolerated on the part of some persons of Gagauz ethnicity, the disposition to emigrate [exists among] a part of the Jewish and German population of the republic.

The municipal committees of Chişinău, Bălţi, Bender, the county committees of Călăraşi, Orhei, Lazo and other county party committees develop insufficiently oriented and differentiated internationalist and patriotic education among the representatives of the Jewish ethnicity—the Tiraspol municipal committee; the county committees of Grigoriopol, Dubăsari, Căuşeni, Soroca, Ocnîţa, Edineţ; the Germany ethnicity—Soroca, Ocnîţa, Edineţ, [and] the Gypsy ethnicity, which cedes to the influence of foreign hostile nationalist centers. In the primary party organs of the multinational collectives the system of class education of the respective persons is lacking, active forms and methods of unmasking the actions of the ideological adversary, and of the formation of immunity to bourgeois and revisionist ideology, are not used.

Many municipal and county party committees, primary party organizations have not succeeded in solidly establishing in the public consciousness of everyone the idea that, today, internationalism and patriotism must be manifested in the active participation in the solution of the problems of the intensification of production, the acceleration of scientific-technical progress, the better utilization of material and human resources for the consolidation and prosperity of the Soviet fatherland. Failure to fully understand the essence of internationalism is manifested through the fact that that the efforts in the work of some collectives are not sufficiently oriented towards the fulfillment of the delivery contracts beyond the borders of the republic. The competition with the Ukrainian SSR region has weakened, [as it has] with other union republics and with the enterprises of the community of socialist states.

In the counties of Călăraşi, Căuşeni, Leova, etc., international and patriotic propaganda lacks foundation, veracity, operational impact and an active attitude. The ideological cadres make insufficient use of the historical importance of the social-economic changes in the region

during the years of Soviet power in their activity, explaining the real difficulties and contradictions in social life, and the activity of the party for overcoming them, in an unconvincing manner. A series of party organizations in the cities of Chişinău [and] Bălţi do not employ an offensive spirit in [their] counterpropaganda, [nor] decisiveness, perseverance [and] intolerance towards nationalist manifestations. Some primary party organizations in the counties of Glodeni, Kotovsk, Kutuzov, Anenii Noi, Râşcani, Soroca, Ungheni, etc., do not take into sufficient account the particularities of the development of the republic and of its historical past, they do not manifest the appropriate perseverance and ability in developing their individual daily educational activity for combating manifestations of nationalism and localism.

The nations and ethnic groups that live in Moldavia are unequally assigned to the leadership cadres of the party, soviet, trade union, komsomol and economic organs of the republic. This is all the consequence of the errors committed in the selection of cadres, of underestimating the political importance of this activity [and] of the XVIth Congress of the Moldavian Communist Party.

A series of municipal and county party committees, of basic party organizations do not take into account sufficiently the fact that, in the recent period, bourgeois and revisionist propaganda has abruptly intensified its actions against our republic. A series of historians, publicists and means of mass information in the Socialist Republic of Romania have aligned themselves with the falsifying calumnies of the bourgeois ideologists.

Romanian citizens visiting the republic likewise contribute to the rebirth of nationalist manifestations and remains. Many of them, educated in the spirit of nationalist and chauvinist calumnies of Romanian bourgeois and revisionist historiography and propaganda, frequently enter into provocative discussions on the margin of the Bessarabian question, on Russo-Romanian and Soviet-Romanian relations, however, a decisive riposte is not always given to their attempts to defame our people and its history.

In the course of the last years, some savants from the scientific institutions of the Academy of Sciences of the Moldavian SSR, of the “V. I. Lenin” State University and of other institutions of higher education in the republic [and] of branch scientific research institutions tolerate nationalist and localist opinions in discussions, reviews and scientific treatises, and in the evaluation of events [and] of thinkers of the past that deviate from the principal of party-mindedness, from clear class positions. In published works there are few new conclusions, generalizations and recommendations that correspond to the requirements of the CPSU XXVIIth Congress and the XVIth [Congress] of the Moldavian Communist Party regarding the improvement of patriotic and international education, the offensive character of counterpropaganda, and the timely unmasking of the falsifiers and distorters of the historic past, of socialist and communist construction.

Serious shortcomings and negligence exists in the institutions of higher education and specialized secondary education, in the professional-technical schools and in the schools of general culture. The party organizations, the leadership of the ministries of higher education and specialized secondary education, of professional state education of the republic do not undertake the necessary measures for intensifying the conceptual orientation of the education process. Part of the professors in the institutions of higher education, of schools, of the students and pupils manifest political myopia [and] national limitation, tolerating verbal expressions of anti-Russian and pro-Romanian opinions. Similar incidents have occurred at the “M. V. Frunze” Agricultural Institute in Chişinău, at “S. Lazo” Polytechnic Institute in Chişinău, at the “A. Russo”

Pedagogical Institute in Bălți, at the Institute of Scientific Planning and Research at the State Planning Committee of the Moldavian SSR, [and] at a series of institutes of the Ministry of Culture of the Moldavian SSR. There have been cases of nationalist manifestation on the part of the Moldavian students and doctoral candidates, who are studying at the institutions of higher education in Moscow, as well as on the part of the Romanians originally from the Transcarpathian regions and Cernăuți in the Ukrainian SSR who work and study in Moldavia.

The manifestations of narrow nationalism and localism are a result of the fact that the youth do not know the history of the region, the problems of the formation of the Moldavian nation and statehood, which speaks to the shortcomings in the teaching of Moldavian history in the schools and in the institutions of higher education in the republic. At the University, at the Agricultural, Polytechnic and Medical Institutes, the above-mentioned course is held without the appropriate counter-propagandistic orientation, [and] without taking into consideration the hostile ideological subversions realized abroad. The lack of specialists, the absence of a unified, methodical system, and the [lack of] effective evaluation of the above-mentioned materials is felt, as is [the lack] of an inter-university history faculty in Moldavia. In addition, the possibilities of studying the Russian language are insufficiently exploited in the familiarization of pupils and students with the spiritual and cultural values of the fraternal peoples.

The preparation of the youth for service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR on the part of the UTCL CC of Moldavia, the Komosomol municipal and country committees, the CC of DOSAAF [Society for the Voluntary Support of the Army, Air Force and Navy] and the Military Commissariat of the Moldavian SSR suffers from an insufficient and declarative [rather than genuine] orientation regarding internationalist and military-patriotic education. Year after year the plans for the selection and admission of the youth in military schools are not fulfilled.

Serious conclusions were not drawn from the critical observations regarding the intensification of internationalist and patriotic education, [and] the necessity of forming immunities to hostile ideology by the Ministry of Culture, State Cinematography, [and] the Moldavian SSR Union of Writers. As a result, in the discourse of some poets and prose-writers at the VIIth Congress of Writers in Moldavia immature [and] marginalized localist judgments predominated, manifesting a total misunderstanding of the ideological tendencies of the works of literature, of their role in the formation of a communist concept among the working people.

Guiding itself principally by financial considerations, the State Cinematography of the Moldavian SSR and its subdivisions continue to present some foreign films with a noxious ideological-artistic content.

There has been no radical restructuring in the activity of the press, television and radio broadcasting through the generalization and dissemination of the experience of party organizations, soviets, and komsomols, etc., in the formation of an internationalist and patriotic consciousness, [and] they do not give the appropriate response to the manifestations of nationalism and localism. The articles, TV and radio broadcasts, and literary works which lack a class approach to the appreciation of the cultural heritage of the Moldavian people stir up legitimate reproaches, [as do] the eulogizing of a philosophy foreign to us of self-forgiving love for those nearby [and] dubious aesthetic tastes.

The above-mentioned circumstances dictate the necessity of a more profound and complex approach to the objectives of patriotic and internationalist education, of the fight against nationalist and localist detritus.

**The Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party
DECIDES:**

- 1) To oblige the municipal and county party committees, the Moldavian trade unions, the UTCL CC of Moldavia, the ministries, the state committees and departments to intensify consequent activity for the education of the working people in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, socialist internationalism, fraternal friendship between the peoples of the USSR, pride for the great achievements of the Soviet people, [and] to conduct an offensive struggle against any manifestations of nationalism or localism. To assure that the orientation, content and high level of these activities be aligned as much as possible with the principal objective—the acceleration of the socio-economic development of the republic, the fuller use of the human factor. To develop by every means the internationalist and patriotic spirit of the competition for the contribution of the republic's working people to the development of the unique complex of the national economy of the country, to increase its role in activating the human factor, in the development of reciprocal collaboration and assistance, in common work. To develop and to strengthen the ties between the work collectives of the Moldavian SSR and the regions of the Ukrainian SSR, of other union republics and countries of the socialist community.
- 2) The municipal and county party committees, the executive committees of the country municipalities, the ministries, the state committees and departments, the basic party organizations must pay special attention to ideological convictions, political maturity, and professional preparation in the resolution of cadre issues. To more actively draw working people of all nationalities and ethnicities that live in our republic into the leadership, to assure their full representation within the party, soviet, trade union, komsomol and economic organs.

Through the use of the means of mass information, the system of Marxist-Leninist education, propaganda through conferences, and oral political agitation, to broadly propagate and to obtain a profound understanding of Marxist-Leninist doctrine in the national question. To demonstrate meaningfully and convincingly the advantages of the socialist order, the radical socio-economic and cultural changes in the years of Soviet power, to demonstrate with concrete examples that the successes in the construction of communism are the result of the reciprocal collaboration and assistance of all the peoples of our country.

To take into account on a permanent basis in political work the relentless subversive actions of foreign anti-Soviet and nationalist centers, of bourgeois and revisionist ideological influence. To demonstrate in a convincing manner the Soviet way of life, to inculcate Soviet people with a high level of political vigilance, the ability to evaluate events and phenomena underway from a clear class position. To animate in every way the counterpropaganda activity among the ranks of the population, to inculcate in the consciousness and behavior of the people intolerance towards the ideology hostile to socialism, towards the bourgeois way of life. To pay greater attention to the internalizing of general Soviet customs and traditions, to fight perseveringly against the appeasing attitude of some communists and komsomol members towards the dissemination of rumors and calumnious anecdotes, to utilize with intelligence individual influence over the specific exponents of nationalist manifestations. To increase the personal responsibility of the CPSU members who work in the ideological sphere for the

state of the internationalist and patriotic education of the working people. To make propaganda and agitation taking into account concrete conditions and particularities, of the development of diverse groups and of the national make-up of the cities, counties, villages and work collectives of the republic. To always take care of ideological work forging the moral well-being of the youth, of their military-patriotic education, of their civic formation. To illustrate widely that the heroes and veterans of war [and] labor, [and] the mentors of the youth, participate in this process.

- 3) The Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences, the Party History Institute of the Moldavian SSR CC, the scientific institutes and the institutions of higher learning must focus the efforts of their savants on the elaboration of current issues that pertain to the internationalist, patriotic and class education of the working people, of raising the ideological-theoretic level of scientific research, assuring the elaboration of some concrete recommendations regarding the acceleration of socio-economic development and the improvement of education work. To profoundly study and to elaborate new forms and methods of raising the efficiency and quality of ideological work, of the formation of a materialist conception among diverse groups of working people, an active approach towards life, to give a principled riposte to the falsifiers of Soviet realities.

The State Planning Committee of the Moldavian SSR, the Academy of Sciences of the Moldavian SSR must examine the issue of creating a new complex sector specialized in Gagauz studies.

The ministries of higher and specialized secondary education, of state professional education of the Moldavian SSR, the party organizations, the leadership of the institutions of higher and specialized secondary education, the trade schools and schools of general culture must direct their attention towards the multilateral improvement of the education process, the consolidation of a conceptual knowledge of the world. To undertake supplementary measures for the improvement of the study of the Russian language in the educational institutions, the increase of its role in the internationalist and patriotic education of the studious youth, taking into consideration the fact that the ability to freely use the Russian language contributes to the continual consolidation of the friendship of peoples. The USSR broadens access to the spiritual values of national and world cultures, the achievements of technical-scientific progress, the consolidation of the defensive capacity of the country. To examine the question of increasing the number of hours for the teaching of Moldavian history in the institutions of higher and specialized secondary education. To intensify quality control over the teaching of social sciences, the socio-economic disciplines and special disciplines. To increase the responsibility of the didactic corps of the institutions of higher education and of the teachers for the efficiency of the international and patriotic education of the studious youth, the inculcation of communist convictions, the ability to evaluate the historic past and contemporary phenomena of the social life of the republic from a class position.

To intensify the activity for the education of students and pupils in the spirit of a strong political culture, intolerant attitude towards nationalist, localist, consumerist, [and] parasitic dispositions, and other detritus from the past; to use more productively in the same activity the force of public opinion, of the didactic and work collectives.

- 4) To oblige the Ministry of Culture of the Moldavian SSR, the State Committee for Cinematography of the Moldavian SSR, the creative unions of the republic to undertake

urgent measures for the liquidation of existing shortcomings in the decisive fight against the lack of ideological principles, and mediocrity in literary-artistic and musical works. For increasing the responsibility and the role of cultural institutions and creative unions, to organize systematically competitions, film festivals, debates dedicated to memorable dates of the life of the country and of the republic, festive-memorial days of the remarkable sons of the Moldavian, Russian, Ukrainian peoples, and of other peoples [in the republic].

- 5) The UTCL CC of Moldavia, the DOSAAF CC of the Moldavian SSR, the Military Commissariat of the Moldavian SSR must heighten attention towards the education of the youth, towards the formation in the youth of communist convictions, of social responsibility, work ethic and social activity, of rational needs and healthy tastes, of a sentiment of civic duty. To improve the study of municipal art, to educate [in them] the disposition to defend the fatherland, [to defend] the achievements of socialism. To strengthen ties with the body of the troops and with the large military units.
- 6) The permanent representation of the Moldavian SSR at the Council of Ministers of the USSR must develop an intense activity regarding the internationalist and patriotic education of the students and doctoral candidates who study in the institutions of higher and specialized secondary education in Moscow, to appreciate justly and on the basis of principle the undesirability of ties with foreigners and with some nationalist demonstrators among the ranks of the students.
- 7) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Moldavian SSR, the Directorate of Foreign Tourism of the Moldavian SSR, the Moldavian Society of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Moldavian SSR must assure a broad propaganda about the achievements of the Moldavian people in the fraternal family of peoples of the USSR; to give a decisive riposte to the revisionist and bourgeois falsifiers of the CPSU's national policies, to the ideological subversions of the class adversary; to utilize more in this aim the actions developed abroad with the participation of the Moldavian SSR, as well as ties along the line of sister cities.
- 8) To rightly consider as very important the intensification of class education among the working people in State TV and Radio Broadcasting, in the State Committee for Publishing Houses, in the State Cinematography of the Moldavian SSR, in ATEM, and in the newspapers and journals of the republic. To profoundly explain for the understanding of everyone the foreign economic policy, social policy, and peace policy of the party, to propagate convincingly the advantages of the socialist way of life. To show clearly that the historic destiny of the Moldavian people is indissolubly tied to the development and consolidation of the Soviet state. To unmask in well-argued fashion the calumnies of the anti-Soviet ideological centers, to give a well-earned riposte to the demagogues and evil-wishers, to heighten political vigilance. In this aim, to use broadly the preparation for the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great October [Revolution], of the 150th anniversary of the joining of Bessarabia to Russia, of the 120th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin.
- 9) To approve the measure regarding the intensification of internationalist and patriotic education of the population of the republic, the fight against those engaged in manifestations of nationalism (See annex).

10) The municipal and county party committees, the Moldavian trade unions, the UTCL CC of Moldavia, the ministries of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, Foreign Affairs, Culture, Education,¹³⁵ State Professional Education, Intourist, State Television and Radio Broadcasting, State Cinematography, the State Committee for Publishing Houses of the Moldavian SSR, ATEM, the Moldavian Society for Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, the Central Committee of DOSAAF in the republic, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Moldavian SSR, the KGB, the MAI [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of the Moldavian SSR, the republican newspapers and journals, the Academy of Sciences of the Moldavian SSR, the Party History Institute of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the republic Society *Science*, the creative unions of the Moldavian SSR must inform the Moldavian Communist Party CC about the implementation progress of the present decisions by 1 September 1987 and 1989.

II. To task the Moldavian Communist Party CC Sections for Science and Educational Institutions, for Culture and for Relations with Foreign Countries with the task of supervising the implementation of the present decisions.

MCP CC Secretary, V. Smirnov (signature)

¹³⁵ In the Soviet system, separate ministries for higher and specialized secondary education for state professional education coexisted with a ministry for education. The more specific ministries used a term that can be translated as either education or instruction - *învățământ*, while the ministry of education used the more limited *educația*. In this series of documents the ministry of education properly-speaking is not generally cited and the translator has opted to use education for both *învățământul* and *educația*.

Document No. 25
Top Secret Annex, Transcript No. 14, § 3

[Source: AOSPRM, fond. 51, inv. 64, dosar 489, filele 24-31; Document No. 100 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 300-306. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

Measures Regarding the Intensification of Patriotic and Internationalist Education of the Population of the Republic, the Fight against Manifestations of Nationalism

- 1) To examine basic party organizations, trade unions, and komsomol organizations the measures regarding the intensification of the patriotic and internationalist education of the population, the formation of class intransigence towards hostile ideology and the fight against manifestations of nationalism.

1986

Moldavian Communist Party CC Sections for Party Organizational Work, Propaganda and Agitation, Science and Educational Institutions, and Culture, the municipal and county party committees, the Moldovan UTCL CC.

- 2) To hold municipal and county seminars of the Basic Party Organizational secretaries and their deputies for ideological work on the theme: "About the forms and methods of party organizational work for patriotic and internationalist education of the working people, the fight against bourgeois ideology and manifestations of nationalism."

1986

Ideological Sections of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, municipal and county party committees.

- 3) To foresee in programs and assure the profound study, in the system of political and economic education, of some courses and themes consecrated to patriotic and internationalist education of the working people, the fight against bourgeois and revisionist ideology.

1986

Propaganda and Agitation Section of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, municipal and county party committees.

- 4) To study the activity of the county party committees in Căușeni, Leova [and] Călărăși regarding the patriotic, internationalist, and atheistic education of the population, the intensification of counterpropaganda work. To publish materials in the Moldavian Communist Party CC Informational Bulletin.

1986

Moldavian Communist Party CC Section for Propaganda and Agitation, Moldavian Communist Party CC Ideology Commission.

- 5) To study the activity of the international friendship clubs of the institutions of higher education, the institutions of specialized medium education, [and] the schools of professional education. To propagate the experience of the best of them through the intermediary of the press, radio and television.

1987

Section of the Moldavian Communist Party, the CC of the UTCL of Moldavia, the municipal and county party committees.

- 6) As a sign of the centuries-long indestructible friendship between the Russian and Moldavian peoples, of the triumph of Leninist nationalities policies, to mark the 150 year jubilee of the liberation of the Moldavian people from under the Ottoman yoke and the joining of Bessarabia to Russia as a great political event.

In this aim:

- To organize a republic scientific session, a united plenum of the unions and creative organizations, a republic cultural day at VDNKh [the Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy] in the USSR.

1987

MSSR Council of Ministers, the Sections of Science and Educational Institutions, Propaganda and Agitation, [and] Culture of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the MSSR AS [Academy of Sciences], the Party History Institute at the MSSR Ministry of Culture, the trade unions and creative organizations.

- To organize in the work collectives and in the places where the population lives conversations, lectures, speeches, thematic evenings, scientific conferences and readings, the presentation of cinematic films and television films. To prepare materials on the theme *The Year 1812—An Important Stage in the Destiny of the Moldavian People* in aid of the political speakers [and] of the party committee lecturers.

1986-1987

Sections of Propaganda and Agitation, [and] Culture of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the MSSR State Cinematography, MSSR State Television and Radio [Telradio], Directorate of the Republican [publishing] Society *Science*.

- To raise a monument in the center of Cantemir county consecrated to the centuries-long friendship between the Moldavian people and the great Russian and Ukrainian people and other peoples of our fatherland.

1987

Sections of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the MSSR Council of Ministers, the MSSR Ministry of Culture, the county party committee of Cantemir.

- 7) To study and to propose for examination in the Moldavian Communist Party CC the issues:

- a. About the activity of the Drochia county party committee regarding the continual intensification of youth military-patriotic education, the formation of their decisiveness for defending the socialist fatherland;

1986

Sections of Administrative Organs, Propaganda and Agitation of the Moldavian Communist Party CC.

- b. About the informational-propagandistic and counter-propagandistic activity of the MSSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the Moldavian Societies of Friendship and

Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries in light of the requirements of the CPSU XXVIInd Congress;

1987

Section of Information and Ties with Foreign Countries of the Moldavian Communist Party CC.

- c. About the activity of Ungheni county committee of the Moldavian Communist Party regarding increasing of vigilance and political intransigence towards hostile ideology;

1988

Section of Propaganda and Agitation of the Moldavian Communist Party CC.

- d. About the state of implementation of the decisions of the Moldavian Communist Party CC “With Regard to the continual development of social-political and work activities of the ethnic Gagauz and Bulgarian populations that live on the territory of the Moldavian SSR” in Comrat, Ceadar-Lungu, [and] Vulcănești counties. To publish the material in the Moldavian Communist Party CC Informational Bulletin.

1986

Sections for Propaganda and Agitation of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, [and the Sections for] Science and Education Institutions, [and] Culture of the Moldavian Communist Party CC.

- e. About the situation and measures regarding the development of foreign tourism in the Moldavian SSR.

1989

Section for Information and Foreign Ties of the Moldavian Communist Party CC.

- f. About the status of the realization of the plan of friendship ties between the Moldavian SSR and the Plovdiv region in the BPR [Bulgarian People’s Republic], the frontier counties [*raions*] of the Moldavian SSR and the frontier counties [*județi*] of the SRR and the increase in their efficiency in the patriotic and internationalist education of the population;

1990

Ideological Sections of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the Ideology Commission of the Moldavian Communist Party CC.

- 8) To organize republic scientific-theoretical conferences consecrated to the jubilees of: 70 years of the Great Socialist Revolution of October, 170 years since the birth of K. Marx, 170 years since the birth of F. Engels, 120 years since the birth of V. I. Lenin, 70 years of the installation of Soviet power in Moldavia, in the framework of which to pay special attention to the national policies of the CPSU, [and to] the consolidation of friendship and brotherhood between the peoples of the USSR, [and of] the community of socialist countries.

1987-1990

Ideological Sections of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the MSSR AS [Academy of Sciences], the MSSR Ministry of Public Education, the

Party History Institute at the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the Directorate of the Republic Society *Science*.

- 9) To organize a mass socialist competition for the fulfillment before the term of the plans for two years of the Five Year Plan by the anniversary of the 70th anniversary of the Great Socialist Revolution in October and for the XIIth Five Year Plan in general—by the 120th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin, for the increase of the contribution of Moldavian SSR working people to the development of the unique complex of the national economy of the Union of SSR.

1986-1990

Sections of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the soviet trade unions of Moldavia, the UTCL CC of Moldavia, the municipal and county party committees.

- 10) To undertake efficient measures for the broad utilization of the didactic-educational process in the scope of intensifying patriotic and international work, especially in the teaching of institutions of higher education, institutions of specialized medium education, schools of professional education and schools of a social [science] discipline on the principal theses of Marxist-Leninist doctrine referring to nations, [and] the contemporary achievements of the Leninist national policies of the CPSU. To demonstrate, with examples and concrete facts, in an accessible and convincing manner, the achievements of the Moldavian people in the fraternal family of the USSR peoples.

1986-1990

Sections for Science and Educational Institutions of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the Ministry of State Professional Education of the Moldavian SSR.

- 11) In the framework of Union-wide student competitions regarding works in the social sciences, the history of the M[oldavian] UTCL and the international youth movement, of creative works of pupils in specialty middle-level education schools regarding social-political themes, the Sections of the "Future" Student Scientific Societies of the republic, the primordial study of the issues connected with the formation of proletarian and socialist internationalism, Soviet patriotism, of the triumph of the CPSU's Leninist national policies, the indestructible friendship between all of the USSR peoples.

1986-1990

Section for Science and Educational Institutions of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the Ministry of Public Education, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of State Professional Education of the Moldavian SSR, the UTCL CC of Moldavia.

- 12) To organize a republic seminar of educators from the social [science] and history of Moldavia disciplines from the institutions of higher education of the republic on the issues tied to the international and patriotic education, the unmasking of bourgeois and revisionist falsifiers of the Marxist-Leninist nationalities theory, the triumph of Leninist national policies in the USSR and in the fraternal countries of socialism.

1986

Section for Science and Educational Institutions of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the Moldavian SSR Ministry of Public Education.

- 13) To obtain by all means an increase in the role of the Russian language as the language of interethnic communication, as an important means of consolidating the international unity of the Soviet people. To organize in a regular manner scientific-practical conferences on “The Russian Language—A Language of Friendship and Collaboration,” Olympiads, composition contests, celebrations of Russian literature and art. To pay special attention to the improvement of activities for inculcating military [conscript] and pre-military youth with the Russian language.

Permanent

Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Public Education, the Ministry of State Professional Education of the Moldavian SSR.

- 14) To organize a competition for the best work of literature and art on a patriotic and international theme. To complete the competition by the 70th anniversary of the Great October.

1987

Cultural Section of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the unions of Writers, Artists, Composers, and Journalists of the Moldavian SSR.

- 15) To prepare and publish a series of fundamental works on *The History of the Moldavian SSR* (in six volumes), *The Historical Importance of the Joining of Bessarabia and Left Bank of Transnistria to Russia*, *The Cultural Interaction of the Soviet Nations and Peoples in the Period of Socialism*, *The CPSU Program for Perfecting Socialist Social Relations*, *Proletarian [and] Socialist Internationalism and the Struggle of Ideas*.

1986-1990

Sections of Science and Educational Institutions, Propaganda and Agitation of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, MSSR AS, State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printers and Commerce with Books of the MSSR.

- 16) In the aim of continually activating actions for increasing the political-educative potential of the family in the patriotic and international education of the children, to organize at enterprises, organizations, institutions, and at the home cycles of lectures on “Powerful Family, Powerful State,” “We are Patriots, Internationalists,” “The Preparation of the Young Generations for Socially-Useful Work, Defense of the Fatherland—The Constitutional Obligation of the Soviet Family.”

1996-1998

Sections of Propaganda and Agitation, of Science and Educational Institutions, of Culture of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the municipal and county party committees, the Directorate of the Republic Society “Science.”

- 17) The editors-in-chief of the republic, municipal and county newspapers, MSSR State Teleradio, the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printers, and Book Commerce of the MSSR, the MSSR State Cinematography, ATEM must elaborate plans for the preparation by the 70th anniversary of the Great Socialist Revolution of October and the anniversary of 120 years since the birth of V. I. Lenin, foreseeing in them the profound and multilateral treatment of the struggle of working people of the republic for the fulfillment before term of the plans and socialist obligations of the XIIth Five Year Plan [of the USSR], the development by every means of an international and patriotic spirit of

competition, a broader reflection of the role of multinational collective work in the consolidation of friendship between peoples, the affirmation of the Soviet way of life.

To increase the role of the means of mass information and of propaganda in hardening the class of the working people, in the military-patriotic education of the youth, in the unmasking of calumnious confabulations by anti-Soviet ideological centers. To undertake measures for improving the quality and efficacy of publications and broadcasts that appear under the rubric "Two Worlds—Two Ways of Life," "The Way of Life—The Soviet Way," "On the Fronts of the Ideological Struggle," "Zionism—Theory and Practice," "Arguments and Facts," "On the Bugeac Wavelength," etc.

Permanent

Sections of Propaganda and Agitation, [and of] Culture of the Moldavian Communist Party, MSSR State Tele-radio, the MSSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printers and Book Commerce, the MSSR State Cinematography, ATEM, the editorial boards of the newspapers and journals.

- 18) The State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printers and Book Commerce must expand the publication of original and translated works which reflect the friendship between the Moldavian, Russian, Ukrainian peoples and of other peoples of the USSR, as well as between the socialist countries, which propagate the multinational literature and culture of our countries. To edit a series of collections about the experience of patriotic and internationalist education. To increase the publication of books, monographs that unmask the tools of bourgeois propaganda, its attempts to falsify the past and present of the Moldavian people, [and] its achievements within the fraternal family of USSR peoples.

1986-1990

Sections of Propaganda and Agitation, of Science and Educational Institutions of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printers and Book Commerce.

- 19) In the aim of intensifying the educational work among the ranks of the Jewish population, to invite for a tour in the republic the Dramatic Theatre "C.S. Stanislavski" from Moscow with the show *Sholom Aleihem St., No. 40*, by A. Stavitski.

Cultural Section of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the Ministry of Culture of the Moldavian SSR.

- 20) To study the status of the fulfillment of the decisions of the Moldavian Communist Party CC "About the activity of the Soroca county party committee regarding the improvement of the moral climate, the affirmation of norms of communist morality, the education of social discipline in the ranks of the working people in the city of Soroca in light of the decisions of the CPSU XXVIIth Congress" in Ocnîța and Edineț counties. To prepare Information [reports].

1986

Sections of Propaganda and Agitation, of Science and Educational Institutions, of Administrative Organs of the Moldavian Communist Party CC.

- 21) To develop sociological research on questions connected with life, work and leisure of the persons of Gypsy ethnicity in the counties of Soroca, Ocnîța, Edineț. To elaborate

recommendations for the improvement of the moral climate, the affirmation of the norms of communist morality.

1987

Sections of Science and Educational Institutions, Propaganda and Agitation [and] Culture of the Moldavian Communist Party CC, the AS of the Moldavian SSR.

- 22) To study the activity of the Ministry of Education, Internal Affairs, and Prosecutor of the Moldavian SSR regarding the schooling of the children, identifying and making responsible the persons of Gypsy ethnicity for avoiding socially-useful work and incorporation into active service in the ranks of the Soviet army, speculation, vagabondage. To prepare proposals.

1987

Sections for Administrative Organs, Science and Educational Institutions, Propaganda and Agitation of the Moldavian Communist Party CC.

In conformity with the original (signature)

Document No. 26

Secret, KGB of the Moldavian SSR, 24 July 1987 [Chişinău]

*[Source: Arhiva Serviciului de Informații și Securitate din Republica Moldova
[Archive of the Intelligence and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova]
(ASISRM), inventory 7502, dosar 6, filele 76-80; Document No. 101 in Elena Negru and
Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul
programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului
totalitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6
(2010), pp. 307-310. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]*

**Decision
of the Moldavian SSR KGB Collegium, On the Implementation Status by KGB MSSR
Section 5
of the USSR KGB Collegium Decisions of 26 June 1986 "With Regard to the Participation
of
the State Security Services in the Fulfillment of the Directives of the XXVIIth CPSU
Congress
on the Intensification of Ideological-Educational Work."**

Hearing and examining the report of Cde. P. T. Tabuika, chief of Section 5, on the issues as well as about the tasks that result from the Decision of the Bureau of the MCP CC of 23 June 1987, "On the Measures for raising political vigilance, strengthening the protection of objectives of the Soviet party organs and of other enterprises and organizations with a special regime," the collegium notes that, guiding itself by the requirements of the above-mentioned decisions of the KGB Collegium USSR, and by the theses of the Decision of the CC of the Communist Party of the republic of 23 August 1986 for the intensification of patriotic and international education of the population [and] the fight against manifestations of nationalism, the leadership and operational personnel established and implemented practical measures oriented towards the more active participation in ideological-educational work along all lines of counterespionage activity.

The immediate efforts were oriented towards the identification of the tendencies of subversive centers and anti-Soviet organizations that act against the republic, towards a more profound study of the operational situation. Measures were undertaken directed towards the consolidation of operations, improving their quality, deepening the work for operational evidence and signals, which permitted the obtaining of supplemental intelligence about negative processes [and] the hostile activity of some persons, to eliminate the premises for the creation of some unfavorable situations, [and] to find efficient forms for influencing their formation.

The section develops more actively, in collaboration with of KGB subdivisions and municipal and county organs, counter-propagandistic and general prophylactic work, [and] some new forms of this work have been consolidated. The party organs were more operationally informed about the negative processes, about hostile and anti-social manifestations, [and] about their causes.

These measures permitted [the KGB] to bar the creation in the republic of stable groups with a hostile orientation, extremist activities among persons of Jewish and German ethnicity

disposed to emigrate to be neutralized, [and] a series of illegal sect communities to be brought within the law.

At the same time, the collegium notes that the section has not yet utilized all possibilities for the intensification of ideological-educational work in the aim of actively counteracting the subversive actions of the special services and ideological centers of the adversary, [and] ending the negative activities of some persons on the territory of the republic. This work did not show enough aggressiveness, foresight, [or] orientation towards subversive centers and specific foreign anti-Soviet organizations, which frequently permitted them to implement their plans regarding the inspiration of nationalist manifestations [and] hostile pro-Zionism.

The restructuring of work with the apparatus of secret agents advances unevenly. Imperfections in assignment, weak specialization of agents of influence, the lack of sources from the ranks of the leaders and activists in informal groups does not yet ensure certain operational control and the timely procurement of intelligence that permits concentrated influence over negative processes and phenomena. Cases of delayed and low-quality documentation of the hostile actions of objects in the dossiers of operational evidence and signals (communications) are occurring, which permits them to exercise a negative influence over their medium for a prolonged period, thus contributing to the formation of some basically hostile conceptions among some politically immature persons.

In the prophylactic work of prevention, educationally, the operational personnel of the section do not always actively support itself on the force of influence of the work collective, on public opinion. The practice of studying its efficacy and of ensuring [that it is carried out] propagandistically must be improved. There are still insufficient efforts made for unmasking and publicly compromising anti-social and politically immature elements, which try to act as a parasite on transparency and democratization, starting on the road of extremism and political demagoguery.

The Collegium Has DECIDED:

The leadership and operational personnel of Section 5 must take energetic supplementary measures, ensuring the full and obligatory implementation of the conditions of KGB USSR Order no. 0365-1986. On the basis of profound analysis of the positive experience accumulated, the state of work in the ideological-political education of the working people aiming at preventing the subversive activities of the foreign adversary and of hostile elements in the interior of the republic is multilaterally and critically understood. To this end, the leadership of the section, guiding itself on the decisions of the CPSU CC Plenum of January (1987), must pay special attention to the inculcating of personnel with the knowledge of how to undertake creative work in the new conditions, [how] to evaluate from class positions the events of the historical past and the events of contemporary social life, to improve its Marxist-Leninist preparation, to form a strong professional culture, political culture and legal culture.

- 1) To subordinate the efforts of the leadership and operational personnel of Section 5 in carrying out operational ideological-educational work and [managing] operational agents in conformity with the situation of transparency and democratization that is on the way to being affirmed. The immediate measures must be oriented towards the continual qualitative improvement of the repatriation [assignment] of secret agents and persons of trust, towards assuring reliable surveillance of the evolution of the operational situation, [and] the more profound study of the persons with dossiers of operational evidence and

signals, considering this activity as a basis for the successful organization of prophylactic and preventive measures, an efficient prevention of the subversive actions of the adversary.

- 2) To launch the study of those who develop subversive activities against the republic of the presenters from the Romanian Section of Radio "Free Europe," the "Dragan" Institute, the Union of Jewish Women of Canada, the "Slav Mission," NTS [National Alliance of Russian Solidarists] section in London, as well as the propagandistic and religious centers of Objective 24, with the aim, using the modified entry and exit regime of the USSR, together with Sections 1, 2, 4 [and] 6, to make a supplementary evaluation on the possibility of using the existing agent networks to be sent abroad and to identify the emissaries of the above-mentioned centers on the territory of the republic.
- 3) Conducting itself according to the directives of the USSR KGB regarding the practical implementation of the decision of the CPSU CC Plenum of June (1987), the leadership and operational personnel of Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, [and] 6 of the municipal and county sections must seek with perseverance reserves and possibilities for increasing the efficiency of the work of guarding Soviet citizens from the hostile actions of the adversary, the prevention of recidivism on the part of persons who have served penal sentences for state crimes and against whom the KGB organs have applied prophylactic measures, to isolate them in timely fashion from politically immature persons in order to avoid contact with them. To not permit the reorientation of the activities of informal associations that appear towards positions that are harmful from a political perspective. To consider as an important task the timely and accurate informing of the party organs about the processes that are produced and upon which their instigators can imprint a hostile tendency.

To base ideological-educational work more on the work collective, to assure the consolidation of business relations with the administration, community organizations, commissions and groups of enterprises and institutions. Informing them about the situation created, on the basis of certain, verified materials, in order to draw them into more active participation in the actions for preventing state crimes, the premises for exceptional cases, the leaking of state secrets, as well as for the localization of negative process and conflict situations, the public unmasking of their instigators in order for the efforts of nationalist [and] pro-Zionist elements, of sect authorities, of political demagogues who try to use democracy and transparency for inciting dissatisfaction, [and] the attainment of their own ends should meet with an active public counteraction.

To broach more seriously the issue of workers trained in the development of prophylactic actions, entrusting them to experienced, well-prepared collaborators. To increase the organizing role of Section 5 in the implementation of ideological-educational work carried out in the municipal and county organs of the republic KGB.

- 4) The operational subunits of the [KGB] and of the municipal and county organs must launch general prophylactic and counterpropaganda work that exposes the subversive activity of the adversary in the current stage. To diversify their forms and methods, to enrich them with a new content, to increase the responsibility and role of the leadership

personnel in its organization and qualitative implementation. To clarify, within the month, the plans of this activity and the graphics of taking some concrete measures, with the help of the graphics and persons of trust from among the ranks of people of science, culture and art, through the intermediary of the means of mass information, to unmask and to decisively compromise the instigators and participants in hostile and noxious manifestations from the political point of view, to provide propagandistic coverage for the operational and prophylactic actions undertaken. To carry out the actions undertaken in such a way as to be understood by working people and be supported by them.

To draw special attention to the intensification of general prophylactic and counterpropaganda work in preparation by the anniversary of the 70th Great Socialist Revolution of October and the 70th anniversary of the CEU-KGB.

- 5) All subunits of the central apparatus of the MSSR KGB and of the municipal and county organs must adopt for immediate implementation the Decision of the Bureau of the Moldavian Communist Party CC of 23 June 1987 “About the Measures regarding political vigilance, the intensification of the safeguarding of the objectives of the Soviet party organs, of other enterprises and organizations with a special regime,” coordinating its requirements with the problems that are resolved along every line [of KGB work], and every sector.

Section 5, the municipal and county organs must launch the search for the authors and executors of anonymous documents, especially those containing threats against the Soviet party *Activ*, the identification of psychological ill persons who hatch impossible and extremist plans, to assure permanent and reliable operational control over their behavior. Sections 3, 5, the municipal and county apparatus will be analyzing the situation in places where armaments, and explosive and toxic substances are kept, and the ranks of personnel who have contact with them. To realize supplementary measures in order to assure the discovery of the intentions of hostile elements, of gaining control of them. Jointly with the MSSR MAI [Ministry of Internal Affairs], to activate the work for discovering lost and withdrawn armament, to expose abuses in the regulations for its preservation in organizations and institutions, to eliminate them without delay through the intermediary of official personalities. To give the perpetrators an appropriate political evaluation, to give publicity to it, [and] to take measures of public influence against those guilty.

To task Cde. D. H. Munteanu, the deputy President of the MSSR KGB for Inspection, with the control of the execution of the decisions of the collegium. The leaders of the KGB subunits and of the municipal and county organs should examine the decisions of the collegium collectively, tracing together with the party organizations the ways of a more active participation in ideological-educational work, the raising of political vigilance. To report on the implementation of the decisions of the collegiums to the chief of Section 5 when the annual report is made for 1987. In 1988, to study the situation of this work in Group I of Section 5, in Group I of Section 6, in the municipal and county organs of Bălți and Cahul with following hearings with the leadership of the [KGB] Committee.

President of the KGB of the Moldavian SSR, General-Lieutenant, G. M. Volkov (signature)

Document No. 27

Secret, Collegium KGB Moldavian SSR, 28 November 1989 [Chişinău]

[Source: ASISRM, inventory 8169, dosar 6, filele 157-161; Document No. 106 in Elena Negru and Gheorghe Negru, "PCM și Naționalism (1965-1989): Documente adunate în cadrul programului de cercetări efectuate de către Comisia pentru studierea și aprecierea regimului tolitar communist din Republica Moldova," special edition, Destin românesc, vol. 16, no. 5-6 (2010), pp. 328-332. Translated for CWIHP by Larry L. Watts.]

Decision

About the measures regarding the decision of the KGB Collegium of the USSR of 5 September 1989 "About the Tasks of the State Security Services of the USSR Regarding the Defense of the Soviet Constitutional Regime"

Examining the respective questions, the collegium notes that the Committee for State Security of Moldavia develops its activity under conditions of an abruptly more acute operational situation in the republic. Heightened social tensions, confrontations in the domain of interethnic relations, and attempts to form parallel political authority have been noted. An important role in this process is being played by the extremist wing of the Popular Front of Moldova, which systematically provokes mass disorder, anti-social actions, [and] disobedience towards authorities. A considerable destabilizing action is exercised by the extremist elements of the "Edinstvo" [Unity] associations, "The Union of Working People of Moldavia," and "Gagauz-halki." The movements among the ranks of the Gagauz for the creation of autonomy, the organization of political strikes by the Russophone population of Transnistria have deepened the process of delimiting national terrain. Anti-social elements have been activated, nationalist, chauvinist manifestations have been incited, [as has] the abuse of the rights of citizens on this basis. The number of threats addressed to the Soviet party active has risen considerably, the interest of some persons for the purchasing and fabrication of weapons has increased.

On the basis of the processes taking place in the republic, the reorientation of the aspirations of the special services of the adversary, principally the USA, FRG, Israel, [and] the special organs of Objective 24, as well as other foreign subversive centers tied to them for obtaining information of a political nature, has been noted. Using the legal modifications in the domain of international relations, the open character of our society, their representatives seek, from the artificially exaggerated positions on the Bessarabian and Jewish questions, as well as under the mask of religion, to bring political prejudice, to create a network of informers, a basis for the realization of some anti-constitutional and other hostile actions, to transfer them onto the territory of Moldavia.

The timely organizational and practical measures taken by the republic [KGB] regarding the restructuring of operational activities, their harmonization with the political and operational situation have permitted it, generally, to assure control over this evolution. The Soviet party organs of the USSR KGB were informed in a timely and professional manner.

However, the aggravation of the situation, the modifications in the tactics of the adversary, the transfer from the concept of fighting against ideological subversion to the concept of defending the Soviet constitutional regime imposes the adoption of some organizational [and] operational measures [related to] agent networks, and other measures of more efficient security,

of some new approaches of principle in evaluating current phenomena, some new forms and methods of prevention actions of an anti-socialist nature.

Taking the above into account, [and] coming under the implementation requirements of KGB USSR order no. 0640 of 17 October 1989.

The Collegium has DECIDED:

- 1) To create Section “3” within the framework of the KGB of the Moldavian SSR, dissolving Section 5. To subordinate to the efforts of the collegium, of the leadership personnel, with the support of the party organizations, affirmations to the personnel of some conscientious understandings of the fact that the formation of new subunits constitutes the result of the practical restructuring of the organs of state security, affirmations of a contemporary conception of the fight against the subversive intelligence activities of the adversary.

To provide a principled basis for the activity concerning the defense of the Soviet constitutional regime. Accordingly, the service obligations of leadership and operational personnel of Section “3” are to be elaborated by 1 January 1990. Likewise, the necessary correctives in conformity with the new tasks in the service obligations of the workers in Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, [and] 6 and of the municipal organs will be introduced.

The inspectorates, together with the operational subunits must elaborate by the first trimester of 1990, proposals for the continual improvement of the interaction and coordination of activities for the fight against the actions of adversarial special services and of the foreign anti-Soviet centers used by them. To complete, by the same term, with organizational and operational measures the lineal plans of the general committees for the fight against the special services of the USA, FRG, Israel (“Kedr” [Cedar], “Vektor” [Vector], “Foton” [Photon]) and against the special organs of Objective 24 (“Zaslon” [Cover]).

- 2) The leadership and operational personnel of Section I and of Section “3” must be established by 1 March 1990, in the aim of renewing the fight against the adversary, the subversive centers of the USA, FRG, Israel, of other Western countries, as well as the propagandistic organs of Objective 24, which have the republic in their sights. To elaborate measures oriented towards the exposure of their interests in the social-political processes of the republic, towards the prevention and curbing of actions against the Soviet constitutional regime.

The [KGB] subunits and the municipal and county organs, given the organizational role of Section 2, will be taking more energetic measures to identify in the channels of foreign tourism, technical-scientific relations and cultural exchanges, and individual entrances, the emissaries and missionaries of anti-Soviet centers and organizations [in order] to paralyze their political intelligence collection operations, to obstruct destabilizing operations, first of all, in the domain of international relations.

Section “3” and the municipal and county organizations must undertake more active work regarding the prevention of attempts by foreign clerical centers to push foreign sect formations onto the path of confrontation with the authorities, of inculcating in them an anti-socialist state of mind on the basis of clericalism. To differentiate these actions without error from the aspirations of the faithful for satisfying their religious needs. To neutralize the aims of the Patriarchy of Objective 24 of influencing the clerics in a pro-Romanian nationalist spirit.

- 3) Section "3" and the intelligence analysis section must undertake, at a new [higher] qualitative level, the analysis of operational intelligence regarding the plans [and] intentions of the nationalist leaders and community formations, about the tendency of the adversary to make contact with them in the aim of achieving over time the intensification of social tensions, to forecast possible extremist manifestations on an anti-socialist basis. To operationally and qualitatively inform Soviet [central KGB] and party organs on these issues, to elaborate proposals on the perfecting of the activities of the [KGB] subunits and of the municipal and country [KGB] organs regarding the defense of the constitutional regime.

To concentrate the efforts of the leadership and operational personnel on the penetration of peripheral processes, which are occurring in the Popular Front, Union of Working People of Moldova, "Gagauz-halki," [and] "Unity" [Edinstvo] movements, [and] in the informal groups that are appearing once again. To assure clandestine influence over leaders with nationalist, chauvinist mentalities, over the secret instigators and organizers of extremist actions, the interception of organizational channels with fellow-travelers from other regions of the country and from abroad.

Sections 3, 4, 6 and the municipal and county organs must identify and energetically strangle the emissary activity of activists of the above-mentioned associations regarding the exacerbation of national discord, of anti-socialist dispositions in the work collective, of the provocation of political strikes [and] anti-social actions.

To more energetically apply towards hostilely-disposed elements measures conforming to the new Laws on State Crimes. The Section for Penal Investigation must review categorically its attitude towards its participation in the work of the units for operational evidence files, in the documentation of illegal actions by some physical persons, especially during the stage of their preparation.

- 4) The operational subunits of the [KGB] must, in their activity with foreign agents, within the framework of the development of some active measures and of manipulating foreigners, should give increased attention to the identification of the persons implicated in the organization of international terrorism, to intentions to transfer their activity to the territory of the republic, to their contact with elements with extremist dispositions. The [KGB] organs of Leuseni, Kotovsk, [and] Cantemir counties will be raising the efficiency of measures regarding the search for means of terror and other subversive actions at the points of entry into the MSSR.

To react more operationally to signals regarding the threats of physical retribution for nationalist and chauvinistic motives, the acquisition and keeping of arms, [and] toxic substances. To study in detail, during the course of their verifications, the motives and aims of the above-mentioned illegal actions. To correlate the measures from the framework of the fight with organized crime with the identification of the attempts of criminal groups to exit abroad, in order to enter into contact with extremist elements with the aim of intensifying the atmosphere in social and national spheres.

- 5) The leadership personnel of the KGB, taking into account accumulated experience, must obtain a qualitative change in counterpropaganda and in prophylactic and preventive activity in the solution of the problems pertaining to the defense of the Soviet constitutional regime. To assure, in the same order of ideas, the preparation of each operational collaborator. To bring their content in conformity with the contemporary

evolution of the operational situation under the new legislation, with the directives of the CPSU CC and the MCP CC. To support itself more on the work collective, on the healthy forces of society, on well-known men of science, of culture, of art, to organize constructive relations with the people's deputies, to actively draw into the prophylactic measures the atmosphere of the collective, as well as that of the citizens and groups of persons whose activities could take on an unconstitutional character.

Entering into the implementation of the requirements of the decision of the USSR KGB Collegium "About the development of transparency in the activity of the USSR KGB organs and troops," to raise through the means of mass information the level of propagandistically assuring operational measures regarding the discovery of the actions of the special services of the adversary, of the foreign subversive centers and of the anti-socialist elements oriented towards the undermining of the foundations of the Soviet regime.

To more broadly explain to society the role and importance of the KGB organs in contemporary conditions, to use more energetically the means of information in order to compromise before public opinion the organizers, instigators, and specific active participants in anti-constitutional actions. To do this in such a manner that the measures undertaken will be understood by the working people and supported by them.

- 6) The inspectorates must systematically study the practical work of Section "3," and of the other KGB subunits and municipal and county KGB organs in the domain of the defense of the constitutional regime, to make proposals regarding its improvement. The Section cadre will study, in the first half of 1990, the efficiency of the repatriation/assignment of the cadres of Section "3," [and] establish measures to improve their completion in the future. To take into more serious consideration the professional, cultural and political preparation of candidates, their aptitude for the work in the proposed sector.

The methodological-didactic commission must foresee for the leadership and operational personnel of the KGB, the lessons regarding the issues tied to the organization of work in the respective directorate, the Section of Investigation will give legal assistance.

To hold hearings in the framework of the KGB leadership in September 1990 on the progress of the formation of Section "3" from its chief, and from the chiefs of municipal and country KGB organs from Bender and Orhei within the framework of the work group.

- 7) To task with the control of implementation of the present decision of the collegium Cdes. D. M. Muntean, I. F. Pogonia, [and] A. I. Maloman, deputies to the President of the MSSR KGB, in conformity with their service obligations and the Inspectorate.

President of the KGB of the Moldavian SSR, Gh. Lavranciuc (signature)

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